X-Message-Number: 22286
From: 
Date: Sat, 2 Aug 2003 09:25:49 EDT
Subject: more simulation problems

--part1_17c.1ea6abdc.2c5d15dd_boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

John de Rivaz writes in part:

>Given that an example of the object can be made using atoms by
>nanotechnology, the next subject to consider is whether it is possible to
>make an example of the object using something else that nevertheless is the
>same in all other respect as the original.

Any analog or description or substitute must necessarily be different from 
the original in some ways. Whether these differences are important is the 

question, which we cannot answer with confidence before we understand the 
anatomy 
and physiology of feeling.

Mike Perry writes in part, reminding us of his previous statements:

>So how can a static 
>record have or contain consciousness? My answer is to invoke what I call a 
>frame of reference. The static record describes a world--a significant 
>portion of a universe--in which events are happening. Among the things 
>happening are all the biographical details of the person in question. 
>Relative to that world, then, it is reasonable to say that there is indeed 
>a conscious person with feeling. But that world is not our world, so we are 
>not forced to a conclusion that the described person is conscious as we 
>usually understand it. Our frame of reference differs--so a different rule 
>applies.

A valiant effort, but one that seems to me too slippery by far. 

"Feeling......relative to (a world of discourse)"? I don't think that has any 
semantic 

content. One might as well say that Mickey Mouse on screen is conscious, 
relative 
to the movie.

He also says it may be impossible to know for sure whether a simulation is 

actually conscious. But I think it is very likely that we can know. For example,
I suspect the self circuit, or a quale, must involve something like a 

standing wave, with spatial and temporal extension. If this is true, then we 
know a 
digital computer cannot be conscious, because the simulation is nothing but a 
succession of sets of numbers representing successive quantum states of the 
thing simulated. There is no binding of space or time. 

In addition, another reminder--the simulation MUST be wrong at least in some 
degree, since our knowledge of physics is imperfect and the simulation 

necessarily reflects today's theories only, even if everything else is 
accomplished 
with ideal perfection. Whether this would make a material difference again is 
something for the future.

Robert Ettinger


--part1_17c.1ea6abdc.2c5d15dd_boundary

 Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII"

[ AUTOMATICALLY SKIPPING HTML ENCODING! ] 

Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=22286