X-Message-Number: 21397 Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2003 23:27:52 -0700 From: Mike Perry <> Subject: Symbols and Qualia Robert Ettinger writes >Thomas' previous point was much stronger--the simple fact that we will almost >certainly learn the anatomy/physiology of feeling, and finally understand the >physical basis of qualia. I too think we will almost certainly learn the physical basis of qualia (states or conditions implying consciousness). When we do, again, I think almost certainly we will be able to design systems that behave as if qualia were present. These new systems will isomorphically simulate the internal workings of those systems we already accept as having true qualia, while actually lacking at least some important element or component of these other systems. The question will then be whether we should regard the new systems as also having true qualia or being just unconscious imitations. It does not follow that, just because our new systems are different, we must consider them as unconscious imitations. Instead, we must ask what would be a rational basis for deciding the question one way or another, if such could be found. In particular, if someone were to claim that a simulating system is conscious, how would you "prove" him wrong? I (as one example of what Ettinger calls an upmorphist) have expressed the thought that, in a reasonable sense, a "proof" as I am referring to will be impossible in principle. >The basic weakness of the upmorphist position is >that it is a strategy of surrender, of accepting permanent ignorance and >helplessness. I don't see it that way, but instead, as a sober recognition of a certain possibility, which at this point seems likely to me but, I admit, could prove untrue. Yet, in any case, it is a legitimate subject of rational inquiry. The possibility would involve a "computer"--I call it that for want of a better term, though it may be different in many respects from today's machines. But this device, in its internal workings, would crunch bits or otherwise operate with what we would call "symbols." Yet it will be able, isomorphically, to simulate a system with qualia down to a very deep level, and will in all usual, behavioral respects seem to have consciousness and feeling. The possibility that I recognize is that there will be no good argument that this particular system in its working does *not* in fact have the consciousness and emotion it seems to exhibit, but is really only unconscious. I don't accept as a good argument a blanket assertion that, because it operates with symbols only, it cannot be conscious. I would ask for justification. Why is it that a system that works by processing symbols could not be conscious? I think I can see one reason many people *feel* that a symbol-processing system could not be conscious. It is because we can design very simple systems of this sort, and also rather complicated systems, that do not appear conscious though showing some of the expected features. But we can ask, should we think of them as totally unconscious or just having a low level of consciousness? If their level is low but nonzero (and I favor this view) it opens the door to systems of the same basic type (symbol-processing), but greater sophistication, having higher levels of consciousness, until, say, the human level is finally reached or surpassed. Mike Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=21397