X-Message-Number: 25433
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 17:43:11 -0800
Subject: Francois' Corner
From: <>

Dear Francois:

You wrote:

"I do define 'I' as the arragement of matter in my head ( and the 
way it changes with time, of course)."

Note that mere definition is not sufficient to establish survival. 
I can define 'I' as the DNA of my cells, in which case a clone of 
me or my genetic twin would be 'me' even if a completely different 
person. 

You define yourself as the arrangement of matter in your head---not 
the actual matter, mind you, but the arrangement---and from this it 
follows that 'you' could have multiple locations simultaneously (in 
theory if not in practice), inasmuch as multiple hunks of matter 
can possess the same arrangement. In such a case, 'you' would of 
course 'survive' the death of one of your 'copies', but this is 
nothing but a useless tautology. It does not establish that your 
subjective inner life continues as long as at least one copy 
survives. For this, you will need some immeasurably strong 
evidence.

You wrote:

"The inner subjective life 'I' experience is created by this 
arrangement and nothing else."

Here you commit the fallacy of assuming that an arrangement is an 
existing thing. Arrangements are abstractions; they are mere 
concepts used to denote specific hunks of existing matter. Strictly 
speaking, it is NOT true that your experience is created by 'an 
arrangement'. Rather, your experience is created by the hunk of 
matter in your skull. Even more precisely, it is specific changes 
to that hunk of matter that are numerically identical to your 
experience. Changes to other hunks of matter are not your 
experience, even if the hunks of matter are similar or identical. 
Changes of a similar kind to a similar hunk of matter are 
numerically identical to *that* hunk of matter's experience, *not* 
to your hunk of matter's experience.

I should point out that even if this were not true (which it is, 
implied by the very notion of identity), the known laws of physics 
applied to our universe prevent two physical systems from being 
exactly the same. Yet it is meaningless to compare changes to non-
identical physical systems (and here, I mean identical in the sense 
their wavefunctions and the forces acting upon them are identical). 
It is like comparing the way a wave changes to comparing the way a 
dog changes. The systems must be exactly identical in every respect 
except those invariant with respect to the physical laws, and then, 
and only then, can you say this change on one system is the same as 
the change on the other. Why? Because 'change' is a word that 
describes one state in relation to another---i.e. a description 
relative to what is changing. 

This argument from physics would prevent two experiences from ever 
being the same. However, as I mentioned above, it is not even 
necessary to go to this level, since your subjective inner life is 
numerically identical to the changes that occur to the specific 
hunk of matter residing between your ears, and therefore, the 
changes of some other hunk of matter, no matter how similar, are 
therefore not numerically identical to your subjective inner life.

[snip]

You wrote:

"If it exists in more than one location, then 'I' exists in all 
those locations. If, through some fluke of probability, an exact 
copy of me has appeared a billion trillion light years away from 
here, then 'I'
am there, probably very puzzled at suddenly finding myself in such 
strange surroundings. It would be completely irrelevant that both 
instances of me do not share perceptions. 'I' would be there just 
as surely as 'I' am here, and 'I' would also be anywhere else the 
arragement of matter in my head exists in functional form."

You should have talked to Mike Perry before making this absurd 
claim, because it proves you have an utterly useless definition of 
'I'. 

I cannot see two different things at once. In my example, I cannot 
see both the sun and the moon, because one is looking at the sun, 
and cannot see the moon, while the other is looking at the moon, 
and cannot see the sun.

Defining 'I' in such a way that I DO see the sun and the moon, even 
though there is no communication between our brains, is about as 
far removed from a useful definition of 'I' as you can get, at 
least from the perspective of personal survival. If the two I's do 
not share perceptions, then in particular, the 'I' that dies won't 
share the perception of continuing life that the other one has.

You have just demonstrated for all the world to see that your view 
of patternism is a mere tautology and never addresses the survival 
question, but merely defines 'I' in such a way that 'I' exist in 
some utterly useless sense even if my subjective life comes to an 
end.

[snip]

Best Regards,

Richard B. R.

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