X-Message-Number: 22327
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2003 14:55:04 -0700 (PDT)
From: Scott Badger <>
Subject: Simulating Qualia 

I'm pretty new to these concepts so bear with me, but
I am having difficulty grokking Ettinger s notion of a
standing wave in the brain, the various states of
which constitute qualia (please feel free to refer me
to a more detailed treatise), or the idea that this is
the only way for my current self to connect with
previous and future selves for a sense of continuity.
I may be wrong, but this sounds like Dualism to me,
the mind-body split position I would not have expected
Dr. E to advocate. I, personally, hold that the mind
 is  what the brain  does ; much like digestion is
what the stomach does.

Here s my take. Based on what I ve been able to
gather, a quale is broadly defined as a consciously
accessible subjective experience. It is explained that
there is a difference between  knowing about  and
 knowing  the color red, for example. That difference
is purportedly between the physical and phenomenal
aspects of a thing. The argument is that knowing all
there is to know about red (e.g. wavelength, hues,
etc) does not equate with the actual experience of
seeing red. That only after actually seeing red can
one say,  So  that  is what it s like to see red . 

Actually, it seems to me there's a subjective aspect
to 'knowing about', too. It is possible for one to see
the color red and know virtually nothing else about
it. So a parallel argument can be made that knowing
what it is like to see red does not equate with the
actual experience of knowing all about red. Only after
learning all about red can one say,  So  that  is what
it is like to know about red . 

In other words, there is something that it is like to
 know about , and there is something that it is like
to  know , so it seems to me there is no important
phenomenological difference between  knowing about 
and  knowing . Put another way, everything we do has a
subjective aspect to it.

Anyway, in terms of explaining the nature of qualia, I
would hypothesize that qualia are nothing more than
the brain s  reaction  to sensory input, bodily
feelings, and cognitions. Or perhaps it would be more
accurate to say, it is the brain sensing of its own
reaction to raw information. This reaction I speak of
is a dynamic process of interpretation influenced by
multiple factors. It involves the biasing, tagging,
and coloring of raw perceptual data. It is brought
about because the brain functions to accommodate,
assimilate, classify, and integrate information for
the purposes of decision-making and story-building. We
are constantly contructing, deconstructing, and
reconstructing information and the process always
occurs in the presence of contexual filters that are
part of the interpretive process.

Strip raw perceptual data of all the brain's reactions
to it and you the equivalent of a computer capable of
using software to create and manipulate a database.
The human experience is essentially the
personalization of data.

I believe subjective experience requires affective as
well as cognitive components. Like consciousness
itself, qualia strike me as epiphenomenal side-effects
of normal brain processes. Consequently, if we can
accurately simulate a human brain with cognitive and
affective processes that can actually generate
consciousness, qualia should happen as a matter of
course.

Of course, I could be wrong.

=====
Scott Badger, Ph.D.
Member: ALCOR, Extropy Insitute, Life Extension Foundation
Assistant Professor/Researcher-University of Idaho
Two Original CD's "Phenom" and "Burdens" 
available at: www.mp3.com/scottbadger

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