X-Message-Number: 25109 Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 17:08:44 -0800 (PST) From: Scott Badger <> Subject: Re: The Richard and Mike's debate I hope it's OK to intrude into this discussion. First, a disclaimer: I am no expert and may not clearly understand some of the terms used here. Feel free to correct any misconceptions. Perry wrote: "There is no qualia experiencer. There is no separation between the events defined as an experience and the body-mind in which those events take place." Richard replied: "I personally have never claimed a separation. In my view, the brain, a purely physical thing, experiences qualia." Your statement seems contradictory to me. In asserting that the brain 'experiences' qualia, you're implicitly claiming a separation exists between experiencer and experience. But if the mind 'is' what the brain 'does', as you suggest, what need is there for a homunculus? even for the construct of qualia? You seem to buy into Chalmers ideas, except you insist that the experiencer is a physical part of the brain. Chalmer says that understanding the functioning of the parts of the brain will not suffice to explain the internal subjective 'experience' (i.e. qualia); much the same way that an advocate of Vitalism would claim that understanding the functioning of the cells and organs of the body will not suffice to explain 'life'. Life is just so impressive that the vitalist can't conceive of it ever being explained in such a reductionistic fashion. And consciousness is even more impressive than life in my opinion. Even so, why should we buy into the argument of the Vitalist at such an early stage in our understanding of the brain? Richard also wrote: "As David Chalmers has pointed out on many an occassion, Dennett merely redefines consciousness and ignores the issue of subjectivity altogether." That doesn't appear to be the case to me. Chalmers essentially claims the 'hard' problem of consciousness cannot be explained by resolving all the 'easy' problems of consciousness, and Dennett says it can (or at least it's too early in our understanding to say it can't). Richard further seems to contradict himself by writing to Perry: "Now here we come to the root of the problem: a process, or a pattern ... cannot experience anything. Processes do not have physical existences;.." Maybe I'm confused here but Richard appears to equate pattern and process. Did Perry make that claim? I didn't think so. But if Richard claims that a pattern cannot experience anything and the structure of the brain can certainly be encoded into a coherent pattern of data, then it follows that the brain can't experience anything. I don't see what Richard's problem with pattern is. But let me ask this: How can you say you experience qualia if the experience itself 'is' the qualia? You're just saying, "I experience experience." Isn't it more parsimonious to simply say, "I experience." or "I qualia."? It's understandably difficult not to buy into the notion that there is an experiencer (homunculus) in the brain because we all grow up making "I" statements. "I see", "I want", etc. Who is this "I" after all? I suspect the self gradually came into existence once the brain became complex and sophisticated enough to represent itself as one of the objects in its environment. Now, the brain not only processes environmental stimuli, but appreciates it, analyzes it, and reflects upon it. What a great illusion, huh? BTW, thanks for stimulating so much discussion Richard. Even if it is an oft-addressed topic, that's the way it should be for our group. There's always newcomers, visitors, and those like me who like to refine their thinking on the subject. Cheers, Scott Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25109