X-Message-Number: 2332
Date: 08 Jul 93 03:09:34 EDT
From: Mike Darwin <>
Subject: CRYONICS Response to Tanya Jones' CRYOMSG# 2323


From: Mike Darwin
Date: 5 July, 1993
Re: Response to Tanya Jones' CRYOMSG #2323


     1) Tanya (and Charles Platt) have stated that they feel the issue  of 
the care A-1399 received should be covered in the political section of the 
net (i.e., File 14).  I disagree.  I can think of no more basic issue than 
the quality of care that Alcor and other cryonic organizations deliver  to 
their  members/clients.   The  issues  at  stake  here  (chlorine   bleach 
contamination of the perfusate being only one) are primarily technical and 
procedural.

     While I would be the first to grant that the root of the problems  is 
managerial/interpersonal/political,  that  does  not  alter  the   primary 
issues: the level of care a patient received, the level of care subsequent 
patients  are likely to receive, and the way this care is  documented  and 
problems with it are handled.

     I  can  think  of  no issues more critical  to  those  interested  in 
cryonics  either  personally  or  peripherally.   If  the  information  is 
damaging  to  the  promotion of cryonics or to its  image,  then  that  is 
unfortunate, but not nearly as important as insuring that: 1) problems are 
corrected, 2) there is open discussion, and 3) that members and  potential 
members  are  aware of the reality of the situation,  however  adverse  to 
member recruitment or retainment that may be.

     2)  Tanya states that her article is "objective" and  "comprehensive" 
with  the aim of providing her (sic) with methods for future  improvement.  
She  also states "The entire tone of my article is one  of  encouragement, 
because  in its entirety (as opposed to dissecting  details)  it  answered 
an essential unknown.  This suspension demonstrated that Alcor is able  to 
perform cryonic suspensions without the services of Mike Darwin, and  even 
the  mistakes which surfaced during suspensions with Mike's  participation 
were  largely  avoided.  ... If this isn't  encouraging  news  to  Alcor's 
membership, I'm at a loss for what to say."

     My  response  to this is to review the care  this  patient  received.  
Please  be advised that the problems I detail below  are ones of  which  I 
have become aware by reading Tanya's incomplete article in CRYONICS and by 
talking  with  several  people  who were present.   I  have  not  had  the 
opportunity to review the case notes, go over the lab data, or talk in  an 
extensive way with the principals.  Tanya and Hugh were invited (and were, 
according  to Steve Bridge) going to come over to Biopreservation  and  go 
over   this   data   with  me,  however   this   never   occurred.    This 
notwithstanding, this is what I do know went wrong:

     a) Despite the presence of clear agonal signs the team leader (Tanya) 
and other skilled personnel were not summoned back to the hospital.   This 
reportedly occurred because personnel left attending the patient were  not 
competent  to  determine  that  skin  color  changes  in  the  extremities 
(cyanosis  and  mottling)  were an agonal sign. Further,  according  to  a 
principal  present  at  the scene, when Tanya left,  there  was  no  clear 
delegation  of responsibility.  This resulted in a very  poorly  organized 
response to cardiac arrest.  Further, despite a prior positive  California 
court ruling, a decision was made to accede to the hospital's unreasonable 
demand  that  respiratory  and circulatory support be  withheld  from  the 
patient until he was off hospital premises.  The net result was that  this 
patient experienced a potentially avoidable period of 15 to 20 minutes  of 
ischemia at near normothermia.

     b)  No  samples were taken during  initial  cardiopulmonary  support.  
There was very little sample taking during MALSS support (apparently  only 
one sample at the beginning and one at the end).  This makes it  difficult 
to  assess  the  quality  of this support  and  further,  to  assess  when 
hypochlorite contamination occurred and to what extent.

