X-Message-Number: 24870 From: "Michael C Price" <> References: <> Subject: Immortalism vs. Life Extensionism Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 00:58:58 +0100 Like Ben, I have snipped bits here and there to reduce the length of the message -- without distortion, I hope. > Discounting of future values is part of the way people > rationally allocate resources. You can call it hard-wired as > a dismissive way of calling it irrational, but I believe the > opposite -- that it is rational. Some discounting -- due the real rate of return on capital -- is rational by a purely economic analysis, but the rest is subjective and value driven. [......] > In order for a person to not be discounting the future, the > prospect of not living one million million years would have > to be one million times more significant than the prospect > of not living one million years. I have an erratum which I hope clarifies your point: I misstated my views earlier when I compared the values of living to different spans and then dying, which I fear has lead to some misunderstanding of "the" -- or at least "my" -- immortalist position. Rather than try to compare the value of different, finite length lifespans, I would rather say that *all* finite lifespans have the same value to me, namely zero. [.......] > The fact that you would find it not worth living another > 10 years if you knew for a certainty that there is no hope > that you could live a googolplex number of years -- or for > Eternity -- is [....] an issue more relevant to the subjectivity > of value than the discounting of future values. If this is truly > the way that you feel, That all finite lifespans are valueless. > I am > somewhat amazed by it, but I can recognize that you > may genuinely feel this way or have these values. Thank you. > I was > similarly amazed when I first became interested in > cryonics and I discovered how indifferent most people > seem to be to the prospect of living less than 100 years. Exactly. I remain equally amazed that any cryonaut or other life-extensionist, can find solace in thinking that they are merely going to live a long time, but not forever. [......] > Whatever can go wrong > will go wrong -- especially when there is Eternity. > Things can go right a million million times, but things > only need go wrong once to obliterate you forever. Not if you're distributively and continuously backed up in real-time across multiple basement universes. Or if you believe that your identity at an earlier time can be shared, to some extent, amongst backups/ duplicates at a later time. [....] >>> Worrying about how to become "immortal" is worse >>> than worrying about how to get from (Y) to (Z). >> >> My take is the complete opposite; worrying about how >> to become immortal is what makes me take anti-aging >> supplements *now*. > > Again, this seems to be in the realm of your value > structure versus mine -- beyond argument. No, pursuing an anti-aging strategy *now* is a logical consequence of *both* immortalist and life-extensionist values. Behaviourally they are the same (or at least very similar, I should say, to be exact). [......] > I don't regard immortality as undesirable -- simply > unattainable. I want to live as long as possible. And I want to live forever, irrespective of its perceived attainability. That's the difference in values again. > Unrelated to this fact, however, are other problems > I see with "immortalists" and their attitudes -- such > as the longing for a belief that immortality has been > attained -- a belief that I believe is unattainable almost > by definition -- and a belief which I believe can lead to > reduction of diligence and hastening of death. You're right, this is an unrelated problem. See my last but one comment. Cheers, Michael C Price Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=24870