X-Message-Number: 25109
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 17:08:44 -0800 (PST)
From: Scott Badger <>
Subject: Re: The Richard and Mike's debate

I hope it's OK to intrude into this discussion. First,
a disclaimer: I am no expert and may not clearly
understand some of the terms used here. Feel free to
correct any misconceptions.

Perry wrote: "There is no qualia experiencer. There is
no separation between the events defined as an
experience and the body-mind in which those events
take place."

Richard replied: "I personally have never claimed a
separation. In my view, the brain, a purely physical
thing, experiences qualia."

Your statement seems contradictory to me. In asserting
that the brain 'experiences' qualia, you're implicitly
claiming a separation exists between experiencer and
experience. But if the mind 'is' what the brain
'does', as you suggest, what need is there for a
homunculus? even for the construct of qualia? 

You seem to buy into Chalmers ideas, except you insist
that the experiencer is a physical part of the brain.
Chalmer says that understanding the functioning of the
parts of the brain will not suffice to explain the
internal subjective 
'experience' (i.e. qualia); much the same way that an
advocate of Vitalism would claim that understanding
the functioning of the cells and organs of the body
will not suffice to explain 'life'. Life is just so
impressive that the vitalist can't conceive of it ever
being explained in such a reductionistic fashion. And
consciousness is even more impressive than life in my
opinion. Even so, why should we buy into the argument
of the Vitalist at such an early stage in our
understanding of the brain?

Richard also wrote: "As David Chalmers has pointed out
on many an occassion, Dennett merely redefines
consciousness and ignores the issue of subjectivity
altogether."

That doesn't appear to be the case to me. Chalmers
essentially claims the 'hard' problem of consciousness
cannot be explained by resolving all the 'easy'
problems of consciousness, and Dennett says it can (or
at least it's too early in our understanding to say it
can't).

Richard further seems to contradict himself by writing
to Perry: 
"Now here we come to the root of the problem: a
process, or a pattern ... cannot experience anything.
Processes do not have physical existences;.."

Maybe I'm confused here but Richard appears to equate
pattern and process. Did Perry make that claim? I
didn't think so. But if Richard claims that a pattern
cannot experience anything and the structure of the
brain can certainly be encoded into a coherent pattern
of data, then it follows that the brain can't
experience anything. I don't see what Richard's
problem with pattern is.

But let me ask this: How can you say you experience
qualia if the experience itself 'is' the qualia?
You're just saying, "I experience experience." Isn't
it more parsimonious to simply say, "I experience." or
"I qualia."?

It's understandably difficult not to buy into the
notion that there is an experiencer (homunculus) in
the brain because we all grow up making "I"
statements. "I see", "I want", etc. 

Who is this "I" after all? I suspect the self
gradually came into existence once the brain became
complex and sophisticated enough to represent itself
as one of the objects in its environment. Now, the
brain not only processes environmental stimuli, but
appreciates it, analyzes it, and reflects upon it.
What a great illusion, huh?

BTW, thanks for stimulating so much discussion
Richard. Even if it is an oft-addressed topic, that's
the way it should be for our group. There's always
newcomers, visitors, and those like me who like to
refine their thinking on the subject.

Cheers,

Scott

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