X-Message-Number: 11792 Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 10:53:10 -0400 From: Daniel Crevier <> Subject: zombies and consciousness To Robert Ettinger. You wrote: >[Daniel Crevier] is confused by mixing up two separate >questions--consciousness in computers on the one hand, and on the >other hand comparisons of living organisms respectively with and >without consciousness. >As I have previously discussed, a computer (if fast enough) could (in >principle) direct a robot to behave as if it were conscious, resulting >in a Zombie; but the computer would still not be conscious. >A naturally evolved, living organism would not behave the same way >with or without consciousness. In order to say this, you ought to have already resolved the very point that we are arguing. You must have decided that consciousness in com- puters and consciousness in humans are completely different matters. I am saying that they are fundamentally the same, because there cannot be one kind of mechanisms (the A's) that make physical systems just behave as if they were conscious, and another kind (the B's) that make them really conscious. If there were, the A's, which would do less, would presumably be more simple. If this were the case, as nature pre- fers simple solutions, we'd be A's. But we're not, since we really are conscious. I agree with the rest of your message, which describes the survival ad- vantages of consciousness. But this is orthogonal to my argument. To Chris Fideli: Your explanation of consciousness as a mechanism involving two monitoring brain organs makes sense. However we seem to have different definitions of zombies. Your zombie is a being with only the first brain organ. It is not conscious, and its behavior is different from that of a conscious being. My zombie has, by defi- nition, a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a truly conscious being. I am arguing that such a zombie is impossible. In terms of your theory, I am saying that a being that seems to be conscious in all respects must have both brain organs, and therefore must be truly conscious. Brook Norton writes: >Biological brains require consciousness as part of the data processing >engine. An emulation of a brain uses various circuitry to achieve the >same data processing without the need for consciousness. My whole point is that you cannot think of consciousness as an extra in- gredient that could replace computational processes. Consciousness is the result of computational processes. As Chris Fideli's posting shows, we are starting to have an idea of what these processes might be. Daniel Crevier Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=11792