X-Message-Number: 11173
From: 
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1999 00:24:02 EST
Subject: Perry comments

Mike Perry (#11164) wrote:

[Ettinger] >> macroscopic objects at different locations cannot "run through
identical states" because they are in different environments.  

[Perry] >As far as consciousness is concerned, I submit they can. We are
talking
about a finite set of events, which would not involve interacting with
all the rest of the environment, whatever that may include. The local
environments could be the same or equivalent, for the time interval we are
talking
about. Two gas molecules in different locations can be in the same quantum
state 

If I understand it correctly, a "quantum state," especially of a macroscopic
object, cannot be fully and accurately stated in isolation, because it is
never fully isolated; you need the quantum state of the whole universe in
order to claim complete or maximum accuracy. At minimum, we must admit we
don't know for sure, since the keenest specialists don't agree or admit they
don't known.

[Ettinger]>>Further, even if the two instantiations really were identical and
remained
>>that way, that still would not obviate the problem. They would, of course,
>>"feel" the same things from the standpoint of an outside observer, who
>>would describe their inner workings as identical. But this would not be
>>"shared consciousness," in part because destruction or change of one (at a
>>great distance, say) would not affect the other in any way. Duplicated
>consciousness is not the same as shared consciousness.  

[Perry]>In my view, duplicate consciousness *is* one and the same as shared
consciousness. If there is a difference, I submit it is a "non-reductionist"
sort of difference, a mystical notion, that I feel comfortable discounting.

Mystical? What is mystical about saying that "I" here am subject to different
hazards and different opportunities than "he" there?

[Perry]>As for the objection that "destruction or change of one ... would not
>affect the other in any way" I handle that problem by allowing the
>possibility of fissioning. One consciousness or one person can split. The
>split would occur as soon as a difference develops in what was, up to
>then, a subjectively identical experience in the two instantiations. Then 
>you would no longer have shared consciousness. 

I see only language traps there. As long as they are sufficiently similar, you
choose to call them the same. When they are not sufficiently similar, you
choose to say they have fissioned. I am looking for proofs, not preferences or
plausibilities. (Not that I object to speculation--just claims of having
solved the problems. Of course, I know Dr. Perry is not dogmatic and doesn''t
claim infallibility.)

[Ettinger]>>But the main point remains that if you are a physical system, and
not >>just an abstraction characterized by your information, then when the
physical
>>system is gone, you are gone, no matter how many other similar systems may
>>exist or may later be created. The subject who feels is in the physical
>>system, or IS (a part or aspect of) the physical system.  

[Perry]>Bob, I am really curious about your opinion on the following questions
(which
somewhat recapitulate some of your thought experiments in *The Prospect
of Immortality*)--others of course also feel free to contribute.

>1. Say it became possible, through some unexpected breakthrough, to
map the detailed, atomic structure of a solid object long before it was
possible to manipulate that structure, as might be needed to resuscitate
a cryonics patient. So as a precaution, a cryonics organization has all of
its patients mapped in this way and the information stored in a safe
place. Later still, a terrorist attack destroys all the patients and scatters
their atoms to the four winds. Later still, the information is used to create
exact, atom-for-atom duplicates, and these copy-patients are 
reanimated. Did the original people survive? 

I wish I knew. But as I have said elsewhere, I don't think atom-for-atom
physical duplication will ever be done, even in the distant future. 
 
>2. Say you are in a coma for 30 years (something like Oliver Sacks' patients
in *Awakenings*). Then you are cured and fully functional again, with
no essential changes in personality, pretty much as if the previous 30 years
had all passed in one night. Even your aging process was not too extreme,
and you are physically much like your younger self. However, due to normal
metabolism during that time, most of the actual atoms in your body, even in
brain cells, are now different from what they were, replaced with other,
similar atoms. 
Did you survive?

I don't know, and I don't think our present knowledge is sufficient to allow
us to know.

>3. A man is found to have committed a crime 30 years after the fact, by
incontestable evidence that has finally come to light. Still, and even though
he has not undergone any substantial personality change, the
man claims innocence on grounds that he is, at best, only a replica of his
former self, thus "he" didn't do it. The jury says guilty anyway. Are they
right?

That is both a philosophical and political question, and I don't know the
answers.

>4. The same as 3, except the man lapsed into a 30-year coma shortly after
the crime, then awakened as in 2. Is he guilty?

Same as above.

>5. The same as 3, except the man was cryonically suspended after the crime,
and
then was replaced with an atomically perfect replica as in 1. The replica is
then revived. Is that person guilty?

Same as above.

>6. Starting with a head-only cryonics patient, we rebuild the body using
nanotechnology, DNA information, etc. and reintegrate head and 
body, before reviving the person. Our patient says he feels fine, just like
his old self in every way, and tests show that he has no deficits, problems
with motor control, etc. Did the original person survive? 

I have no biological or philosophical problem with neuro preservation--only a
public relations problem. If whole-body patients survive, then neuro patients
do too.

[Ettinger]>>Finally, to recapitulate yet once again: I assert that EVERY
proposal on
>>criteria of survival (that I have seen) can be put in doubt by various
>>thought experiments. We also KNOW that many possibly relevant questions
>>stem from our lack of knowledge of the laws of nature, including the
>>fundamentals of space and time, and of our own brain anatomy and
>>physiology. It is therefore premature to pretend to know the answers, or
>>even--in my opinion--to form even moderately firm conclusions.  

[Perry] >To my way of thinking, many possible doubts can be resolved by the
notion of "pattern survival" in which the person can survive in a *different*
though similar or equivalent physical system. This in turn seems reasonable
because (again in my view) information and its processing are what are
important to personhood, not the physical platform that supports this.

Plausible, yes; reasonable, maybe--but correct? I see no proof, and plenty of
reasons for skepticism. 

Robert Ettinger
Cryonics Institute
Immortalist Society
http://www.cryonics.org

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