X-Message-Number: 22292 From: Date: Sun, 3 Aug 2003 10:25:51 EDT Subject: questions and answers --part1_27.45857120.2c5e756f_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" I'm not sure if we're just treading water or making progress, but I'll keep trying to clarify my viewpoint and be sure I don't misunderstand the others. Peter Merel writes in part: >1) Your sensors interact with some process in such a way that their behavior changes. Patterns (structures of relationship) among these behaviors represent sensations - for example, your representation of the colors in my shirt - yes/no/mu?< I'm not sure what this means. But at some level(s) there are signals in my brain that represent things observed in the outside world, and there are also signals that represent cognitive events or structures in my brain. But at the conscious level the quale doesn't represent anything; it is the phenomenon of feeling, and of feeling something in particular. (A particular quale may be caused by or related to an outside object or event, and therefore could be said to "represent" it in that sense, but the primary feature of the quale is its existence as a subjective experience.) Peter goes on to discuss hierarchies of representation, but that is not central to what we are discussing, although interesting in itself. Also: >I'm not suggesting that a quale represents, but I suspect that a representation of a quale might also be a quale, per above. I am content that a quale is the signal of representation itself.< I think a quale may be "represented" only in the sense that its existence gives rise to other phenomena, so it is both a result and a cause, like any other physical phenomenon. One quale in an individual may even give rise to additional qualia, so in that sense the new qualia might be said to "represent" the first, a strained locution. Once again, the quale is unique in that it is the ultimate subjective thing-in-itself. In other words, I reject the notion that "a representation of a quale might also be a quale," because "representation" implies a difference or substitution. Different qualia feel different, so one cannot substitute for another. ------------ Tim Freeman writes in part: > What am I assuming that I'm also trying to establish?< He was trying to establish that "the simulation of an emotion is the emotion" and that "emotions etc. are computational properties." He was assuming that nothing essential would be changed if "the aliens landed while I was sleeping last night, ate all or part of my brain, and replaced the part they consumed with some other device that simulates the original computation." In other words, both his premise and his conclusion might be phrased, "The simulation of an emotion is an emotion." Thus, I repeat, he is assuming the very thing he is trying to establish, which is a no-no. Also, I had said, "A simulation is the same as the original only in some respects, not in all respects. You simply assume, as an article of faith, that the differences are not important." He responded, "No, I'm just refusing to multiply entities without cause. Show me a difference that I care about, and I'll make a distinction between a simulated emotion and a real emotion." This is just another way of saying he believes there can be no important difference between the original and the simulation. I have offered both general and specific reasons to think the differences could be important. He mentions virtual computation, but this is irrelevant. I never said that every simulation is worthless in all respects--far from it. Many simulations are in many respects valuable and even indispensable, and certainly a computation at a different level is just as good as one at the first level. Doesn't touch the issue, which is feeling. Finally, he writes: >I do things. Written descriptions don't do things. Life is about doing things. If you eliminate the possibility of doing things by eliminating the fancy devices, you're eliminating the essence of what consciousness is.......... a written description of me isn't me, but if you run the description in an environment where it can do the same sorts of interesting things that I normally do, it is me.< Several things here. First, whether we "do things" is an unsettled philosophical issue. Our understanding of time is essentially zero, and some writers subscribe to the "block" universe wherein past, present, and future coexist in some sense. Second, Dr. Freeman acknowledges that isomorphism isn't necessarily everything, since he rejects time isomorphism. But if some forms or aspects of isomorphism can be rejected, why not others? Dr. Perry accepts time isomorphism, albeit with tricky qualifications. Third, he ignores the incompleteness of our knowledge of physics; this incompleteness guarantees that, in the foreseeable future, any simulation will be inaccurate, with unknown implications for subjectivity. Additionally--and I'll stop here--he ignores all the issues related to formal systems. A programmed computer may be considered a realization of a formal system, and every formal system stands on shaky legs. Robert Ettinger --part1_27.45857120.2c5e756f_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1" [ AUTOMATICALLY SKIPPING HTML ENCODING! ] Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=22292