X-Message-Number: 21394
From: 
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2003 14:17:29 EST
Subject: Platonia

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Mike Perry writes in part:

> Suppose we have a 
> system, call it S, that simulates the brain at a deep level, though S 
> itself is computational and symbolic. S, then, passes reasonable tests for 
> awareness just like the real brain. Not only does it communicate, but 
> internal brain structures and their associated functioning: neurons, 
> synapses, molecular architectures, and so on, are all isomorphically 
> reproduced. Again, though, S is "only" a (very advanced and sophisticated) 
> computational device, and, at its *own* deepest level, is clearly not 
> functioning just like a brain. But I maintain that, under the circumstances 
> 
> and barring some fundamental new discovery about reality, there would be no 
> 
> reasonable proof or compelling argument that S does not have true 
> awareness.
> 

It seems compelling to me just to remember that a description or picture of a 
brick is not a brick and cannot be used in building a house. And this is not 
just because of the simplicity of the usual description or picture. As far as 
I can see, there can NEVER be any complete isomorphism between a computer and 
a different physical system. A computer-cum-program will always have some 
stuff in it that the simulated system does not, and will also lack some of 
the features of the simulated system, such as its compactness. To dramatize 
this, think of a Turing tape. So, to reach "isomorphism" you must mentally 
excise part of the system, or fix your attention on just certain parts of it, 
and cavalierly assume that these conceptually conjoined parts represent a 
full and true isomorphism. This is in addition to the already unjustified 
assumption that in itself isomorphism is enough.

(If I'm not being specific enough, once again think of the Turing tape or any 
digital computer. The only parts that are "isomorphic" to the simulated 
system are the occasional sets of numbers representing successive quantum 
states. Perhaps less importantly, these are also necessarily incomplete and 
inaccurate, since they are the results of programming done by people who did 
not know ALL of the facts and laws of the universe.)

Mike also mentions some current notions amounting to neo-Platonism. In fact, 
Julian Barbour, in his book The End of Time, actually proposes calling his 
version of the real world Platonia.

Robert Ettinger

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