     There  were,  according to Hugh Hixon, no blood gases  done  and  few 
samples  taken  during cryoprotective perfusion.  One  reason  that  blood 
gases  were not done was that the blood gas unit was down at the  time  of 
the  suspension;  a condition in which it had been for at  least  6  weeks 
prior to the time this patient deanimated (I know this because Hugh  asked 
me  about  disposables and parts and we discussed the  problem).   Because 
there is no blood gas data it is now not possible to tell what impact  the 
bleach  contamination had on the patient's metabolism.  If metabolism  was 
still  intact  (as  indicated by oxygen  utilization  and  carbon  dioxide 
generation) things would be considerably more hopeful.

     c)  According  to  one  observer present, a  cannula  and  line  were 
improperly  anchored  in the operating field and were pulled  out  of  the 
patient  during cryoprotective perfusion.  The photo which appears on  the 
bottom  of page 19 of CRYONICS shows what appear to be cannulae  in  place 
without  the conductive tubing anchored to the tubing holder.  This  is  a 
violation  of one of the cardinal rules of cardiopulmonary  bypass.   This 
incident  was not mentioned in the case report: it is thus  impossible  to 
assess whether it was an arterial or venous cannula and whether or not (if 
it  was  the aortic root cannula) appropriate steps were taken  to  insure 
that air was not perfused upon reinstituting circulation.

     4)   Cardiotomy  suction  was not set-up initially  and  it  was  not 
discovered that the patient was losing large volumes of perfusate  through 
the  chest  wound until the recirculating perfusate volume was  very  low.  
Recently on Cryonet, Tim Freeman asked if it was possibly the bleach  that 
caused  the high terminal glycerol concentration.  The answer is  that  it 
was not the bleach, but the loss of a large fraction of circulating volume 
to  the  table  top, which in turn increased the  steepness  and  terminal 
concentration  of  the  glycerol introduction ramp.   This  also  was  not 
documented in Tanya's article.

     d)  A  concentration of hypochlorite which is corrosive to  skin  and 
metal  was added to the water bath bathing the patient.  This resulted  in 
leakage  of  wall  water  into  the  perfusate  and  denaturation  of  the 
hemoglobin  of  the patient's circulating red  cells  strongly  suggesting 
exposure  of  the patient to toxic concentrations of  hypochlorite.   Even 
after  this  incident  occured  no one  bothered  to  read  the  product's 
instructions before implemenmting a policy change.  This indicates a  lack 
of thoroughness in dealing with the problem; both in investigating it  and 
in preventing its recurrence.

     If the above constitutes encouraging news to Alcor members about  the 
quality  of cryonic suspension care they are likely to receive then it  is 
not Tanya, but *I* who am at a loss for words.

     I  am insulted that Tanya equates this sorry performance with my  own 
work in caring for Alcor patients.

     3) I do not, as Tanya states, feel that "lithium analyses...would  be 
a good indicator of the contamination levels in this case."  I believe  it 
would be a good place to start. I would not have used a clinical test  for 
lithium  since it is quite possible that lithium hypochlorite levels  well 
under  0.10 mEq/L (the lower end of clinical sensitivity) would  be  quite 
damaging.   The  only  way to evaluate the severity of  this  injury  with 
confidence is to have recourse to the animal lab.

     As  to  Hugh's  assessment that no harm was likely  done:  the  short 
answer  is,  who knows?  Many, many variables are present  in  this  case.  
They  need to be systematically evaluated by an outside group.  Why?   See 
point #4 below.

     4)  Tanya states that "Hugh discarded the idea of using  an  external 
investigator, like Mike suggests.  His reasons included: that  independent 
investigations  are usually initiated to seek out manufacturing or  design 
deficiencies; and that corrosion by a powerful disinfectant falls  outside 
the standard arena for external examination."  

