X-Message-Number: 11154
From: 
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1999 12:54:08 EST
Subject: attempted clarifications

Thomas Donaldson (#11145) writes:  

>Second, I note in Bob's discussion that the cases he discusses always
involve creation of a SECOND version of you (or a person). There is an
essential problem with creation of a second version: it is almost by
definition impossible to make the experiences of that second version match
those of you. Even a different location means that it must be a different
creature, ….  

I think the last sentence is probably correct, but it is arguable, on the
basis of "fuzzy" identification, among other things.  

>I do not know just what opinion Bob has on what might happen if creation
of this second version took place after destruction of you, the first
version. That question seems to me to be essential to this discussion. In
those terms, we are also talking about something much closer to the case
of revival from cryonic suspension. For what it's worth, I'd say that even
a non-identical version, if close enough (just how close it needs to be we
will someday find out by actual experiment!) would qualify as the same
kind of continuation of you as, say, the person who comes out of hospital
after recovery from a head injury.  

>And it's very important here that the original you no longer exist.
Merely by existing, that original creates a situation in which the
duplicate quickly ceases to be a duplicate, and takes its own path to its
own existence.  

This seems confused to me. A continuer, just as much as a "duplicate" at
another location, would quickly diverge, and indeed you quickly diverge
from your previous selves from moment to moment in the ordinary course of
life. Further, your continuer (say after cryostasis and revival) WILL be
at a different location. Not only is the earth moving, but you will not be
revived at the same facility where you died. Likewise, if "close enough"
applies to a continuer, why not to a duplicate at another location?  

Mike Perry (#11149) writes:  

>An identical construct THERE (running through identical states, etc.)
should feel whatever is felt HERE--thus you would have one shared
consciousness in two locations. I see no particular problem with that. The
"different entity" is not different at the level of personhood, only at a
lower, "instantiation" level.  

I think, first, that some confusion may arise from the concept of "state"
in quantum theory. The "state" of a hydrogen atom (e.g. ground state) does
NOT fully specify its relation to the rest of the universe and possible
interactions; location also plays a role. And two macroscopic objects at
different locations cannot "run through identical states" because they are
in different environments.  

Further, even if the two instantiations really were identical and remained
that way, that still would not obviate the problem. They would, of course,
"feel" the same things from the standpoint of an outside observer, who
would describe their inner workings as identical. But this would not be
"shared consciousness," in part because destruction or change of one (at a
great distance, say) would not affect the other in any way. Duplicated
consciousness is not the same as shared consciousness.  

But the main point remains that if you are a physical system, and not just
an abstraction characterized by your information, then when the physical
system is gone, you are gone, no matter how many other similar systems may
exist or may later be created. The subject who feels is in the physical
system, or IS (a part or aspect of) the physical system.  

Finally, to recapitulate yet once again: I assert that EVERY proposal on
criteria of survival (that I have seen) can be put in doubt by various
thought experiments. We also KNOW that many possibly relevant questions
stem from our lack of knowledge of the laws of nature, including the
fundamentals of space and time, and of our own brain anatomy and
physiology. It is therefore premature to pretend to know the answers, or
even--in my opinion--to form even moderately firm conclusions.  

But of course it is not premature to make choices and place your bets--as
we are compelled to do in any case, since even the default choice of doing
nothing also has its consequences.  

Robert Ettinger Cryonics Institute Immortalist Society
http://www.cryonics.org  

Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=11154