X-Message-Number: 21325 Date: Sun, 02 Mar 2003 00:46:23 -0700 From: Mike Perry <> Subject: Replies to Robert Ettinger and David Pizer Robert Ettinger writes, in connection with the uploading thesis (in which, in a fairly general context, "isomorphism is everything"): >... I have repeatedly pointed out, if you accept isomorphism >for matter and for space, why not also for time? I do accept it also for time, *but*, for the most general situation, I invoke a frame of reference which may be different from the universe as we know it. (This would be reasonable if, for instance, we were talking about beings in some other universe, and I think it is reasonable in other circumstances too.) >But this leads to what I >have called the "Turing Tome," an enormous book in which each page describes >the quantum state of the universe at a particular moment of time. If I understand it right, this would cause a problem because the book is, after all, just a static record, so what is described in it could not be conscious even though an isomorphism may exist between something inside the book and something outside it that *is* conscious. (That is to say, time is isomorphically modeled in the [very large] book, say, by page and line number rather than what we know as "time.") I would resolve this problem by noting that the book, if it is as complete as it should be, contains its own frame of reference, that is to say, its own version of space-time. Relative to *that* background it should be reasonable to say that beings which are suitably described in the book are conscious, have feelings, and so on. In this case the frame of reference is clearly something distinct from our own universe, so if we say that beings within the frame of reference are "conscious" in some sense, it does not mean in the usual sense that we ascribe to humans and other denizens of our own world. So we gain no extensions of the notion of consciousness, yet the notion that isomorphism determines consciousness in some sense, is not overturned. However, there are other situations we can imagine, in which the frame of reference *is* our own universe, but the entity in question is not, say, a human or animal, but an artificial construct that isomorphically emulates a known sentient creature. In this case, since the frame of reference is our own, I think we would be justified in regarding such a beastie as conscious, in the everyday sense. >... >Another aspect of the problem is that it becomes difficult or impossible to >distinguish existence from potential existence. Pi exists whether it is >written down in mathematical symbols or not, and in the same sense we >supposedly exist whether we are instantiated or not. You are therefore >already immortal, always have been and always will be--in fact, every version >of you and your history or possible histories. (Horrible thought!) Again, I would invoke a frame of reference argument here. In this case the "universe," we could say, is not only static but only potentially existent, not actually (fully) existent. So we don't have to fear that there are suffering creatures, as we usually understand "suffering," trapped in gazillions of digits of pi. As for any "horrible thought" that may be associated with "all possible histories," well, of course all the possible histories must include a fair share of bad events, but overall I am optimistic. Sentient beings want the good times, not the bad ones, and as they get smarter their capacity increases for bringing about what they want. Will this be enough, eventually, to produce a heavenly paradise in every domain in which it is possible? Time must tell--perhaps it will happen in our universe--but we will have to make it happen! Turning now to David Pizer, he is less than satisfied with the criticism to his argument on duplicates, and repeats the argument: >1. X is really distinct from Y if and only if X can exist without Y and Y can >exist without X > >2. By definition, a duplicate would have to be separate from the original to >qualify in the discussions/debates we have been having on this subject of >duplicates, on this forum. > >3. So if there was a real duplicate, it could exist apart from, and without, >the original, and by premise one it would be distinct. In other words a >duplicate is distinct from the original. > >4. Therefore, there is no time when a duplicate is the original. > >5. If you are the original (and we all are our originals), and a duplicate is >made of us, it is distinct, so if we die, even though the duplicate lives on, >we (the original) did not survive. He then comments: >This argument appears to be air-tight, so don't tell me about books and how >you feel when you wake up, if you want to prove a duplicate surviving the >original's death equals the survival of the original, find a hole in the >above argument. Here I will not attempt the full "proof" he is referring to, but I do think I can point out the hole that I see in his argument, in a bit different, hopefully clearer way than before. As I see it, his argument depends on strictly equating a person with his/her physical body (or at the very least, an important part such as the brain or a portion thereof; for simplicity I'll just refer to it as "the body."). This conforms to his beliefs about personhood. A person, at a particular time, is equated to a physical object. (The object may change over time, but only in certain, restricted ways that do not, for instance, allow it to be replaced all at once by another object, however similar.) If this equality does not hold, the argument falters. Thus, in statements 3-5 above, we should, for greater clarity, replace "original" with "original body" and similarly, "duplicate" with "duplicate body." This, I think, would much better reflect the intended point of view. #5 would then read: "If you are the original body (and we all are our original bodies), and a duplicate body is made of us, it is distinct, so if we die, even though the duplicate body lives on, we (the original body) did not survive." The main disagreement I have here is in the assertion "we all *are* our original bodies" (emphasis added). Again, clearly this premise is necessary to the whole argument. For those who accept it, the argument will seem airtight. It can then be stated more simply as, "a duplicate body is different from the original body, but we are the original body; therefore, if the original body does not survive, we do not survive, whether the duplicate body survives or not." But I have given reasons why I do not accept that you are, strictly speaking, your physical body, and I find these reasons (along with others) compelling. So for me the argument loses force. Mike Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=21325