X-Message-Number: 16959
Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 08:42:45 -0700
From: Lee Corbin <>
Subject: Re: Why beings of the future WILL reanimate us.

Peter McCluskey writes

>>First, I do disagree with those who would suggest that the mere touting
>>of an advanced ethical precept (such as Dave's) will itself accomplish
>>anything.  The actual mechanism of progress, I suggest, is that of a 
>>person recognizing inconsistencies in his or her own point of view.
>
> Are you claiming that my indifference to the interests of
> ants implies some inconsistency in my ethical system?

Oh, by no means.  But suppose that somehow it was discovered that
a certain species of ant (but only one) is as intelligent as
chimpanzees (who require years to learn to count to four).  And
suppose that we understand all the ants so well that we are 
confident that this one species is not only very intelligent,
but can experience pain and suffering to the same extent that
chimpanzees do.  Then if we continued to be equally indifferent
to this species, I submit that our value system would be 
inconsistent.

>I contend that ethical systems can make a wide variety of assumptions
>about whose interests matter without being inconsistent, and that the
>historical expansion in the class of beings whose interests matter to us
>has been mainly caused by the benefits of cooperating with beings with
>whom it has recently become practical to cooperate.

I'm sure that this is true.  But our historically recent concern for
horses, dogs, and cats has not arisen from any benefits that we get
by cooperating with them.  Instead, it's been in line with the sudden
concern the West got for slaves about two hundred years ago.

> I don't want to suggest that the prior rules on abortion were optimal,

>but it seems to me that cryonicists who want society to give the benefit
>of the doubt to beings whose rights are disputed should at least demand
>that doctors who perform abortions make every possible effort to insure
>that the fetus lives.

Well, I would say that a fetus a quarter of an inch long *per se* has
no interests, intelligence, or sentience.  Such a creature, in and of
itself, can be benefitted to about the same extent as a cockroach.
The cockroach can probably feel more reward at certain actions it's
able to take, and more pain when things go wrong.  I predict that
since fetuses can't do anything at all about their predicament, they
can't feel much at all in the way of reward or punishment.

>>in ways that are not self-interested.  (E.g., Matt Ridley, "The Origins
>>of Virtue", Sober and Elliott "Unto Others".)  Evidently, most people
>>do have some actual compassion & altruistic circuitry.
>
> My recollection is that they showed that genes acting selfishly sometimes
>produce behavior that is altruistic from the viewpoint of organisms. When
>I said self-interest, I meant the interests of the genes, not the organisms.

Oh, sorry.  Yes, as machines, the genes certainly do act in ways
that we would call "self-interested" only.  But the focus of many
discussions is on whether *people* act altruistically or not.

>And a true descriptor of how existing biological life behaves has
>to be fairly consistent with the interests of its genes.

Just so.

Lee

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