X-Message-Number: 12936
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 17:34:43 -0500
From: Daniel Crevier <>
Subject: Why machines can be conscious, in a nutshell.

Greetings to all.

A few weeks ago, further to a rekindling on the discussion on whether 
computers can be conscious, I had a posting asking if anyone knew of a 
short summary of the arguments in favor of machine consciousness. As 
such a document did not seem to exist, I decided to get brave and 
produce my own. It is quite short as such discussions go (five pages), 
but still too long for a regular Cryonet posting. Here is a list of 
the arguments presented. 

- Argument for the physical origins of consciousness. Since our 
  consciousness is affected by physical or chemical changes to our 
  brains, it must have a physical origin.
- Argument for the reproducibility of conscious behavior in machines.
  Computers can simulate any physical system, and therefore a brain.
  Such a simulation would behave as if conscious, and claim to be
  conscious. It could be realized by a number of different computer 
  architectures.
- Argument from the uploading thought experiment. You could turn your
  brain into a computer bit by bit, and ensure the continuity of your   
  conscious experience.
- Argument from the unobservability of 'true' consciousness. If no 
  difference can be observed between a conscious being and a 
  simulation of one, does it make sense to talk about such a difference?
- Argument from evolution or entropy. What survival advantage would a
  'truly' conscious being enjoy over a perfect simulation of one?
- Argument from the place of humans in nature. Humans have no special 
  place in nature, so there is no a priori reason to believe that other 
  kinds of beings cannot be conscious also.
- Argument from solipsism. If we were surrounded by apparently conscious 
  machines, doubting their consciousness would be a form of solipsism.
- Argument from artificial intelligence: the utilitarian view of 
  consciousness. Consciousness seems to be just a set of behaviorally 
  efficient mechanisms.
- The orchestral chord argument, or the informational origins of qualia. 
  How the 'redness of red' could be the result of information 
  processing.
- The cartesian theater argument, or why appearances can be deceiving.
  Our consciousness is not what it seems to be, and qualia may not be   
  either.
- The Russian dolls argument. Why a true account of consciousness will 
  always disappoint. 
- Conclusion.

If you would like to have the full document, please send me e-mail at 
 There are two versions: MS Word  (recommended), 
and plain text. Please let me know which one you prefer. Comments are 
welcome, but I may not have time to engage in lengthy discussions.

Daniel Crevier, Ph.D.

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