X-Message-Number: 25236 Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 10:41:51 -0800 Subject: Corrections, to Robert From: <> Dear Robert: [snip] "Once more, in my view, we do not live in a film-frame universe." Absolutely. Physics does allow us to treat time as a spatial dimension, but this is a statement of our model, and in no way implies that time *is* a spatial dimension (let alone that it is quantized in the way the frames of a film are). It is clearly different than the other three dimensions, which would not be the case in the film-frame view. [snip] You wrote: "And again, there is in my view no distinction between the QE or 'qualia experiencer' of RBR and the qualia themselves." In my terminology, the QE is what exists, while the qualia are what happen to what exists. Qualia themselves, that is, the subjective sensations of my inner-life, do not exist---rather, they happen, in the same way that waving does not exist, but water does, and when waving happens to water, we say a wave 'exists'. In your terminology, you would say, when (certain kinds) of change happen to the brain, a qualia experiencer 'exists'. This is simply an alternate definition of qualia experiencer. However, this qualia experiencer does indeed cease to exist when the subject loses consciousness, because while the brain still exists, the qualia do not. Indeed, over small enough time scales, your qualia experiencer does not exist, since experience is something that requires a relatively long amount of time in order to occur. In my terminology, the qualia experiencer always exists, whether awake or asleep, because it is simply the physical thing in which changes of a certain kind correlate precisely with subjective experience. It exists even if the brain doesn't happen to be changing in the right way over a particular interval of time (whether on the microsecond scale, in the case of living brains, or the decade scale, in the case of frozen brains). You wrote: "An ocean wave consists of water undergoing a special type of movement; without the movement it would be inappropriate to say that what is left--just the water--is a wave or even potentially a wave. In other words, a wave is not something that happens to water; the combination of water and form IS the wave. If EITHER the water or the form is lacking, there is no wave. " And in the exact same way, there is no subjective 'I' when either the brain exists but does not change in the ways yielding subjective experience, or when the brain does not exist. So your definition is more of a 'subjective I' definition, while mine is an 'objective I', whose purpose is to clearly delineate what exists from what happens. Both can be useful. You wrote: "Somewhat similarly, I surmise, the 'self circuit' is perhaps some kind of standing wave in the brain, and modulations of this wave constitute the qualia, and the qualia constitute the person or the essence of the person." Or it could be that firing of certain neural circuits correlates with experience. Or the collapse of entangled states (in quantum models of consciousness). Many possibilities at this point in the game. You wrote: "Even if true, this does not necessarily solve all the philosophical problems, but it does open up possibilities. Even if the brain is totally quiescent at liquid nitrogen temperature, with a presumed interruption of the self circuit, there is still a (possibly very large) overlap in time between predecessor and successor configurations, allowing reasonable (partial) identification of prior and later selves." Perhaps a way of phrasing survival that would be more compatible with you: (1) 'I' am the changes that happen to this brain (in which case, I may stop happening, if this brain stops changing, but I may resume at a later date, if this brain existed to that date; but if the brain is destroyed, then I can no longer happen, because I am the changes that happen to *this* brain); Or if you like, (2) 'I' am the changes that happen to this brain, together with this brain (in which case, I am both part a happening and part an existing thing; and the part of me that happens may stop, but as long as the part of me that exists continues to exist, the part of me that happens may resume, and I have survived). where of course 'changes' refers to the specific changes correlated with subjective experience (but certainly dependent on other changes not so correlated). Your preferred form of expression seems to be the combo (2). I would prefer (1), since it is cleaner and easier to communicate. Best Regards, Richard B. R. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25236