X-Message-Number: 22397 From: Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2003 09:27:57 EDT Subject: more responses --part1_27.46802768.2c7622dd_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mike Perry writes in part: >Consider the following proposition: "One computer (generally) has many features lacking in another one, and conversely. Thus a simulation of one computer by another cannot be fully isomorphic." Yet we know it can (or can be "sufficiently isomorphic" at any rate), that is, one general-purpose machine can emulate another one.< Yes, one Turing computer is sufficiently isomorphic to another so they can do the same computations and are interchangeable in that respect. But we already know that a computer (ideally) will model a brain accurately enough to be "as good as" or "the same as" the brain in those particular ways and to the accuracy allowable. The question is whether that is sufficient, and I know of no good reason to be confident that it is. And: >f a theory of everything can be developed, it would seem to indicate that reality as a whole can be regarded as a formal system< I don't follow that. A formal system differs from reality in several ways--most importantly, the formal system uses symbols that have no meaning except in the context of a metalanguage. (Conceivably, a sufficiently large language might allow of only one interpretation, but that has not been proven.) Also, in most formal systems of interest there are formally undecidable propositions, which hardly seems allowable for reality. Also, the undefined terms in the formal system may have unclear meaning even in the metalanguage. This is a formidable philosophical problem, including the basics of ontology. Nobody has a clear idea of what a "thing" or "object" is. Finally: >On the other hand, we may ask, really, what is meant by "formal system." Does it imply "predictable"? If that is true, then all we need is to equip our computer with a quantum random number generator, and it ceases to be a formal system.< The full ramifications of this would be lengthy, but among other things it underscores the point that a general purpose digital computer is a classical system. It can calculate quantum quantities--as you could with pencil and paper--but it itself is classical. The present mathematical formulations of quantum physics allow only calculations of probabilities, and in particular of the most probable successor state of a simulated system. And again, for ultimate integrity you need the quantum state of the universe, which may not even be meaningful, since the wave equation reflects probabilities, which referred to the whole universe has no clear interpretation. Robert Ettinger > > --part1_27.46802768.2c7622dd_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" [ AUTOMATICALLY SKIPPING HTML ENCODING! ] Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=22397