X-Message-Number: 12936 Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 17:34:43 -0500 From: Daniel Crevier <> Subject: Why machines can be conscious, in a nutshell. Greetings to all. A few weeks ago, further to a rekindling on the discussion on whether computers can be conscious, I had a posting asking if anyone knew of a short summary of the arguments in favor of machine consciousness. As such a document did not seem to exist, I decided to get brave and produce my own. It is quite short as such discussions go (five pages), but still too long for a regular Cryonet posting. Here is a list of the arguments presented. - Argument for the physical origins of consciousness. Since our consciousness is affected by physical or chemical changes to our brains, it must have a physical origin. - Argument for the reproducibility of conscious behavior in machines. Computers can simulate any physical system, and therefore a brain. Such a simulation would behave as if conscious, and claim to be conscious. It could be realized by a number of different computer architectures. - Argument from the uploading thought experiment. You could turn your brain into a computer bit by bit, and ensure the continuity of your conscious experience. - Argument from the unobservability of 'true' consciousness. If no difference can be observed between a conscious being and a simulation of one, does it make sense to talk about such a difference? - Argument from evolution or entropy. What survival advantage would a 'truly' conscious being enjoy over a perfect simulation of one? - Argument from the place of humans in nature. Humans have no special place in nature, so there is no a priori reason to believe that other kinds of beings cannot be conscious also. - Argument from solipsism. If we were surrounded by apparently conscious machines, doubting their consciousness would be a form of solipsism. - Argument from artificial intelligence: the utilitarian view of consciousness. Consciousness seems to be just a set of behaviorally efficient mechanisms. - The orchestral chord argument, or the informational origins of qualia. How the 'redness of red' could be the result of information processing. - The cartesian theater argument, or why appearances can be deceiving. Our consciousness is not what it seems to be, and qualia may not be either. - The Russian dolls argument. Why a true account of consciousness will always disappoint. - Conclusion. If you would like to have the full document, please send me e-mail at There are two versions: MS Word (recommended), and plain text. Please let me know which one you prefer. Comments are welcome, but I may not have time to engage in lengthy discussions. Daniel Crevier, Ph.D. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=12936