X-Message-Number: 14177
From: "Brook Norton" <>
Subject: Ettinger on the "quantitative" view of identity
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2000 13:21:00 -0700

Bob Ettinger says in Message #14172:
>>>
2. The "quantitative" view of identity is superficially easy to understand
and accept. It simply says there is no such thing as "identity"-only KINDS
and DEGREES of identity or similarity. Two different physical systems at
different locations (in time or space) share certain features to a certain
degree, and that is all there is to it.
<<<

response- I don't understand why "quantitative" is used to describe this
view of identity, but let's go with it for now.  Bob's summary in the above
paragraph sounds accurate to me.

>>>
The attraction of this view is that it seems (at first) to be simple and
reasonable, perfectly straightforward. But it does not appear to lend itself
to construction of a rational value system.
<<<

response- Even if it does not lend itself to a rational value system, I
don't see why that would in any way make it less likely to be true.  But it
may very well lend itself to a rational value system.  If the "quantitative"
view is correct, the primary objective still remains to maximize the
happiness of the experiencer.  The "quantitative" view acknowledges the
existence of an experiencer and the feeling of happiness. The "quantitative"
view might lead to a different approach to maximizing happiness, but
whatever the approach, a rational system could be built around maximizing
happiness.

>>>
Pushed to its logical conclusion, it leads to something like some Oriental
philosophies in which all people share in each others' identities. After
all, everyone has some of your features, so everyone must be partly you, and
you must be partly they. (Other animals too; you may be reincarnated as a
cockroach.) This view COULD conceivably be an eventual winner, especially
with the help of quantum entanglement, but it has lots of problems.
<<<

response- Recall that there is no such thing as "identity" - only KINDS and
DEGREES of similarity.  To say I share identity with another human because
of our similarities would be incorrect because there is no such thing as
"identity".  There is no SPECIAL, identity-linking commonality between me
and other humans.  There are simply similarities between humans; there are
similarities between me and a tree, me and my reflection; similarities only,
not shared identity.

The simplicity is attractive.  There is no paradox at all in creating self
duplicates, or having many consciousnesses merged into one, or having
duplicates separated by large time segments, or changing brain structure
over time, or losing all or part of your memories, or the many-worlds
interpretation.  The "quantitative" view hangs together for all these cases.

>>>
This view COULD conceivably be an eventual winner, especially with the help
of quantum entanglement, but it has lots of problems.
<<<

response- I'm having real trouble finding those problems.

Brook Norton

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