X-Message-Number: 11797 From: Thomas Donaldson <> Subject: To Mike Perry, with a word for Kennita Watson at the end Date: Sat, 22 May 1999 23:05:25 +1000 (EST) Hi Mike! Yes, I'd be interested in reading your book. I'll even reimburse you for the cost of sending it to me, and if you wish, send it back. I will also note one major change in what you seem to be saying. A robot living in the world is not the same as a subroutine or other program structure in a computer --- even if that program structure in the computer seems to act as if it is a human being in a virtual world. The first does not perform any purely symbolic actions: it acts in the world, and thus is not just a symbolic structure (the same as a book). The second is a symbolic structure alone, and acts like a human being only in the sense that a REAL human being, reading or seeing its activities in its virtual world, would agree that they are like those of a human being. But it has no more real existence than any other symbolic entity --- like Donald Duck. (A computer virus is a REAL life form because it acts on the computers in reality. If it only made virtual changes, it would only be a virtual computer virus, and again no more real than Donald Duck). There is a subsidiary question which Bob Ettinger has brought up several times. It deserves attention, but at present I would not claim it is decisive in any way. The neural nets of which our brain is composed do not work like those in current computing: they grow new connections. Whether this becomes a critical issue would need a good deal of thought; I will say, though, that it just might mean that such neural nets, and the brains made up of them, are not finite state machines in the normal sense of a finite state machine ie. a machine with a FIXED and FINITE set of possible states. Yes, at any given time, they would have a finite set of possible states; but since they can grow new connections, the finite sets will change over time in response to new learning. That is, their set of states is FINITE, but it can change considerably over time. And the source of those changes does not come from within the neural net but from extra influences in the world. (This means that those sets of states cannot be predicted merely by examining the existing set of states). Naturally this means that they cannot be imitated by any finite state machine in the normal sense, and so may not be Turing machines. But then I would hope that our notion of computing in broad enough that it doesn't simply evaporate if we discover non-Turing machines. Finally, a word to Kennita Watson: If you think about it a bit, when we discuss issues such as whether or not we could be read off in a computer, we are discussing not just our (possible) long term futures, but even more than that just what cryonic suspension must preserve and what it need not preserve (ie. our consciousness and how it may work). Some people actually like discussing such issues, others do not; but they DO relate to cryonics. Speaking for myself alone, I don't feel like I am beating my head against anything. Perhaps I need not say this, but there is no reason that you or anyone else who wants to discuss more concrete issues need bother to read our discussions. And because I have met you, I'll add that such an attitude in no way suggests that you lack intelligence or other such features. It's just a personal choice. Best and long long life to all, Thomas Donaldson Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=11797