X-Message-Number: 25110
From: "Basie" <>
Subject: microconsciousness
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 22:39:30 -0500

<each node of a processing-perceptual system creates its own
microconsciousness.>

If one extrapolate this to the whole brain one could argue that one does not
need the whole brain to be conscious. All one needs is a critical number
where one will become conscious again.


Abstract: The visual brain consists of several parallel, functionally
specialized processing systems, each having several stages (nodes) which
terminate their tasks at different times; consequently, simultaneously
presented attributes are perceived at the same time if processed at the same
node and at different times if processed by different nodes. Clinical
evidence shows that these processing systems can act fairly autonomously.
Damage restricted to one system compromises specifically the perception of
the attribute that that system is specialized for; damage to a given node of
a processing system that leaves earlier nodes intact results in a degraded
perceptual capacity for the relevant attribute, which is directly related to
the physiological capacities of the cells left intact by the damage. By
contrast, a system that is spared when all others are damaged can function
more or less normally. Moreover, internally created visual percepts
illusions, afterimages, imagery, and hallucinations activate specifically
the nodes specialized for the attribute perceived. Finally, anatomical
evidence shows that there is no final integrator station in the brain, one
which receives input from all visual areas; instead, each node has multiple
outputs and no node is recipient only. Taken together, the above evidence
leads us to propose that each node of a processing-perceptual system creates
its own microconsciousness. We propose that, if any binding occurs to give
us our integrated image of the visual world, it must be a binding between
microconsciousnesses generated at different nodes. Since any two
microconsciousnesses generated at any two nodes can be bound together,
perceptual integration is not hierarchical, but parallel and postconscious.
By contrast, the neural machinery conferring properties on those cells whose
activity has a conscious correlate is hierarchical, and we refer to it as
generative binding, to distinguish it from the binding that might occur
between the microconsciousnesses.



@article{zek_99,
author = {Zeki, S.},
title = {Toward a theory of visual consciousness},
text = {Consciousness and Cognition 8:225-259 (1999) (with A. Bartels).},
year = {1999},
url =
{http://www.ini.unizh.ch/~kiper/consc_articles/zeki_bartels_99_consciousness
.pdf},
keywords = {philosophy, neuroscience, consciousness, vision},
abstract = {The visual brain consists of several parallel, functionally
specialized processing systems, each having several stages (nodes) which
terminate their tasks at different times; consequently, simultaneously
presented attributes are perceived at the same time if processed at the same
node and at different times if processed by different nodes. Clinical
evidence shows that these processing systems can act fairly autonomously.
Damage restricted to one system compromises specifically the perception of
the attribute that that system is specialized for; damage to a given node of
a processing system that leaves earlier nodes intact results in a degraded
perceptual capacity for the relevant attribute, which is directly related to
the physiological capacities of the cells left intact by the damage. By
contrast, a system that is spared when all others are damaged can function
more or less normally. Moreover, internally created visual percepts
illusions, afterimages, imagery, and hallucinations activate specifically
the nodes specialized for the attribute perceived. Finally, anatomical
evidence shows that there is no final integrator station in the brain, one
which receives input from all visual areas; instead, each node has multiple
outputs and no node is recipient only. Taken together, the above evidence
leads us to propose that each node of a processing-perceptual system creates
its own microconsciousness. We propose that, if any binding occurs to give
us our integrated image of the visual world, it must be a binding between
microconsciousnesses generated at different nodes. Since any two
microconsciousnesses generated at any two nodes can be bound together,
perceptual integration is not hierarchical, but parallel and postconscious.
By contrast, the neural machinery conferring properties on those cells whose
activity has a conscious correlate is hierarchical, and we refer to it as
generative binding, to distinguish it from the binding that might occur
between the microconsciousnesses.}
}

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