X-Message-Number: 21362
Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2003 22:57:50 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Quantum Mechanics and Uploading

Robert Ettinger writes

>... More conservative uploaders believe that feeling is inherent in a special
>kind of programming, not yet understood, although perhaps understandable in
>principle. If organic systems (we) feel because of (say) a special kind of
>standing wave in the brain, then a symbolic analog of that, in (say) a
>classical digital computer, would also feel.

Quantum mechanics tells us that significant changes happen in discrete 
jumps, under laws that are Turing computable. Thus it should be possible, 
in principle, to simulate the interactions of a finite collection of 
particles over a finite time in a symbol-manipulating device such as a 
(classical) computer. (Or just possibly, it would require an exotic device 
such as a quantum computer, which I see also as a type of 
symbol-manipulation system, as does David Deutsch in *The Fabric of 
Reality*. I actually have doubts this sort of extra power--if it is 
that--would be needed in an absolute sense, though it could offer a 
substantial speedup.) Thus it should be possible to simulate a human or 
finite society of humans, down to the quantum level. The simulated humans 
should behave as conscious beings with feeling and, in particular, be able 
to communicate among themselves or with outside observers. They should be 
able to pass the Turing test, if we make a generous allowance for the time 
it may take to run the simulation. But much more than that, the simulated 
humans would have simulated brains with functioning parts isomorphic to the 
corresponding structures in human brains. I submit that, assuming quantum 
mechanics is a sufficiently accurate description of reality (and its track 
record is pretty good so far) there will be no way to "prove" that the 
simulated humans are not conscious or do not have feeling. Here is where I 
would gladly give the benefit of doubt, that is to say, I would accept 
these symbol-beings as really having the consciousness and feeling they 
seem on a deep level to have. To do otherwise would seem unjustifiably 
chauvinistic, a position akin to solipsism. So this is one argument that 
favors the uploading premise, at least in some of its possible guises, and 
I think it will not be easy to discount.

Mike Perry

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