X-Message-Number: 14121 Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2000 08:46:25 -0700 (PDT) From: Scott Badger <> Subject: Preserving the Self Greetings all, I, also, have been thinking about the nature of identity lately and the whole "is it me or is it a copy" problem presented by uploading and other future possibilities. I'd appreciate any comments, corrections, or criticisms to my argument below. Here goes ... Premises: 1. I want to save my brain because I strongly suspect that my mind "is" what my brain "does", and what my brain does is a function of it's architecture. Structure "is" identity. (remember, this is a premise, not a statement of fact) 2. From moment to moment, my brain structure undergoes physical changes. Dendrites from some neurons are reaching out, seeking connections ... while others are withdrawing and disconnecting. Some cells are dying. New evidence suggests that some new neurons may be forming. Point being, "I" change from moment to moment. "I" am not a product, "I" am a dynamic process. Therefore, it can be argued that successive versions of myself are continually being generated. Though each successive version is a close approximation to the last, they are not the same. 3. I am unable to consciously discriminate between these successive versions of myself. As a result, I experience a distinct sense of continuity of self. It is this sense of continuity that gives me the impression that my self/identity is a static thing despite the evidence to the contrary. Consider the transporter beam (ala star trek). One can argue that the original has been destroyed at point A and a copy created at point B. But isn't Entity B just another version of Entity A? Suppose that Entity B is not reconstituted right away and instead, the information for reconstituting Entity A at point B is held in a buffer for a period of time. Whether it be 10 seconds or 10 years, Entity B would be a closer approximation to Entity A than Entity A would have been to itself had it not been transported. So at what point am "I" not "me" anymore? Exactly how much structural change does it require between the "then me" and the "now me" for me to "feel" like a different person? Is that subjective evaluation sufficiently discriminating? What if I developed enhanced discriminatory abilities? Instead of feeling different when a 1% structural change had occurred in my brain, I would notice a .01% change. Of course, to protect our sense of continuity and thus our sense of self, limits to how much change we can detect may be necessary. Actually being able to feel the changes in one's self from moment to moment might completely disrupt one's sense of identity. The critical factor appears to be that a sense of continuity is what matters, regardless of the substrate within which your consciousness resides. Whether you're beamed to the other side of the planet, have your brain place in someone else's body, or even if your uploaded into a computer, it's just another version of you ... and new versions of you are being generated all the time anyway. If a sense of continuity remains, then self is preserved. For me, then, it seems the argument that uploads are "just" copies is a moot one. I'm already just an approximate copy of who I was a moment ago. So what? I know I'm different, but I feel the same. --------------------------------- Now, a brief counter-point. What if, due to brain damage, I am uploaded but a large number of memories can not be retrieved? Or what if other's memories are introduced into my psyche? And yet I still feel fine? In other words, it seems possible that one may wake up with a sense of continuity despite the fact that significant alterations to the self have taken place. That is, a sense of continuity would not necessarily be dependent on very close approximations of the previous version of the self. Part of the solution may lie in being able to empirically validate one's sense of self with historical records. If I'm reanimated and I have a portfolio of information regarding who I was, and that matches to a large extent with what I recall about myself, then I can be reasonably confident that my identity has been preserved to a great degree. Of course, it's possible that a fake portfolio might have been created for some sinister purpose, but this seems excessively paranoid. Why would anyone bother? Best regards, Scott Badger (I think) __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get Yahoo! Mail Free email you can access from anywhere! http://mail.yahoo.com/ Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=14121