X-Message-Number: 25064
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2004 03:14:45 -0800
Subject: The Duplication Procedure (To Francois)
From: <>

Dear Francois,

You wrote:

"It is really worth examining the concept of identity because it is 
very important to the whole cryonic experiment. Lets say that I 
volunteer for an experimental duplication procedure. The procedure 
in question must be performed while I'm under general anasthesia, 
so I won't be aware of it. I lie down on an operating table and I'm 
'put under'. When I wake up, I'm in a hospital bed. There is a 
second bed in the room, with someone who looks exactly like me who 
is also waking up. We look at each other. Then what?"

Now there are two individuals in the room, each with their own 
distinct qualia experiencer. However, from the view of the qualia 
experiencer of individual A, the existence of another qualia 
experiencer (identical in atomic arrangement) is useless for the 
purpose of personal survival. If individual A died, just as 
individual B came into existence, the qualia experiencer of A would 
still be destroyed. The creation of a new qualia experiencer, no 
matter the form of this qualia experiencer, does not extend the 
subjective inner life of individual A.

[snip]

You wrote:

"There are in fact only two people in the room, the scientist and
Francois."

Only if you define 'people' in a very strange way. There are in 
fact, three people in the room, all of which have separate qualia 
experiencers. That both individual A and individual B have the same 
atomic arrangement is irrelevant to the separateness of their 
identities. They are not the same person: they have completely 
distinct(even if atomically identical) qualia experiencers. 

You wrote:

"Obviously, what individual A feels is not shared by individual B. 
If the scientists pricks individual A's hand with a needle, 
individual B will not feel it. A and B cannot read each other minds 
and each has different memories of what happened after they woke 
up. They however have the same memories of what happened before. If 
they are not told which one physically walked into the lab to 
undergo the duplication procedure ans which one is the result of 
that procedure, they will never be able to decide which one is 
which."

This is true. But the *fact* of the matter is that one went into 
the lab to undergo the procedure, and the other one did not. This 
is an objective fact of reality which cannot be changed by the 
confusion of the individuals. If individual A died during the 
duplication, instead of surviving, then he would be dead; there 
would be no mystical 'transferring of essence' to individual B.

You wrote:

'This is an extremely bizarre concept. Effectively, Francois exists 
in
individual A's location as well as individual B's.'

There are two individuals who have the same atomic makeup. If they 
were the same individual, they would have the same location, and 
the same qualia experiencer, which is clearly false. There is only 
'one individual' in the sense that both individuals have the same 
memory and personality traits, but this won't help one of them 
survive when the other dies.

You wrote:

"Both subjectively experience continuity of identity with the pre-
duplication Francois. If either A or B were to die at this point, 
Francois would continue to live as the surviving individual."

No, this is true only if you define 'Francois' as memory + 
personality, which is absurd. This neglects the most important 
aspect of Francois: the qualia experiencer. Without the qualia 
experiencer, Francois would not experience anything. He would be 
like a rock.

The fact is, there are two qualia experiencers. Two subjective 
inner-lives. Bringing one of these lives to an end does not enable 
its qualia experiencer to 'jump' hosts to the other individual. 

You wrote:

"If we now consider the qualia aspect, would Francois truly exist 
in both A and B, or would we end up with two distinct qualia 
experiencers."

What do you mean, 'end up' with two distinct qualia experiencers? 
Individual A always had a qualia experiencer. A new qualia 
experiencer was created as individual B was constructed.  The fact 
that these two DISTINCT qualia experiencers have the same atomic 
arrangement does not make them the same qualia experiencer. A 
duplicate of a thing is not that thing; it is a duplicate. 

This is not thinking about the matter clearly, in my view.

[snip]

Best Regards,

Richard B. R.

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