X-Message-Number: 17064 Date: Sun, 22 Jul 2001 21:09:10 -0700 From: Lee Corbin <> Subject: The Origins of Altruism A couple of days ago Peter McCluskey wrote >I don't think Ridley said anything that was clearly relevant to >our attitudes towards animals who don't cooperate with us. Matt Ridley's "The Origins of Virtue" says (p. 137): "At [the core of Frank's insight] lies the idea that acts of genuine goodness are the price we pay for having moral sentiments - those sentiments being valuable because of the opportunities that they open in other circumstances. So when somebody... tips a waiter in a restaurant she will never revisit, gives an anonymous donation to charity... she is not, in the long run, being selfish or rational. She is simply prey to sentiments that are designed for another purpose: to elicit trust by demonstrating a capacity for altruism." (I will admit that the author, Matt Ridley sometimes goes back on this later in the book, in the sense that he sometimes makes it sound kind of "calculated", say, for example, to give blood.) Here, Peter, is how this applies to animals that do or do not cooperate with us (e.g., how we may feel sympathy for a rhinoceros with a hurt foot): The "genuine goodness" referred to above is a sort of "price" that we pay for actually having true moral sentiments. Thus your instinctive feelings for some kitten that you encounter that has a broken leg arise directly from these things that have been built into you "because of the opportunities that they open in other circumstances", just like Ridley said. The rest of you: Scott, Robert, Kennita, etc., are you any closer to seeing what I am talking about, and why this book "Origins of Virtue" is at the top of so many peoples list of suggested readings, and why it completely changed how I myself looked at all this a few years back? >>Sarah Hrdy's book "Mother Nature" [contained something like] >> >> women have been partially successful in detecting genuine >> kindness, and have "rewarded" actually kind men with >> favors. Thus this behavioral characteristic has found its >> way into our genes." > >I don't think Hrdy said anything like that; I think the argument to >which you are refering comes from The Mating Mind. Yes, you are right. The basic idea is from Geoffrey F. Miller's "The Mating Mind". He writes, (page 292) "We have the capacity for moral behavior and moral judgments today because our ancestors favored sexual partners who were kind, generous, helpful, and fair. We still have the same preferences. Badiv Buss's study of global sexual preferences found that "kindness" was the single most important feature desired in a sequal partner by both men and women in every one of the 37 cultrues he studied. It ranked above intelligence, above beauty, and above status." Okay :-) so I'll take credit then for suggesting that an arms race developed between women seeking ***genuine*** kindness in men (so that their children would later benefit), and men seeking to *appear* altruistic, and that women to this day are still partly successful in having bred into men (and thus into all of the men's descendents, women and men alike) actual kindness. By the way, for everyone else reading this. Understand that 90% of these books *still* discuss the way that the selfish gene works, and how you *must* account for altruism or anything else in terms of greater genetic fitness. A (IMO stupidly defined) "pure altruism" that somehow had no impact on fitness, is, of course, impossible. Flatly impossible. >Now that I understand what you are refering to, it seems likely >that we have been disagreeing mainly on terminology. I agree >that when talking about the proximate causes of human behavior, >it is appropriate to classify many acts as altruistic, and that >seems to be much of what you are trying to emphasize. [Yes.] >I [on the other hand] have been describing the origins of ethical >systems, and I continue to maintain that, when explaining what >caused our most basic beliefs, selfish causes are the only >coherent type of answer. Beliefs about what is ethical? I'm not one hundred percent sure that I'm following you. Suppose that we believe that it is not ethical to cheat someone (even if they don't know that it happened to them and no one knows that we did it). I agree that a big component of the anti-cheating meme in our ethical system still arose from self-interest. But, in general, doesn't a small component also arise from a genuine and direct feeling of compassion or sympathy for the swindled? Lee Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=17064