X-Message-Number: 25167 Date: Sat, 27 Nov 2004 12:28:17 -0800 Subject: The Qualia Experiencer: Robert, Scott, et al From: <> Dear Robert, Scott, et al. I have gotten a bit behind, so rather than address individual messages, I will post a single message covering as many of these questions and concerns as I possibly can. If I overlook something, feel free to point it out. Robert and others have claimed there is no such thing as a qualia experiencer, and therefore, my analysis of the problem is flawed. In the case of Robert, I'm not sure there is a disagreement with the meaning so much as the terms used. In any case, in this message, I intend to clarify my stance on the issue. 1. Solipsism Valera brought up a crucial point in the debate, one which cannot be overlooked. This point underlies both solipsism and any rational philosophy of the self. Simply stated, it is that we can absolutely know only two things: that we exist, and that we experience (of which existence is a form). Regarding these things, we cannot be mistaken, for, to even contemplate the possibility of these tenets being wrong, they must be right. Therefore, there can be no denying the existence of 'I'. There can be no denying what we experience: the colors, the sounds, the thoughts in our head, the consciousness that pervades every moment of our waking existence. These things not only do exist, but they are the only things we can know exist. On the basis of our senses, we have formed a model of reality, and this model happens to include a thing called a 'brain' that is made of other things we call 'atoms', which operates according to things we call 'physical laws.' We can be certain, in the strictest sense of the word, of none of these things. Possibly, our memories of such models are invalid, perhaps being spontaneously brought into existence (the day before yesterday hypothesis). Possibly, we have no such thing as a brain and the whole of reality outside our own subjective inner lives either does not exist, or does not exist in the manner we think it does. Of course, we all believe in our model. We think are memories are accurate (or largely so). And we believe we have a brain. But note these are beliefs. They cannot be known to be valid, certainly not by the same standard that we can know we exist and experience. Thus establishes the primacy of 'I'. I exist and I experience. I could give up all the rest, for it may all be false, but of these two tenets, there can be no doubt. 2. Little Man An argument brought forward against the existence of a qualia experiencer is the problem of the 'little man'. Early philosophies of the self pictured a little man existing inside your head, who was aware of things going on; this, they claimed, was the seat of the self. The problem with this is that the very reasons that lead you to conclude there's a little man in your head would also force you to conclude there's a little man in the little man's head, and so on, ad infinitum. This is known as the 'little man' problem, or hommunculus. This problem is not an obstacle for the existence of a qualia experiencer. The reason being, the qualia experiencer is not a little man at all, as the next section will make clear. 3. The Qualia Experiencer I have repeatedly claimed there is some part of the brain responsible for the experience of qualia, and have defined this part to be the 'qualia experiencer'. Preservation of this thing, the most fundamental component of the self, is absolutely critical to personal survival. Clearly, if I am correct in these views, then uploading and duplication cannot result in personal survival, but will inevitably lead to destruction, as sure as cremation. In fact, if I am correct, then a poor cryonics suspension, or even delay after death, would likely result in permanent destruction. Now Robert and others deny there even is such a thing as a qualia experiencer. Robert's rejection of the concept is more for philosophical reasons, while others argue to preserve their notion that uploading/duplication results in personal survival (because, let's face it, it is comforting, especially to an immortalist---but that doesn't make it true). I hope to show that even Robert probably agrees with me (but chooses to use words that, I think, are less clear), while other arguments against the qualia experiencer have no merit. First, let me agree with Robert that there is no actual gap between the subjective and the objective (i.e. the objective subjective, as Robert calls it). I do believe in a philosophical gap, meaning that you cannot use the laws of physics to deduce the existence of subjectivity (and this is what the philosophers, Chalmers especially, assert). But this is quite different than saying there is a true gab between the physical reality and our subjective inner lives. I am physical, I experience subjectivity, therefore, something physical experiences subjectivity. No gap at all, and I believe a precise mapping could be accomplished, in a manner similar to the one Robert has described, between physical events and experiences. With this in mind, I can now present the most precise definition of the qualia experiencer that I have presented to date: **The qualia experiencer is the part of the brain in which state changes correlate precisely with subjective experience.** Note a few things about this definition: (a) First, there is no little man in the head. (b) Second, the qualia experiencer is an actual physical thing. Duplication may produce a new qualia experiencer (while uploading does not), but this new qualia experiencer will not be the same one as the original. It will be a different one, no more useful to the survival of the original than my qualia experiencer is useful to your survival. (c) Third, the qualia experiencer is a proper subset of the brain. There are many changes that occur in my brain that I do not feel. Some part of the brain in which I cannot feel changes is therefore not part of the qualia experiencer. 4. The Nature of Qualia What are qualia? In my view (and I think Robert would agree with this), a quale is a type of change in the state of a type of physical system. Specifically, it is a type of change that can be subjectively felt---more precisely, it is a change that exactly corresponds to a subjective experience. The brain changes in many ways. Some of these changes are felt, subjectively; indeed, the change is identically equal to the subjective sensation. Some other ways the brain changes are not felt, and these are not qualia. Thus, it is proper to say that experience is something that *happens* to us, in the same way that decay is something that *happens* to a radioactive isotope. 5. Preservation of the Self Suppose we are concerned with the preservation of a 'carsoul'. Further, suppose that by 'carsoul', we mean a physical system for which P(X) holds, where P(X) is defined as the predicate 'X is capable of locomotion, if supplied with gas and oil'. Now if a carsoul does not stop existing, then surely, it is the same carsoul. Therefore, if a physical system X undergoes a series of changes from time T0 to T1, but P(X) holds for all points in time ranging from T0 to T1, then the same carsoul exists---on grounds that it never stopped existing. The application to the qualia experiencer is self-evident. The implications for duplication and cryonics are equally clear. Destructive duplication is equivalent to destruction, from the perspective of the destroyed. Therefore, Merkle's plan to deconstruct the brain one atom at a time (storing the locations and tagging the exact atoms), compute the proper arrangement, and rebuild the brain, is doomed to fail, if the goal is to maintain continuity of the subjective inner life of the cryonics patient. Of course, the 'new' you will think it is you---that is given---but it won't be you, in the most fundamental sense of the word. You were destroyed when you were destroyed (this is a tautology, folks!). We would consider this obvious in the case of an apple, the only reason it is not obvious in the case of humans is that too many people believe we are more than just a physical system possessing certain properties. I contend this is not so (or rather, if it is so, it is as if it were not, from the perspective of making judgements and inferences). This means we cannot rely on the technology of tomorrow to bring us back. We must strive for better methods of preservation, and ultimately, suspended animation, which will give us as much confidence of coming back as going to sleep does. I hope this addresses the majority of questions people have raised. If not, just drop a line. Best Regards, Richard B. R. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25167