X-Message-Number: 25458
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 19:33:19 -0800 (PST)
From: Scott Badger <>
Subject: Theory of Mind ... to Richard

              Happy New Year Everybody!

For Richard,

There are a 100 or so more articles I need to read on 
this topic but it seems to me you exhibit two important 
contradictions in your writings.

I wrote:

"Also, may I ask ... which theory of mind would you say 
most closely aligns with your views?"

Richard wrote:

"The identity theory of mind. But most identity theorists 
do not believe in qualia; at least, if you ask them, they 
will say no. But usually this is just a difference of 
terminology."

I write:
You appear to have  developed a kind of contradictory, 
hybrid Identity Theory (IT) of Mind; One where you allow 
yourself to integrate the notion of qualia.

IT is a species of Physicalism, and broadly denies the 
existence of qualia with their irreducible, non-physical 
properties. In fact, qualia are often seen as being a de facto 
refutation of physicalism. I think most IT advocates would 
disagree with you that it's just a matter of terminology.

Physicalism may allow for the existence of non-material 
entities derived from physical processes. For example,
gravity is a non-material aspect of the physical universe. 
But it would not allow for non-physicals such as qualia. 
Accepting the irreducibility of subjective consciousness 
means you cannot accept physicalist explanations of 
mental phenomena which means you cannot be an 
Identity Theory advocate.

The other contradiction is that you clearly endorse
Nominalism, while making arguments that reflect Essentialism. 

Nominalism is the position in metaphysics that there exist 
no universals outside of the mind. Nominalism contrasts 
to Realism. Philosophical Realism holds that descriptive 
terms we use such as "Green" or "Tree" are not merely 
descriptive words, but that the Forms of those concepts 
really exist, independently and somehow prior to the world, 
in an abstract realm; such thought is associated with Plato. 
Nominalism, by contrast, holds that such things as "Green" 
and "Tree" are no more than words we use to describe 
specific objects; they do not name or identify anything real, 
and have no real existence beyond our imaginations.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism


"... Essentialism is a belief that everything has a 
true essence which can be discovered through the use of reason. 
The definition of essence varies greatly from philosopher to 
philosopher. Some possibilities include: a soul, a mind, an idea, 
or an ideal form. To distinguish between essential qualities and 
other qualities, an essential quality is one where the object 
would no longer be of the same type if the quality was removed."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essentialism

You appear to be an essentialist to me because you believe that 
if the qualities of the nervous system are sufficiently removed 
(or altered), then the mind is also removed... irrevocably. Your 
writings repeatedly suggest there is some type of special, 
essential nature to your current QE that cannot be reproduced 
using another substrate of even using the same substrate if 
sufficient damage occurs regardless of how perfect the repair. 
In doing this, you seem to be assigning an ideal form to 
your QE which is contradictory to your strong stance on Nominalism
which emphatically denies ideal forms. You still haven't explained
what is so special or essential about the QE at T1?

Other problems with your arguments:

You state that:

"When you are in deep sleep or are anesthetized, you do not 
experience qualia. However, you survive because the neural circuits 
in your brain responsible for the experience of qualia remain 
preserved, even if during this time they do not happen to be 
changing in ways that elicit the experience of qualia."

I write:
You cannot know this to be true. You can only surmise. It is 
possible that every time you go to sleep, the old QE dies and 
a new QE is born (believing itself to be the old QE) when you
awake. Your statements seem arbitrary. I'm curious... is your
theory your own or do you rely heavily on a certain author or
authors? I ask because I cannot recall a single citation in 
your arguments so far.

You state, "The universe does not know about 'damage' or 
'disassembly'." 

I write:
Of course it does. Damage requires more repair than simple 
disassembly for the orignal to re-instantiate. If I smash 
a watch with a sledgehammer, it'll take considerably more 
effort to repair it than if I simpley disassemble it. If I 
cremate your remains, it'll take considerably more effort 
to infer the original structure and repair it than if I simply
disassemble it.

