X-Message-Number: 25422 Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 12:34:10 -0800 Subject: Precision is the Key, to Scott From: <> Dear Scott: [snip] You wrote: "Richard asserted that disassembly destroys the QE. But he agreed the QE would probably 'not' be destroyed if, while frozen, the brain were broken into just two pieces and then properly reassembled. And, of course, this is how most people woud answer. There's no reason why proper reassembly after being broken into 3, 4, ... n pieces shouldn't yield the same answer." It cannot possibly yield the same answer. When you alter a physical system X in such a way that it no longer possesses all properties in a set Q, then modifying X again so that it DOES possess all properties in Q results in the creation of a new thing having properties Q---on grounds that a system having properties Q came into existence. Let me be clear about this. All nouns such as 'dog' or 'tree' or 'qualia experiencer' do not refer to existing dogs or trees or qualia experiencers. Speaking precisely, dogs do not exist. Trees do not exist. Qualia experiencers do not exist. The only thing that exists is matter and energy. 'Dog' is just a word used to describe a particular arrangement of matter and energy, which can be equivalently described as an arrangement of matter and energy satisfying certain properties. While particular arrangements of matter and energy DO exist, you should not forget that labeling such an arramgenet a 'dog' means only that the arrangement has all Dog Properties, which is to say, it satisfies certain relations that I have arbitrarily decided in advance to describe compactly with the word 'dog'. With this in mind, to say that a dog exists is to say there is some arrangement of matter and energy that satisfies the relations I encode by the word 'dog'. Now let's say I label some particular arrangement 'Rover'. When I say 'Rover is a dog,' I am saying that the physical arrangement I denote by the word 'Rover' has all properties necessary for me to classify it as a dog, based upon my definition of 'dog'. Now if I take a flamethrower to Rover, this will quickly change the arrangement so that it no longer has all Dog Properties, even though all the atoms still exist in roughly their same locations (give or take a few meters). By using my flamethrower on Rover, I will have destroyed the dog. This is what destruction means---that a physical system having some set of well-defined properties that collectively delineate some useful category changes in such a way that it loses one or more of those properties, and therefore, changes classification. Take the example of a light bulb. To say a light bulb exists is to say that some physical arrangement exists such that, when it is screwed into a light bulb socket, the arrangement emits visible light (by my definition of light bulb, probably close to your own). If some particular arrangement changes in such a way that it no longer satisfies the criteria of 'light bulb', then the light bulb that formerly existed (i.e. the physical system having Light Bulb Properties) exists no longer. In the case of personal survival, I am interested in the continuation of my subjective inner life. At the heart of survival is the qualia experiencer, which I have defined as the part of the brain responsible for the experience of qualia. But keep in mind that, like a dog or a light bulb, when I say my qualia experiencer exists, I mean strictly that the physical arrangement of my brain satisfies certain properties, namely, the Qualia Experiencer Properties. If this arrangement changes in such a way that it ceases to have the Qualia Experiencer Properties, then the qualia experiencer that formerly existed, exists no longer. Creating from its ashes a new qualia experiencer won't do me any good. You wrote: "There's no justification for drawing a line. Stating that at 'some point' the system becomes incapable of experiencing Qualia, and thus the original QE is destroyed is completely arbitrary." On the contrary, it is a tautology, true by virtue of the definitions of the words used. Clearly, a qualia experiencer does not exist in your chopped up brain if your chopped up brain does not have the Qualia Experiencer Properties. [snip] You wrote: "But, reason suggests that this 'common sense' perspective breaks down. What if I used 2, 3, 4, ... n new bricks? At what point is it no longer the same building? Different people would draw the line at different points but how could an objective line justifiably be drawn at any point?" Different people come to different conclusions because they have different definitions. Each one is correct, when you supply their own definitions. But in our case, we are not discussing random definitions of 'self'. Rather, we are discussing the survival of our ability to experience qualia. This is a very specific set of well-defined properties, and therefore questions regarding the survival of this 'self' have a single and unique answer. You can argue that the qualia experiencer is not important, in which case you will come to different conclusions regarding 'survival'. But if you agree with me that continuation of subjective inner life is the most important criterion of personal survival, then the set of properties giving rise to this subjective inner life is fixed and well-defined (even if unknown at present), and therefore you must come to the same conclusions as I. [snip] You wrote: "For a person to insist that the 'original' atoms 'must' be used to reassemble any structure in order for the original to be 'saved' suggests that the person believes there is something metaphysically special about the original." The atoms are irrelevant. What maters to the survival of any 'noun'- type thing, be it a dog, tree, or a qualia experiencer, is survival of the set of properties that all objects belonging to these categories possess. You can change the atoms of a physical arrangement without changing various subsets of its properties, and if some particular subset is important to you, then it makes sense to change it only in ways that are consistent with that subset. (For example, in the case of a light bulb, its Light Bulb Properties are important to me, so I take care that my handling of it will not result in the loss of any of these properties, for otherwise, it would cease to be useful to me.) You wrote: "I'm not immune to the psychological discomfort associated with these ideas. It doesn't 'feel' right to me that my brain can be completely disassembled then reassembled using either the same or different atoms and it will still be me. " It won't be you, as convincingly demonstrated by numerous thought experiments. For example: Fall asleep and then have yourself disassembled. Now assemble two copies of you, one looking at the sun, and the other looking at the moon. Now wake both copies up. From your subjective point of view, you go to sleep and when you wake up you are staring at what, exactly? The sun or the moon??? You can't possibly be staring at both. Take this experiment to the logical conclusion, with billions of copies of you, each looking at unique views of the universe, and ask yourself the question, from your subjective point of view, which copy is the continuation of your subjective inner life? Clearly the question is absurd and has no answer. No copy continues your inner life. If you disassemble yourself, you won't be coming back at all. From your subjective point of view, destructive duplication is identical with cremation---i.e. there is a last experience for you, and that experience occurs a moment before you lose consciousness. You wrote: "But if I consider myself to be a rational materialist, then I don't see how I can avoid the logic of it." Mike Perry acknowledges his views are not compatible with strict materialism. You have not yet seen this particular implication of patternism because you haven't been in the game as long as he has. But you will. That, or you will return to the materialist camp and deny the validity of patternism. [snip] You wrote: "Was the original rainbow destroyed or is it the same rainbow?" A rainbow is a word used to describe something that happens, not something that exists. Therefore, I don't understand your question. Photons exist, and water molecules exist, but rainbows don't. Best Regards, Richard B. R. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25422