X-Message-Number: 15128
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2000 08:15:58 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Re: Psychological Survival & Values

I have a few comments on Robert Ettinger's interesting posting, #15124

>Criteria of identity and survival have never been agreed upon by 
>philosophers, by cryonicists, or those few others who are interested.
>
As I see it, it appears that more than one theory will "fit the facts" on
these issues and different people, with their different values, dispositions
etc. may genuinely prefer different theories that all in some sense could be
said to be valid.

>A number of philosophers fix on "psychological connectedness" as the 
>criterion of survival. If the revived (or copied!) person has largely the 
>same memories and values and inclinations, they say, then he is the "same" 
>person.
>
That is my position, or at least, that knowledge of the earlier values,
experiences and so on must be present and the waking person must sense and
accept having been the earlier person with those attributes; I consider this
at length in my book.
>
>The main problem with this--as with the "all-is-information" stance of the 
>uploaders--is that it is merely an assertion, with a certain amount of 
>plausibility but nothing more. By no stretch of the imagination is it proven.
>

To "prove" it presumably would mean to establish in some decisive way that
it is right where other theories are wrong, period. That may be impossible
in principle. Which theory do you prefer? Is the day-person hypothesis
correct or not? Are memories important or not?
...
>It is difficult for me to imagine that I would not choose to be improved, if 
>I were revived as my old self. But having said that, it is also difficult to 
>see any strong reason for deferring the improvement; why not do it during the 
>revival?
>
Mainly, though, I would want to *remember* the earlier condition, whether I
wanted the improvement immediately or later.
...
> Even if you decide 
>the "real" you is the historical one, is that the one you want revived and 
>perpetuated?
>
>Some would say yes: I want the truth. I want to change and improve--but not 
>retroactively, not unconsciously, not without my knowledge and consent, and 
>not suddenly. I don't want to keep on licking my wounds, but I want to 
>remember them, or be able to remember them--otherwise there is no validity.
>
That is largely my position. I would not necessarily be opposed to waking up
improved in some ways, maybe in many ways. (For instance, if I deanimated in
pain, I would not want to wake up in pain.) But I insist on being able to
remember to a reasonable extent who I was. Otherwise, how can it be "me"
that wakes up or benefits at all?

>Again, this has a plausible ring, but little if anything more than that. 
>Personally, I would just as soon be rid of my bad memories and traits and 
>habits instantly, and "know" the history only as an archive that I can look 
>up if I wish.
>
This is because basically (as far as I can see) you don't value your
memories. So for you another theory of survival will seem right than for me.
>
>YOU CAN'T GO HOME
>
I think to a significant extent you can, and that's something memories are

good for. Moreover, in my view, an experience worth having is worth remembering.
>
>The "connectedness" criterion is clearly related to poignant juvenile longing 
>for the comfortable familiarity of early home and family. We want the comfort 
>and security of habit and the memory of love and first awakenings. We don't 
>want to be cast adrift. We may have trouble forming new habits, viewpoints, 
>and values; subconsciously, we may even equate change with betrayal of the 
>earlier self or selves. 
>
Yes, I agree.
>Disturbing questions suggest themselves. If you discard what you were--then 
>were you worthless? If your past self was discarded, will that also be the 
>fate of your present self? If "you" will be discarded by some future "self," 
>what becomes of your present self's confidence and pride and orientation?
>
Basically, if "you"--your present self--is discarded, "you" simply don't
survive. Not the road to immortality, if that's what you want (as I do).

...
>
>The only motivation that is valid, or even physically possible, is to please 
>the self, i.e., to maximize pleasure or satisfaction and to minimize pain or 
>dissatisfaction. This is the basis of value.
>
But you always must keep in mind which "self" you are talking about. If you
allow arbitrary changes and still end up with an entity that feels good,
that isn't necessarily meeting "your" objectives because it isn't
necessarily "you" that is benefitting.

>(3) It seems to follow that most of "you" is inessential--including your 
>memories, habits, and personality. You could lose all that and still exist.

With that I strongly disagree. If you change Derek Parfit into an exact
replica of Greta Garbo, even if she is now very happy, it isn't Derek Parfit
you have benefitted.
 
>Some think they would rather die than lose their connections;

Basically, I *could not* lose my "connections", if by that you mean all or a
very large part of my memories, knowledge of habits, knowledge of
personality, of dispositions, in short, the information that makes me what I
am today (in my view) and *not* die. A matter of definition, as far as I am
concerned.

Mike Perry 

Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=15128