X-Message-Number: 11056 Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1999 07:26:26 -0800 From: "Joseph J. Strout" <> Subject: Re: CryoNet #11048 - #11054 In 11050, wrote: >If it indeed becomes possible to download and upload your soul(all the >information, memories & experiences in your brain) it will not be you, just a >copy of you. This is meaningless unless you have a theory of personal identity that explains why a copy is not the very same person as the original. And that theory should also explain why you are the same person from day to day, or after hypothermic surgery, etc., yet you are no the same person as your identical twin. If it's a really good theory, it will also explain why, in some cases, we say things like "she's just not the same person since the accident" and such. Without such a theory, you're just basing your assumption that a duplicate is not the same person as the original on your intuition. But intuition is based on experience, and we have NO experience with personal duplication whatsoever, so intuition here is pretty much worthless. I have a theory of personal identity which is simple, logically consistent, and fits with all of the above. And it concludes that a copy *IS* the same person as the original; that "copy" and "original" are just meaningless labels we use to keep track of instances, not identities. >Suppose we could download >your "soul" and upload it into a cloned version of you. Now suppose we did >that while you were still alive. Will your consciousness exist in two >separate bodies? There will be two consciousnesses, both you, of course. There is no problem with this, except that it strikes us as very odd, because in all the history of the world, it has never happened (yet). Best regards, -- Joe ,------------------------------------------------------------------. | Joseph J. Strout developer: MacOS, Unix, 3D, AI | | http://www.strout.net | `------------------------------------------------------------------' Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=11056