     There is no gentle way to respond to a statement like this other than 
to note that it is grossly  wrong.  Most medical accidents are human error 
of  exactly the kind that occurred in this situation.  While  devices  are 
sometimes  at fault, that is not the usual case since quality  control  on 
the  people  using them is usually far less stringent and  objective  than 
that  on  the devices themselves.  The reasons that outside  agencies  are 
used to investigate accidents are as follows:

     a)  People involved in the accident and/or the people who  caused  it 
rarely  make  good, objective evaluators.  There is simply too much  of  a 
tendency  to  try to see the accident in the best possible  light  and  to 
minimize  its seriousness.  This is a natural human tendency and is  known 
as a "conflict of interest."

     b)   And more to the point, even if they *were* to be objective  they 
lack  the necessary credibility since they are *involved*.  Brenda  Peters 
has  posted a piece which all but accuses me of engaging in  mud  slinging 
and  irresponsible  hysteria  in my letter to the  editor  regarding  this 
incident.  I do not believe that that is the case, and further, I  believe 
that   the  emotions  I  have  expressed  have  been  both  reserved   and 
appropriate.   However, the point here is simple: investigation by a  more 
objective  third party would squelch such criticism from me, or  at  least 
eliminate its credibility -- if such is justified.  That is precisely  the 
point!

     5)  An excellent possibility for an investigative agency would be the 
nonprofit   Emergency   Care   Research   Institute   (ECRI).    ECRI   is 
a  multidisciplinary  agency made up of  chemists,  biomedical  engineers, 
physicians,  lawyers  and allied health professionals.   ECRI  has  strong 
conflict  of  interest rules and has as its primary  mission  "to  improve 
safety,  efficacy  and  cost  effectiveness  of  health  care  technology, 
facilities  and procedures."  A key function of ECRI is  medical  accident 
and forensic investigation services.  There are similar agencies to  ECRI, 
and  further,  there  are technical and medical  people  in  the  cryonics 
community who would probably be willing to help if asked -- believe it  or 
not  I would have been among them had I been invited to be on  the  inside 
rather than on the outside of this incident.   It is still not too late to 
do this, and I urge Alcor to follow this course of action.

     6) Tanya states that "Jerry Leaf spent time documenting protocols for 
cryonic  suspension (over a decade ago), and those protocols were  removed 
from Alcor by Cryovita and weren't available for me to study when I  began 
learning about suspensions."

     This  statement  is so incomplete, and such a  coarse  distortion  of 
reality that I believe it constitutes an either outright lie or to be more 
charitable  evidence that Tanya never bothered to examined  these  binders 
while  they sat for a year at Alcor.  The material Tanya is  referring  to 
consists of blue three-ring binders containing not specific "protocols for 
cryonic  suspension"  but  basic training  material  covering  physiology, 
anatomy,  sterile  technique, and so on copied from standard  text  books.  
This material was prepared by Jerry as supplemental training material  for 
his course.  

     More  to the point, this material sat on the shelf at  Alcor/Cryovita 
for  a  period of nearly a year after I left, during much  of  which  time 
Tanya had full access to this material!  When Paul Wakfer finally  removed 
it  last  June  it was still sitting on the shelves where  it  had  rested 
undisturbed  and covered with dust throughout Tanya's tenure.  If she  was 
even  slightly interested in this material (much of which is  badly  dated 
and  inappropriate to current needs) what was to prevent her from  copying 
it?   Further, what was to prevent her from going to similar, more  up  to 
date text books and copying it?

     This is the kind of unfortunate distortion of the truth which I  have 
found unacceptable in dealing with Tanya in the past and it is the primary 
reason  why I will not work with her and do not trust her to deliver  good 
care to cryonics patients.

     7)  Tanya states that "Hugh was unable to immediately answer  all  of 
Mike's  concerns  to his satisfaction."  She then goes on to note  that  I 
similarly  called  Steve Bridge and found  his  responses  unsatisfactory.  
It is not that Hugh was *immediately* unable to answer my concerns, it was 
his  attitude  in  dealing with them.  An attitude I  perceived  then  and 
now  as  blase  fatalism.  This is the  same  irresponsible  and  uncaring 
attitude  which  so often characterized Hugh's delivery  of  patient  care 
during the decade that I worked with him.  I have not forgotten that  this 
is  the  same  man who during my tenure at Alcor has  walked  out  of  the 
operating room with a patient being perfused on the table, and gone to his 
room  (more  than once) to read a science fiction book  without  notifying 
ANYONE and in the meanwhile leaving the blood gas machine unattended.   My 
patience  with Hugh and my confidence in his diligence in delivering  good 
cryonic care was exhausted long, long before this incident.  I hope that I 
can  be  forgiven for reacting as I did, but it was not because it  was  a 
distressing  new  pattern, but rather because it was a  distressing  *old* 
one.