I wrote:
"I maintain that it doesn't matter how many pieces a frozen brain 
is broken into if those pieces can be properly reassembled through 
some future technology."

Richard wrote:
"You cannot maintain this view without going beyond strict 
materialism."

I write:
Wrong. Physicalism, a branch of materialism, allows for the 
notion of weak emergence. That is, the pieces of a machine 
can together perform a function than none of the individual 
pieces could perform alone. This is to be contrasted with strong 
emergence where the mind is seen as a purely emergent and
possibly epiphenominal entity. I suspect that mental states
'are' brain states and if the brain is put back together the 
way it should be, then the same mental states reappear. Trying 
to determine whether they are the original mental states or new 
mental states has questionable utility. You have a problem with 
the whole idea because of the implications with regard to 
duplicates.

Richard wrote:
"You can theoretically disassemble the brain into atom-
sized pieces, in which case, there is no need to use the original 
atoms, since they are indistinguishable from other atoms, and if 
you don't need to use the original atoms, you can 'reassemble' 
multiple brains."

I write:
That appears to be the case.

Richard wrote:
"Clearly the [original] subjective inner life of the patient cannot 
continue in multiple brains..."

I write:
I agree. As unappealing and counter-intuitive as it may be,
that is the quandry we face. Clearly, our traditional, common
sense views will be challenged when these possibilities 
become real issues.

Richard wrote:
"My view has no paradoxes, is alone compatible with both strict 
materialism and the fact of qualia..."

I write:
There is no 'fact of qualia'. It is a theoretical construct. And 
there is no room in strict materialism for qualia. Let me state plainly
for all who are following this thread, there is no 
consensus among philosophers with regard to the existence of qualia.
Arguments pro and con can be found at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
 
Richard wrote:
"Why would you hold to a supernatural view that requires the 
creation of many non-physical mechanisms, leads to paradoxes and 
absurdities, and seems completely arbitrary (or rather, constructed 
for the express purpose of giving some hope to cryonicists)?

I write:
It's odd how we accuse each other of the same errors in thinking.
To my mind, you are the one assigning some mystical and 
special essence to the original QE, as if it's some Platonic ideal . 
To me, you're the one being arbitrary in deciding that a brain 
may be slightly damaged but not too damaged for the original 
QE to survive. And you're the one that endorses the non-physical 
when you assume the existence of qualia.

Richard writes:
"In my view, cryonicists need to face up to the problem of identity, 
abandon the 'information-theoretic' criteria of death, and 
acknowledge it is possible that even if a person's brain can be 
restored to operation through statistical inference or creation of 
memories from external sources, this does not mean the person's 
subjective inner life will continue, from before his suspension to 
afterwards.

I write:
We agree on many things and this is one. Cryonicists should 
indeed give serious consideration to these topics and understand 
that we do not have the answers. That even if the biological form
can be reanimated, it may or may not mean that the original self 
will return. I happen to believe that it is more likely than not. And,
of course, Alcor and CI should strive for better methods of 
preservation, but it is far too early to take on Richard's pessimistic
attitude.

Based on recent readings, the Theory of Mind most broadly
endorsed by the majority of cognitive psychologists, and 
a theory that is a satisfactory materialistic alternative is 
Functionalism. Richard is probably familiar with it already, 
but for those of you who want to read up on it, here's some
links:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V038
http://www.mind.ilstu.edu/curriculum/basics/functionalism1.html

Functionalism strikes me as a more palatable theory of mind 
for cryonicists and uploading enthusiasts.

Whew! I'm glad I'm on vacation and have enough time to 
investigate all this. But starting next week, it's back to the 
grind. Thanks to Richard and everyone else who contributed. 
I've learned a lot (though Richard probably disagrees).  8^D

Best regards,

Scott

=====
Wm Scott Badger, PhD

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