X-Message-Number: 15022 From: "Eunice Corbin" <> Subject: Re: more on computers and brains Date: Sat, 25 Nov 2000 11:49:58 -0800 Lee Corbin here. Thomas Donaldson wrote >So far the only person on Cryonet who has come close to >answering my question about whether or not humans may be >considered Turing machines is Mike Perry... [and] who >remains the only person so far on Cryonet who has >tried to seriously answer my question. I'm sorry that lack of time has prevented responses to your very good points. I did send you an email personally, but I don't think that you received it. There is also the fear that I am merely repeating points that others have already made. But I will summarize some of my views regarding what you frequently write anyway: >Does all thinking map easily into a Turing machine? Yes, and by the following route: processors that now execute millions of instructions per second may someday execute trillions, and if not, as many of us have said, one machine can in principle do the same thing as many. I don't agree that time is a fundamental issue anyway (as regards speed). Suppose that you knew someone who executed only a quarter as fast as the rest of us. His inner life would seem no less rich to him than yours does to you, (just as your inner life would be no less genuine than someone's who ran four times as fast as you do). You would talk to him exactly as you would a time-retarded occupant of a spaceship traveling at .97c. (In your frame of reference he REALLY IS retarded, it's not just appearance!) Reading Greg Egan's "Permutation City" gives one a nice feel for the problems of talking with slower and faster people. Anyway, if a computer program executes in a robot, and gives every appearance of being a person, then this really is completely the same as an exceedingly complicated UTM executing on a tape so rich and intricate that the tape itself is comparable to the real world (i.e., for every structure in the real world that the robot may encounter in a suitable time interval, the tape possesses an equivalent structure). But I know such arguments do nothing for you: for one thing, for reasons never made clear, you regard connections between objects physically connecting and disconnecting as entirely different from connected structures sending and not-sending information respectively. (If one object does not communicate with another, just how is this different from them being disconnected?) Lee Corbin Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=15022