X-Message-Number: 22287
Date: Sat, 2 Aug 2003 08:16:58 -0700
Subject: Descartes season! Leibniz season! Descartes season!
From: Peter Merel <>

Robert Ettinger writes,

> Peter Merel offers ideas of "representation" as support for the notion 
> that
> computer simulations can be conscious.
>
> This is the nub. Leibniz mischaracterized Descartes. It is NOT a 
> matter of
> representation. Representation relates to cognition--important, but not
> essential. A quale is not a representation of consciousness or 
> personhood--it is the
> thing itself.

I agree that Leibniz mischaracterized Descartes just as the Simmons 
article suggests. Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between 
Leibniz's analysis and Descartes, and I believe that digging at that 
distinction will shed light here. At least localizing the disinction 
and agreeing on terms will help me understand you better.

So I'll ask some specific questions, and you can tell me "mu" if I'm 
too far off base for you to answer. I note before continuing that the 
following draws heavily on the personal philosophy of a brilliant 
friend of mine, Ken Happel:

1) Your sensors interact with some process in such a way that their 
behavior changes. Patterns (structures of relationship) among these 
behaviors represent sensations - for example, your representation of 
the colors in my shirt - yes/no/mu?

2) A pattern among your sensations across multiple sensors and over 
time represents an experience - for example, the floral pattern in my 
shirt - yes/no/mu?

3) A pattern in these experiences represent a definition or "thing" - 
for example, you saw the back of the shirt, and now you see the front 
of the shirt, and you represent them as experiences of a single shirt - 
yes/no/mu?

4) A pattern in these definitions represents a distinction or class - 
for example, you have seen a lot of shirts like this, and you 
distinguish them as instances of Hawaiian-shirt - yes/no/mu?

5) A pattern in these distinctions represents a method or metaphor - 
for example, shirts, cathedrals, umbrellas, and sunscreens are all ways 
of sheltering from the elements - yes/no/mu?

6) A pattern in these methods represents a methodology - for example 
Chris Alexander's pattern language of design, or Frank Lloyd Wright's 
organic architecture - yes/no/mu?

7) A pattern in methodologies represents a paradigm or philosophy - for 
example, Cartesian or Leibnizian - yes/no/mu?

At each step I use the word "represents" to indicate a process of 
mapping from a classification of observation to a classfication of 
expectation. This hierarchy of representation need not be lossy - that 
is to say, just because you classify some sensation as part of a 
Hawaiian shirt does not entail that you lose awareness of it as a 
distinct floral pattern, or as part of a fractal, or as red.

> Descartes was correct in saying that we KNOW our own existence, 
> because we
> have DIRECT information about our immediate feelings. We can be 
> mistaken about
> the implications of those feelings, or their relation to the outside 
> world, but
> we cannot be mistaken about the feelings themselves.

I agree.

> What some have called "Descartes' error" can also be called the 
> homunculus
> problem. If the central person is an observer, then must there be 
> another,
> smaller observer (homunculus) inside that one, etc.?
>
> There is no succession of homunculi. The parts or aspects of the brain 
> have
> many functions, including housekeeping and memory and cognition, as 
> well as
> consciousness. The essence of consciousness is feeling or qualia. A 
> quale is a
> physical phenomenon, not yet characterized. Once more, the quale does 
> not
> "represent" your feeling; it IS your feeling. In a sense, it is the 
> most basic part
> of you. And a description of a quale would not be a quale.

I'm not suggesting that a quale represents, but I suspect that a 
representation of a quale might also be a quale, per above. I am 
content that a quale is the signal of representation itself. But I am 
probably misunderstanding you, and I look forward to your responses and 
corrections.

Peter Merel.

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