     8)   Tanya  then goes on to essentially agree with  me  stating  that 
"Unfortunately  this  isn't  indicative of a fatalistic  attitude,  it  is 
indicative of a more serious problems."  Please note that Tanya said  this 
first.   And for once we agree completely.  It *is* indicative of  a  more 
serious problem.  But Tanya is mistaken if she believes it is just  Hugh's 
problems or even mostly Hugh's problem.  The reality is that it is  mostly 
Tanya's  problem.   Tanya is the Team Leader, Tanya is  "Alcor  Suspension 
Services  Manager."  It is *Tanya's job* to see to it that Hugh  does  his 
work,  does  it professionally, and does it in a timely  fashion.   If  he 
fails in this, it is Tanya's job to go up the chain of command and  demand 
appropriate  action, disciplinary or otherwise, to insure that  it  *does* 
get done.

     Yes,  I  was  disgusted at the way this  incident  was  handled.   An 
undetected   wall water leak into the extracorporeal circuit is usually  a 
major  disaster.  It ranks right up there with pumping air.  The  presence 
of a visible color change in the perfusate is very ominous.  In a clinical 
setting such a change would mean certain death for the patient.  I thought 
that  it  deserved to be treated with gravity and to be dealt  with  in  a 
professional manner.  I still feel this is the case.

     9)   In  Tanya's CRYONICS article, she goes on at some  length  about 
having a relaxed suspension working environment; and in her CRYOMSG #2323, 
she  states  that she has "found  profound grief  and  soul-searching  (as 
advocated  by Mike) to be an unproductive combination, and have  therefore 
preferred to address damage assessment and solutions rather than  berating 
myself or poorly trained but willing volunteers."

     My  response  to  this  is to note that  this  is  at  variance  with 
everything I have learned and seen in critical care medicine and in  other 
technically  demanding  areas such as neuro- and cardiac  surgery.   Jerry 
Leaf  himself  remarked that he felt real tension and anxiety  before  and 
during each suspension.  Part of success in any such complex life-or-death 
task is to have a sense of presence and awareness of what everyone else is 
doing.    This  is  especially  so  in  when  utilizing  "poorly   trained 
volunteers."  Curtis Henderson has noted that "Alcor wants happy cryonics, 
and  that  is  not possible."  I agree with him.  This  kind  of  "anxious 
vigilance"  has  been  summarized by the  consummate  neurosurgeon  Robert 
Spetzler in the book THE HEALING BLADE by Edward Sylvester which documents 
the work of neurosurgeons using deep hypothermia and circulatory arrest at 
the Barrow's Neurological Institute in Phoenix, Arizona:

"We  were  talking about what a neurosurgeon does to prepare for  a  major 
case like this. You go over the procedure, and over it again, and over  it 
again,  he said. You simply repeat every step you are going to do  and  go 
through every possible thing that can go wrong.  And then you do it again.
     You go over the procedure so often it cannot leave your mind;  that's 
the  point.   Then it is the night before surgery.  As you drift  down  to 
sleep, you are in the operating room, and you cut the wrong side.  Or  you 
see a vein or an artery, and you cut right through it.  Stupid things, all 
the  things  you  prepared yourself never to do since your  first  day  of 
residency, you're doing them.  And that wakes you up.  And then you  think 
about the procedure, and as you fall asleep, it comes again.  On the night 
before a major case you never really *sleep*. Running things through  your 
mind.   And  then after a repose full of nightmares you go in and  do  the 
procedure...Procedure  is the key word to neurosurgery.  A procedure   has 
specified steps that can and must be choreographed and rehearsed; it has a 
beginning,  a  middle,  and  an end. *Most important,  it  must  not  have 
surprises."  (Emphasis mine.)

