X-Message-Number: 11233
Date: Sun, 07 Feb 1999 17:41:57 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Re: CryoNet #11224

Bob Ettinger writes,

>Apologies to those who are uninterested, but I am trying to wrap up some
>sections of my draft book, and possibly any physicists on the list might help.
>

(As for me (MP), my physics unfortunately is limited--a deficiency I hope
strongly
to reduce in coming years, but the issues Bob raises are important to me 
too, in particular since I am also writing a book, so I would like to
contribute to
the discussion.)

>Tipler (THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY) rests his case for the "identity" of
>replicas, despite differing locations, on the alleged identity of systems in
>the same quantum state.  He specifically refers to thermodynamics. I see (said
>the blind man) more than one problem with this view.
>
>First, he appears to mean that two molecules (say) in the same quantum state
>will behave identically, despite differing histories and trajectories.


I didn't get that from my reading, for example, where Tipler discusses the Gibbs
Paradox, pp. 230ff. Perhaps Tipler would invoke many-worlds to argue
that "one" particle can become "two" that can then behave differently(?)
...
>
>Second, he seems to use "quantum state" in ambiguous ways. In discussing
>diffusion, he speaks of molecules in the "ground state" as being in the "same"
>quantum state.

He is certainly very clear on this. On p. 231: "In most gases with normal
pressures and temperatures, almost all of the molecules are in the ground
state, which means that they are in the same quantum state."

> But "ground state" does not fully specify a molecule. Elsewhere
>in his book, he acknowledges (I think) that "quantum state" refers to the
>precise point or region in phase space occupied by the system at a given
>moment. For example, a fully specified quantum state for a water molecule
>would have to include directions of the axes. And, as I understand it (or
>possibly misunderstand it) the phase space includes coordinates of spatial
>location, hence "quantum state" MUST explicitly acknowledge the relevance of
>location. 
>
This seems to apply when your system must be viewed as part of a larger system
in which or with which it interacts.

>Third, in light of "quantum entanglement," the past histories of systems
>apparently do (or at least might) affect the total quantum state; and in SOME
>interpretations a change of state of a previously entangled system at a
>distance could (instantly) change the state of the system being observed. 
>
Again, I think this becomes significant when your system is part of a larger
system, but not when you are only interested in localized effects that occupy
a particular, bounded region of spacetime. (Also, if you accept
many-worlds, you don't have the violation of locality.)

>Is a puzzlement. At least to me. Any help?
>

I have a further thought on this discussion, which started, as I recall,
with a claim
I made that two constructs, people for instance, might go through the
"same states" and thus experience the "same consciousness" (or at least
duplicate
consciousness). This would necessarily happen, if the two were in the "same
quantum states" throughout (if the term is understood correctly, though it
appears
it is not so simple an issue). But probably the same or equivalent
conscious experiences could occur under more general circumstances; the same
quantum states would not by any stretch be necessary. Suppose we had two
cryonics patients, for instance, who may have lived far apart and been frozen
under different circumstances. With advanced technology, however, it is found
that (unlikely though it would be to really happen) the two are exact atomic
replicas of each other. (A useful property here would be that only a finite
number of significantly different, atomic or subatomic arrangements 
are possible in a finite volume. I think that this could be shown
to hold based on quantization. Remember we are talking about solid 
structure.) Then a reasonable claim could be made that, insofar as
it is possible to reanimate these persons, and speak of the "same" persons
living again, the two must have at least had equivalent conscious experiences
prior to suspension. To my thinking, based on my notion of "pattern survival,"
they would at that point represent two instantiations of one and the same 
individual, though after revival they would start to diverge. It is, 
of course, most unlikely such a scenario as this would occur naturally, i.e. 
with two people really living separate lives, but there is a nonzero
probability,
so that this sort of duplication and splitting is possible in principle.

>Incidentally, Tipler has interesting comments on memory, similar to some made
>by Donaldson. In particular, our memories of specific events may often be only
>fragments, or even fragments of previous fragments, which when called upon are
>fleshed out on a probabilistic basis, so that frequently our recall has
>substantial elements of fiction. So--would you rather be revived with the same
>partly fictional memories you had when frozen, or with veridical memories?
>Which would more nearly represent your "true" self? Probably many of us would
>prefer, at least initially upon revival, to be as nearly the same as possible,
>but that just defers the question.
>
An interesting question. It may be possible to have it either way it the
future, i.e.
technology could, say, either wake you up substantially as you were, with the
partly fictional memories you had before suspension, or, by studying other
evidence (diaries, photos, videotapes, etc.) which could extend to records
from many sources, "correct" these fictionalizations. This would produce a
"truer" you in one sense, but not as much the "real" person that existed 
before.

Mike Perry

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