X-Message-Number: 12989 Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1999 20:07:49 -0700 From: Mike Perry <> Subject: Re: Being There Here are some comments on Bob Ettinger's posting "Being There" (#12981). In the first place he goes through a thought experiment in which parts of your brain are replaced bit by bit with electronic devices. "You" report that the devices "feel exactly the same" as the original tissue, so "you" have no problem (presumably) in discarding this biological tissue for the electronic devices. We are assuming, of course, that the devices in question really do function as intended. But opponents of strong AI will argue that it is not sufficient if, under such a hypothetical change in hardware, you *say* you feel fine, and still pass every test of functionality, observable emotional response, etc. Because, changing your hardware in this way could result in an entity that only imitates consciousness and feeling, however perfectly, and actually has not a bit of either. But an argument like this to me suffers from the same sort of weakness as the solipsist's argument. Such arguments might never be disproved, yet I would reject them. We could ask, for example, whether a person, just like you but with reverse chirality (left-handed molecules changed to right-handed and vice versa) would be "really" conscious, or just an imitation, and go from there. > >Second (yes, this is partly redundant), the thought experiment dodges the >question of time and space relationships. I'll omit repeating the reasons >here, but it is reasonably clear that awareness (based on feeling) must bind >time and space. A computer--especially a serial computer--does not do this. >According the the hard-core strong-AI people, it doesn't matter. Even a >basic, low-tech Turing computer--a strip of paper moving back and forth with >marks being written and erased on its squares--would feel and think, they >claim. This is what I think, and I think the objections can be answered, perhaps better than I've tried to do in previous postings. > One must admire the audacity of the thought, but not the stubbornness >that refuses to admit its weaknesses. > I'll admit that there are difficulties, but one is simply that we are talking about thought experiments here, and actually implementing an advanced intelligence on a Turing machine (or even one of our top-of-the-line computers) is far outside our powers today. But this is not an argument against the principle of the thing. A being with whom I could converse and who seemed intelligent and full of emotion I would be inclined to accept as such, even if implemented in silicon or some other nonbiological form, and with sequential in place of parallel processing. >There are even deeper questions. David Deutsch and others tend to believe >that one should not speak cavalierly about what is possible "in >principle"--that there is no disjuncture between the physically possible and >the logically possible. Again, remains to be seen, and not soon either. > In general, I use "in principle" to mean "ought to be achievable eventually, though we may not be able to do so yet." > >I realize I have said all this before, many times, but I am searching for >phraseology that will be more effective. Hope springs eternal. > I have had some new thoughts on some of the issues previously raised, and think I now know some better ways of addressing them--later, if there is enough interest. Mike Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=12989