X-Message-Number: 25309 Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 11:38:17 -0800 Subject: Scott's Identity Issues From: <> Dear Scott, [snip] You wrote: "Please understand. First, I don t believe that a copy or a duplicate of me is really me." This is good news. Earlier, you seemed to have been unsure of the validity of Perry's views. If we have persuaded you, I am encouraged. You wrote: "I do think it may be possible to upload using a gradual process that maintains continuity." If by 'upload', you mean to gradually replace the substrate of your brain, then please do not use the word 'upload'. Uploading has a very specific definition, which may be found at the following URL: http://www.ibiblio.org/jstrout/uploading/ Immortalists are attracted to uploading because it implies they can create many backups of themselves (except Perry, who likes the idea because it and the multiverse allow for afterlives). [snip] You wrote: "I don't get it. How is intelligence not an intrinsic human limitation? Brains differ but all have their limits." Our brains are not infinitely intelligent, but that doesn't mean they have a limitation which must be overcome. The language you use suggests it is 'bad' to have a certain level of intelligence. To see this bias, imagine me saying, 'Your brain's lack of ability to explode in a ball of fire is a limitation.' It is true your brain cannot explode, but whether that is a limitation (i.e. bad) is for you to decide. [snip] You wrote: "Well, as I understand your theory, the QE is a physical system, and systems can be downgraded or upgraded, can't they? If I added a third eyeball to the back of my head, I'd be enhancing or upgrading my visual system if it was properly hooked up. What's the essential difference?" In your description of two linked 'brains', you were aiming for either (1) a single QE spread across two 'brains', in which case the system cannot function (as a QE) if either 'brain' were destroyed, or (2) two QE's experiencing the same thing, in which case the destruction of one would not mean its subjective inner- life continued in the other (it would not continue). Your central problem is that while you accept a duplicate of you is not you, you still are trying to find a way to 'backup' yourself. This is not possible. A backup will always be a duplicate, even if kept in lock-sync with you, and even if tethered to your brain by cords. Any attempt to get 'clever' will fail. For example, if you just create two linked brains, each with a QE, then even though they have the same subjective experiences, when one brain is destroyed, that brain has no more subjective experiences because it no longer exists (self-evident but worth repeating in light of Francois' post). If you try harder, and you create a system of two linked brains, such that the overall system has a 'collective' QE, but each brain has a QE, too, kept in synchronization, then you will end up with three QEs, each defined by different circuits. The death of either brain would destroy the 'collective' QE, along with the QE of that brain. Finally, if you try to trick death one last time by creating one system with a single QE, but each of whose halves can be configured to operate as a QE independently, through use of some 'switch', then you still die, since it will take a non-zero amount of time to flip the switch (i.e. reconfigure the circuits so that the surviving half is independently a QE), and during this time, the system that was formerly able to experience qualia is no longer able to experience qualia. In summary, there is no way you can ever create a backup of yourself. You wrote: "So if I completely understood the physical structure and functioning of my QE, would there be any possible way for me to enhance it?" Yes, you could enhance it greatly in numerous ways, and increase the kinds of things you could experience. But you can never create any backups, or failsafe systems. Any duplicate or upload of you is useless from the perspective of continuing your subjective inner life. Best Regards, Richard. B. R. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25309