X-Message-Number: 14994
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2000 23:36:01 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Destruction of Duplicates

Lee Corbin, #14983:
>
>Mike Perry writes
>
>>The way the conditions are set up, I feel that the destruction
>>of one of the copies is not equivalent to the destruction of
>>none, subjectively speaking, even though I do not believe in
>>a mystical soul. If we imagine that we start with 1 million
>>(or 10^1000 say) copies and destroy all but one, it seems all
>>the more so. At some point it's almost certain "you're gonna
>>die," though an epsilon of chance remains you won't.
>
>This isn't so.  In principle this could be happening to you
>every night at 4pm: a million are made, and only one is allowed
>to wake up.  You should not be worried to find that this was
>occuring.

There's a difference here, however. If I am fast asleep and copies are made
then erased, with no consciousness occurring, it would be a matter of
indifference. Some copies of my information have been made, then erased. No
biggie. I don't care, even if my atoms got changed out in the process (i.e.
if the original of me was destroyed but a copy remained). But, if I am
conscious and you inform me that there are N conscious, exact duplicates of
me "somewhere" and all but one is to be destroyed, I do start to worry. If N
is large, it does seem likely I'll die. "My" next perceptions then will
likely be strange, as I've discussed before. And why should that be? In the
first place, let's assume that I *know* what's coming. (Otherwise, naturally
I'm not worried!). Moreover, in referring to "my" next perceptions, I'm
referring to a version of me that will *remember* what was coming, not some
earlier version that knew nothing about all this. (That version won't have
any worries, but then again it didn't know what was coming.) Any continuer
of the real me at this point must have *known* that something was about to
happen that would likely destroy it. This in fact is the vast majority of
continuers of me (in some appropriate sense), who are now going to suffer a
strange fate. So, considering the original me, facing this likely happening,
knowing that most of my continuers from that point will be stressed, I am
justifiably worried.

Now, I won't deny that the above argument has some weak points. I'm assuming
that, just because there are many copies of me to begin with, there must in
some sense be many continuers (or a high probability-weight of them)
resulting from this incident, most of whom will have experienced "death" and
that coming out of that (being recreated by some process or other, maybe by
advanced sentient beings somewhere) will in some way be disagreeable or
stressful and penalizing. These sorts of things, at any rate, are what I
would worry over, whether they in fact are true or not. (And of course I
regard a recreation of me as a true continuer, in view of its having
appropriate memories and other similarities, and not just another being
entirely who happens to have these similarities.) By the same token I would
worry if I was informed that N exact copies of me were to be made, and that
all but one would be subjected to some severe punishment. And here is an
interesting thought to ponder. Suppose I am told (by a Pizerist, let's say),
"don't worry, Mike, *you* won't suffer, because we'll make sure that the
original is the one that is spared. Hey, you're the original, aren't you? So
it'll be you!" Well, I'm not at all sure it would be me, or that I would not
find that my atoms had been changed out, which I consider at that point to
have N/(N+1) probability of happening. (Of course I would be concerned over
the fate of all the others, whether or not "I" was the lucky one who stayed
original, but as usual I'm ignoring this for the sake of argument.)
...
>[re the suicide lottery:]
>>But if you think that "your" survival is guaranteed so long
>>as some double of yours somewhere survives, you shouldn't be
>>worried at all if you believe in the many-worlds possiblity.
>
>I do believe in MWI, and I do believe that I will survive in
>other worlds, and that everyone who could possibly live is
>alive somewhere.  Big deal.  I have already said that I really,
>really, really regret when any one of me doesn't get run time,
>or is killed.  So this argument does not apply to us.
>
>As for the "suicide lottery", you can see why anyone who values
>the life of his duplicates about as much as he values his "own"
>life, would think the suicide lottery a very bad idea.
>
I can see it--from my point of view (see my last posting), but haven't you
just discounted any reason for concern if other copies of you are destroyed? 

Mike Perry

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