X-Message-Number: 16949
Subject: Re: Why beings of the future WILL reanimate us.
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2001 18:01:33 -0700 (PDT)
From:  (Peter C. McCluskey)

  (Lee Corbin) writes:
>Message #16871
>Date: Wed, 04 Jul 2001 10:49:59 -0700

>I think that Dave Pizer is taking a good, logical next step in the
>evolution of our morality.  Here, he says "To consider a person's
>or an animal's interests, we do not ask if it can help us."  This
>is in accord with recent anthropological findings (see below).  And
>then he says, (paraphrasing) "What's important is whether a thing
>can be benefitted."
>
>But Peter McCluskey writes
>
>>I wish I could believe people were switching to such an ethical system,
>>but the evidence for this hypothesis appears rather weak. It looks to me
>>like people are broadening their notion of whose interests matter only
>>as interactions with those beings makes it in people's self-interest to
>>be seen as caring about those beings. Logical arguments by themselves
>>show no signs that they are about to convince people to respect the
>>interests of ants.
>
>It will be a very slow process, but I do believe that logical
>arguments can *eventually* change the course of people's beliefs,
>and it might even be a gradual unconscious process.  Here is why:
>
>First, I do disagree with those who would suggest that the mere touting
>of an advanced ethical precept (such as Dave's) will itself accomplish
>anything.  The actual mechanism of progress, I suggest, is that of a 
>person recognizing inconsistencies in his or her own point of view.

 Are you claiming that my indifference to the interests of ants implies some
inconsistency in my ethical system?
 I contend that ethical systems can make a wide variety of assumptions
about whose interests matter without being inconsistent, and that the
historical expansion in the class of beings whose interests matter to us
has been mainly caused by the benefits of cooperating with beings with
whom it has recently become practical to cooperate.
 A secondary effect of this process is that where our attitudes towards
other species matter very little, the dominant consideration is often
what our attitude says about our default towards cooperating with versus
exploiting beings whose ability to reciprocate we're uncertain about. 

 I think it is worth noting that by the standards that you seem to be
propounding, there was a step backward on the issue of abortion not too
long ago. I submit this as evidence that small changes in the costs of
following ethical rules can overwhelm your logical arguments.
 I don't want to suggest that the prior rules on abortion were optimal,
but it seems to me that cryonicists who want society to give the benefit
of the doubt to beings whose rights are disputed should at least demand
that doctors who perform abortions make every possible effort to insure
that the fetus lives.

>>I'm currently in the middle of reading an impressive book, The Biology
>>of Moral Systems, which seems to do a good job of explaining ethical
>>systems by showing how it has been in people's self-interest to adopt
>>increasingly sophisticated ethics (and to claim that those ethics are
>>based on something better than self-interest).
>
>I'm sure that you are describing the predominant mechanism.  But
>I think that it has been established that people can and do act
>
>in ways that are not self-interested.  (E.g., Matt Ridley, "The Origins
>of Virtue", Sober and Elliott "Unto Others".)  Evidently, most people
>do have some actual compassion & altruistic circuitry.  This provides
>the wedge in the door, the opening that is needed!

 My recollection is that they showed that genes acting selfishly sometimes
produce behavior that is altruistic from the viewpoint of organisms. When
I said self-interest, I meant the interests of the genes, not the organisms.

>By focusing on people's genuine concern for others, someone like
>Dave Pizer can announce some advanced moral axiom and then say,
>"You will find that if you are to be utterly consistent as a
>materialist acting across all forms of matter in the universe,
>then you will see that my axiom is the true descriptor of your
>behavior."

 Yes. And a true descriptor of how existing biological life behaves has
to be fairly consistent with the interests of its genes.
-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter McCluskey          | Fed up with democracy's problems? Examine Futarchy:
http://www.rahul.net/pcm | http://hanson.gmu.edu/futarchy.pdf or .ps

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