X-Message-Number: 25064 Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2004 03:14:45 -0800 Subject: The Duplication Procedure (To Francois) From: <> Dear Francois, You wrote: "It is really worth examining the concept of identity because it is very important to the whole cryonic experiment. Lets say that I volunteer for an experimental duplication procedure. The procedure in question must be performed while I'm under general anasthesia, so I won't be aware of it. I lie down on an operating table and I'm 'put under'. When I wake up, I'm in a hospital bed. There is a second bed in the room, with someone who looks exactly like me who is also waking up. We look at each other. Then what?" Now there are two individuals in the room, each with their own distinct qualia experiencer. However, from the view of the qualia experiencer of individual A, the existence of another qualia experiencer (identical in atomic arrangement) is useless for the purpose of personal survival. If individual A died, just as individual B came into existence, the qualia experiencer of A would still be destroyed. The creation of a new qualia experiencer, no matter the form of this qualia experiencer, does not extend the subjective inner life of individual A. [snip] You wrote: "There are in fact only two people in the room, the scientist and Francois." Only if you define 'people' in a very strange way. There are in fact, three people in the room, all of which have separate qualia experiencers. That both individual A and individual B have the same atomic arrangement is irrelevant to the separateness of their identities. They are not the same person: they have completely distinct(even if atomically identical) qualia experiencers. You wrote: "Obviously, what individual A feels is not shared by individual B. If the scientists pricks individual A's hand with a needle, individual B will not feel it. A and B cannot read each other minds and each has different memories of what happened after they woke up. They however have the same memories of what happened before. If they are not told which one physically walked into the lab to undergo the duplication procedure ans which one is the result of that procedure, they will never be able to decide which one is which." This is true. But the *fact* of the matter is that one went into the lab to undergo the procedure, and the other one did not. This is an objective fact of reality which cannot be changed by the confusion of the individuals. If individual A died during the duplication, instead of surviving, then he would be dead; there would be no mystical 'transferring of essence' to individual B. You wrote: 'This is an extremely bizarre concept. Effectively, Francois exists in individual A's location as well as individual B's.' There are two individuals who have the same atomic makeup. If they were the same individual, they would have the same location, and the same qualia experiencer, which is clearly false. There is only 'one individual' in the sense that both individuals have the same memory and personality traits, but this won't help one of them survive when the other dies. You wrote: "Both subjectively experience continuity of identity with the pre- duplication Francois. If either A or B were to die at this point, Francois would continue to live as the surviving individual." No, this is true only if you define 'Francois' as memory + personality, which is absurd. This neglects the most important aspect of Francois: the qualia experiencer. Without the qualia experiencer, Francois would not experience anything. He would be like a rock. The fact is, there are two qualia experiencers. Two subjective inner-lives. Bringing one of these lives to an end does not enable its qualia experiencer to 'jump' hosts to the other individual. You wrote: "If we now consider the qualia aspect, would Francois truly exist in both A and B, or would we end up with two distinct qualia experiencers." What do you mean, 'end up' with two distinct qualia experiencers? Individual A always had a qualia experiencer. A new qualia experiencer was created as individual B was constructed. The fact that these two DISTINCT qualia experiencers have the same atomic arrangement does not make them the same qualia experiencer. A duplicate of a thing is not that thing; it is a duplicate. This is not thinking about the matter clearly, in my view. [snip] Best Regards, Richard B. R. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25064