X-Message-Number: 25422
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 12:34:10 -0800
Subject: Precision is the Key, to Scott
From: <>

Dear Scott:

[snip]

You wrote:

"Richard asserted that disassembly destroys the QE. But he agreed 
the QE would probably 'not' be  destroyed if, while frozen, the 
brain were broken  into just two pieces and then properly 
reassembled.
And, of course, this is how most people woud answer. There's no 
reason why proper reassembly after being broken into 3, 4, ... n 
pieces shouldn't yield the same answer."

It cannot possibly yield the same answer. When you alter a physical 
system X in such a way that it no longer possesses all properties 
in a set Q, then modifying X again so that it DOES possess all 
properties in Q results in the creation of a new thing having 
properties Q---on grounds that a system having properties Q came 
into existence.

Let me be clear about this. All nouns such as 'dog' or 'tree' or 
'qualia experiencer' do not refer to existing dogs or trees or 
qualia experiencers. Speaking precisely, dogs do not exist. Trees 
do not exist. Qualia experiencers do not exist. The only thing that 
exists is matter and energy. 'Dog' is just a word used to describe 
a particular arrangement of matter and energy, which can be 
equivalently described as an arrangement of matter and energy 
satisfying certain properties.

While particular arrangements of matter and energy DO exist, you 
should not forget that labeling such an arramgenet a 'dog' means 
only that the arrangement has all Dog Properties, which is to say, 
it satisfies certain relations that I have arbitrarily decided in 
advance to describe compactly with the word 'dog'.

With this in mind, to say that a dog exists is to say there is some 
arrangement of matter and energy that satisfies the relations I 
encode by the word 'dog'.

Now let's say I label some particular arrangement 'Rover'. When I 
say 'Rover is a dog,' I am saying that the physical arrangement I 
denote by the word 'Rover' has all properties necessary for me to 
classify it as a dog, based upon my definition of 'dog'. 

Now if I take a flamethrower to Rover, this will quickly change the 
arrangement so that it no longer has all Dog Properties, even 
though all the atoms still exist in roughly their same locations 
(give or take a few meters).

By using my flamethrower on Rover, I will have destroyed the dog. 
This is what destruction means---that a physical system having some 
set of well-defined properties that collectively delineate some 
useful category changes in such a way that it loses one or more of 
those properties, and therefore, changes classification.

Take the example of a light bulb. To say a light bulb exists is to 
say that some physical arrangement exists such that, when it is 
screwed into a light bulb socket, the arrangement emits visible 
light (by my definition of light bulb, probably close to your own). 
If some particular arrangement changes in such a way that it no 
longer satisfies the criteria of 'light bulb', then the light bulb 
that formerly existed (i.e. the physical system having Light Bulb 
Properties) exists no longer.

In the case of personal survival, I am interested in the 
continuation of my subjective inner life. At the heart of survival 
is the qualia experiencer, which I have defined as the part of the 
brain responsible for the experience of qualia. But keep in mind 
that, like a dog or a light bulb, when I say my qualia experiencer 
exists, I mean strictly that the physical arrangement of my brain 
satisfies certain properties, namely, the Qualia Experiencer 
Properties. If this arrangement changes in such a way that it 
ceases to have the Qualia Experiencer Properties, then the qualia 
experiencer that formerly existed, exists no longer. Creating from 
its ashes a new qualia experiencer won't do me any good.

You wrote:

"There's no justification for drawing a line. Stating that at 'some 
point' the system becomes incapable of experiencing Qualia, and 
thus the  original QE is destroyed is completely arbitrary."

On the contrary, it is a tautology, true by virtue of the 
definitions of the words used. Clearly, a qualia experiencer does 
not exist in your chopped up brain if your chopped up brain does 
not have the Qualia Experiencer Properties.

[snip]

You wrote:

"But, reason suggests that this 'common sense'  perspective breaks 
down. What if I used 2, 3, 4, ... n new bricks? At what point is it 
no longer the same building? Different people would draw the line 
at different points but how could an objective line justifiably be 
drawn at any point?"

Different people come to different conclusions because they have 
different definitions. Each one is correct, when you supply their 
own definitions.

But in our case, we are not discussing random definitions of 
'self'. Rather, we are discussing the survival of our ability to 
experience qualia. This is a very specific set of well-defined 
properties, and therefore questions regarding the survival of this 
'self' have a single and unique answer.

You can argue that the qualia experiencer is not important, in 
which case you will come to different conclusions regarding 
'survival'. But if you agree with me that continuation of 
subjective inner life is the most important criterion of personal 
survival, then the set of properties giving rise to this subjective 
inner life is fixed and well-defined (even if unknown at present), 
and therefore you must come to the same conclusions as I.

[snip]

You wrote:

"For a person to insist that the 'original' atoms 'must' be used to 
reassemble any structure in order for the original to be 'saved' 
suggests that the person believes there is something metaphysically 
special about the original."

The atoms are irrelevant. What maters to the survival of any 'noun'-
type thing, be it a dog, tree, or a qualia experiencer, is survival 
of the set of properties that all objects belonging to these 
categories possess. You can change the atoms of a physical 
arrangement without changing various subsets of its properties, and 
if some particular subset is important to you, then it makes sense 
to change it only in ways that are consistent with that subset.

(For example, in the case of a light bulb, its Light Bulb 
Properties are important to me, so I take care that my handling of 
it will not result in the loss of any of these properties, for 
otherwise, it would cease to be useful to me.)

You wrote:

"I'm not immune to the psychological discomfort associated with 
these ideas. It doesn't 'feel' right to me that my brain can be 
completely disassembled then reassembled using either the same or 
different 
atoms and it will still be me. "

It won't be you, as convincingly demonstrated by numerous thought 
experiments. For example:

Fall asleep and then have yourself disassembled. Now assemble two 
copies of you, one looking at the sun, and the other looking at the 
moon. Now wake both copies up.

From your subjective point of view, you go to sleep and when you 
wake up you are staring at what, exactly? The sun or the moon??? 
You can't possibly be staring at both. Take this experiment to the 
logical conclusion, with billions of copies of you, each looking at 
unique views of the universe, and ask yourself the question, from 
your subjective point of view, which copy is the continuation of 
your subjective inner life?

Clearly the question is absurd and has no answer. No copy continues 
your inner life. If you disassemble yourself, you won't be coming 
back at all. From your subjective point of view, destructive 
duplication is identical with cremation---i.e. there is a last 
experience for you, and that experience occurs a moment before you 
lose consciousness.

You wrote:

"But if I consider myself to be a rational materialist, then I 
don't see how I can avoid the logic of it."

Mike Perry acknowledges his views are not compatible with strict 
materialism. You have not yet seen this particular implication of 
patternism because you haven't been in the game as long as he has. 
But you will. That, or you will return to the materialist camp and 
deny the validity of patternism.

[snip]

You wrote:

"Was the original rainbow destroyed or is it the same rainbow?"

A rainbow is a word used to describe something that happens, not 
something that exists. Therefore, I don't understand your question.

Photons exist, and water molecules exist, but rainbows don't.

Best Regards,

Richard B. R.

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