X-Message-Number: 21318
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 2003 08:06:50 -0500
From: Thomas Donaldson <>
Subject: CryoNet #21307 - #21316

For Christine Gaspar:
We do not think cryonics patients are dead in the first place; that
they have been "declared dead" by others does not change our judgement,
though for some cases it makes what we do a lot easier than if 
physicians ALL thought they were alive (the government would then 
get fully involved in controlling what we do).

So another way to handle the problem is simply to say that we disagree
with the declaration of death, and freezing is our attempt to preserve
someone who has lost the independent ability to preserve him/herself.

For Bob Ettinger:
The belief that we are not the same as our bodies isn't a form of
platonism at all. To believe that the contents of a book is not
the same as one physical example of the book is not a form of 
platonism, either. It merely recognizes that there are some things
in the world --- VERIFIABLY in the world --- that are not material
things. In my personal opinion, the difference between a material
person and the information about how that person's brain is wired
remains unlikely to have any practical effect similar to the practical
effect the difference between the contents of a book and real examples
of the book. But that doesn't make it any more platonistic.

For Dave Pizer:
It is your last clause in which you jump to an unjustified conclusion.
Yes, the duplicate is not the same as the original. But I am not
the same person I was yesterday, either. This does not mean that
there has been any break in my consciousness, just that I am not
identical to my yesterday version. So why is it, then, that being
a "different person" in your definition means that there must have
been some kind of break in consciousness? Even more to the point,
how could we prove that one duplicate formed from another person
did not have the same consciousness as his/her original?

For both Bob and Dave:
If it will help, I repeat again that I doubt that this discussion
re duplicates will mean anything practical for hundreds of years,
but I too can be tempted to discuss philosophical points. I must
have that kind of mind. And I personally would not be at all 
surprized that if and when we really can duplicate people, we'll
also have empirical, quite NONphilosophical answers to the 
questions raised in this forum about it.

              Best wishes and long long life for all,

                    Thomas Donaldson

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