     While  I  do not wish to be seen as advocating  paralyzing  grief  or 
depressive  inaction,  I feel that success depends on *all*  the  elements 
being  there.  Saying "the operation was a great success but  the  patient 
died"  doesn't cut it.  Saying that the shuttle launch was  perfect,  with 
myriad things being done right except for this little problem with the  O-
rings doesn't cut it either.  At least not with me.

     When mortality or morbidity causing errors are made in medicine,  the 
presence of remorse and grief in those who made them is considered healthy 
and  normal.   It is a measure of the propriety of the  value  systems  of 
those  experiencing  them and a significant deterrent to a repeat  of  the 
accident.   While I do not know what Tanya is actually  feeling  regarding 
this  incident, I can only say that I do not have much evidence  of  these 
emotions as expressed in her response.

     If that is the level of care with which everyone else is satisfied, I 
can live with that.  And if Tanya's and Hugh's standard of performance  in 
this  matter is considered acceptable, indeed even praiseworthy  to  those 
who  are using their services, that's fine too.  But I do not consider  it 
acceptable for myself, my loved ones, or for the profession of cryonics as 
a whole.

     Further,  it is my belief that in the long run people in general  are 
not  interested  in excuses or explanations, but rather in  good  outcome. 
Period.

     10)   Even  in  the most excellent  medical  centers  errors  happen.  
Highly  skilled people make mistakes too.  I have certainly made my  share 
in  both clinical and cryonic medicine.   It may be argued that I  am  the 
LAST  person  who  should be criticizing Tanya  and  Alcor's  performance.  
Perhaps  this  is so.  But my central point when I first  spoke  to  Steve 
Bridge  about this is that *I* shouldn't be in a position where  this  was 
possible,  let  alone necessary.  As Tanya herself points out  in  several 
places  in her response: prior to my undertaking to make an issue of  this 
incident NOTHING was actually being done.  That, and the way in which this 
matter  has  been  handled  is  the *real problem.*   I  do  not  feel  it 
inappropriate that I took the tack that I did or that I wrote the letter I 
wrote.   In  point  of  fact  it appears to  have  been,  by  Tanya's  own 
admission, the approach which resulted in action.  Certainly her  approach 
had not yeilded progress.

     11)  Finally, I wish to point out that there are a couple  errors  of 
fact in Tanya's Cryonics article which bear correcting.  This case was not 
the  first case in which a neuropatient's pulmonary artery (PA)  was  tied 
off.  I believe this was done in every (or almost every) suspension  since 
that  of  A-1260  and perhaps before.  I know this  because  I  personally 
ligated A-1260's PA and instructed/observed our contract surgeon doing the 
same  in  subsequent cases.  The operative record sheet which  contains  a 
diagrammatic  representation  of the surgery in the patients'  case  notes 
will document this.

     Readers  should  also be aware that it is these case notes,  and  the 
detailed,  written case histories (which are available on several  of  the 
Alcor  patients) which constitute the "protocols" which Tanya  would  have 
profited  most  from  studying.   These  have  been  in  Alcor's   custody 
continuously.

     Tanya  also states, in her CRYONICS article, that  "nerves  typically 
perfuse  poorly  when  compared to other organs."  To  my  knowledge  this 
statement is not correct.  In fact, I would state that based on both human 
and  animal  experience, the brain and spinal cord *perfuse*  better  than 
many  other  organs,  even after  significant  intervals  of  normothermic 
ischemia.   Similarly,  the brain experiences dehydration and  failure  to 
*equilibrate*  well with perfused cryoprotectant, about as well or  poorly 
as  many other tissues including skin, skeletal, and cardiac muscle.   The 
point  here  that vascular perfusion and equilibration  of  cryoprotectant 
across the cell membrane are two different things.

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