X-Message-Number: 24959 From: "Michael C Price" <> References: <> Subject: Probability of resurrection alternatives is meaningless? Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2004 07:32:20 -0000 Mike Perry makes a good point with his analogy between infinitely scarce techno-Hells and being released from a Poeian Hell by the flip of a coin, on a daily basis. Yes, I too might accept such a sentence in return for a million pounds (or even dollars). But I think there is a fundamental difference between being in a situation where you know the objective future branch probabilities (i.e. release from the "Pit and the Pendulum" scenario based on a coin flip) and trying to assign prior probabilities or weights to where subjectively you seem to end up after being copied, which Universal Resurrection requires. Do probabilities exist in the UR scheme? What I mean by this is: if your consciousness is copied, and then diverges, can you assign a prior subjective probability to each subsequent branch of your world-line, of "ending up in it"? It seems to me that we cannot assign prior subjective probabilities for two reasons: 1) they are non-operational quantities. No experiment can ever measure them. This should make us suspect that they are meaningless or "metaphysical" in the Ayerian sense. 2) contradictions abound with them. If Mike is copied to create MikeA and MikeB then symmetry says they have equal probabilities? But what if MikeB is subsequently copied again? Do we have a symmetric situation amongst all three, or is it a 1/2, 1/4, 1/4 split? Equally convincing arguments can be made for both sets of weights, it seems, which is contradictory. For these reasons we cannot assign prior subjective probabilities to where we end up when copied. Therefore we cannot dismiss even infinitely scarce techno-Hells as places we are "unlikely" to be revived in. All we can say is that if they exist they will contain copies of us. Same for techno-Heavens. Cheers, Michael C Price Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=24959