X-Message-Number: 25436
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 20:52:41 -0800 (PST)
From: Scott Badger <>
Subject: Re: Precision is the key... for Richard

I wrote:
"Richard asserted that disassembly destroys the QE. But he agreed 
the QE would probably 'not' be  destroyed if, while frozen, the 
brain were broken  into just two pieces and then properly 
reassembled. And, of course, this is how most people woud answer. 
There's no reason why proper reassembly after being broken into 
3, 4, ... n pieces shouldn't yield the same answer."

Richard wrote:
It cannot possibly yield the same answer. When you alter a physical 
system X in such a way that it no longer possesses all properties 
in a set Q, then modifying X again so that it DOES possess all 
properties in Q results in the creation of a new thing having 
properties Q---on grounds that a system having properties Q came 
into existence.

I write: 
As I understand it, your premise is that our brain must continuously
have the ability to experience qualia or the qualia experiencer dies.
In other words, any significant alteration to the brain that would 
prevent it from being able to experience qualia would result in the 
irrevocable destruction of the original self.

So given that the brain is clearly incapable of experiencing qualia 
in the cryonically preserved state, does that mean we are all lost?
These brains are significantly damaged and will need repair before 
they are capable of generating a QE again. In addition to being 
damaged, one would have to admit that, given the cracking that 
takes place (less now than before), the brain has been at least 
partly disassembled. Have the identities of these damaged and 
partly disassembled brains been destroyed for all those currently 
in stasis?

Your arguments seem to suggest that you think the brain is a machine.
OK, fine. But taking a machine apart and putting it back together just
as it was results in that machine doing exactly what it did before it
was disassembled. Your (somewhat disturbing) analogy of changing 
the properties of a dog with a flamethrower is a poor one since that
involves 'damaging' the dog machine. Disassembly does not imply 
damage. 

I maintain that it doesn't matter how many pieces a frozen brain is 
broken into if those pieces can be properly reassembled through 
some future technology. Indeed, it is clear that the 130+  
cryonically suspended brains currently in storage vary considerably 
in terms of the degree to which they are damaged and disassembled. 
It is my belief that future technologies will be able to infer from
even the most damaged brain what its original form was and how it
should be reassembled. And when the machine is switched back on, we
expect the original (though possibly somewhat damaged) self to
reappear.

Are you going to draw a line somewhere among those 130+ patients,
insisting that some will have their original QEs while others won't? It
seems to me that it doesn't matter how damaged the brain is if it can
be restored to it's original form. 


Also I wrote:
"Was the original rainbow destroyed or is it the same rainbow?"

Richard wrote:
A rainbow is a word used to describe something that happens, not 
something that exists. Therefore, I don't understand your question.
Photons exist, and water molecules exist, but rainbows don't.

I write:
In the same way that your mind is a word that describes something 
that happens, not something that exists? Neurons exist, neurochemicals
exist, but minds don't?

Perhaps you'll say now that rainbows are purely epiphenominal while 
the mind is causal in nature since evolution would never have allowed 
such a complex thing to develop if it had no value. But that is clearly
a debatable topic (see Crick, Blackmore, and others).

This has turned into a theories of mind debate and I have a lot of 
reading to do before I'd feel comfortable about debating that topic. 
Ergo, I don't have a lot more to say... for now.

Best wishes,

Scott

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