X-Message-Number: 21362 Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2003 22:57:50 -0700 From: Mike Perry <> Subject: Quantum Mechanics and Uploading Robert Ettinger writes >... More conservative uploaders believe that feeling is inherent in a special >kind of programming, not yet understood, although perhaps understandable in >principle. If organic systems (we) feel because of (say) a special kind of >standing wave in the brain, then a symbolic analog of that, in (say) a >classical digital computer, would also feel. Quantum mechanics tells us that significant changes happen in discrete jumps, under laws that are Turing computable. Thus it should be possible, in principle, to simulate the interactions of a finite collection of particles over a finite time in a symbol-manipulating device such as a (classical) computer. (Or just possibly, it would require an exotic device such as a quantum computer, which I see also as a type of symbol-manipulation system, as does David Deutsch in *The Fabric of Reality*. I actually have doubts this sort of extra power--if it is that--would be needed in an absolute sense, though it could offer a substantial speedup.) Thus it should be possible to simulate a human or finite society of humans, down to the quantum level. The simulated humans should behave as conscious beings with feeling and, in particular, be able to communicate among themselves or with outside observers. They should be able to pass the Turing test, if we make a generous allowance for the time it may take to run the simulation. But much more than that, the simulated humans would have simulated brains with functioning parts isomorphic to the corresponding structures in human brains. I submit that, assuming quantum mechanics is a sufficiently accurate description of reality (and its track record is pretty good so far) there will be no way to "prove" that the simulated humans are not conscious or do not have feeling. Here is where I would gladly give the benefit of doubt, that is to say, I would accept these symbol-beings as really having the consciousness and feeling they seem on a deep level to have. To do otherwise would seem unjustifiably chauvinistic, a position akin to solipsism. So this is one argument that favors the uploading premise, at least in some of its possible guises, and I think it will not be easy to discount. Mike Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=21362