X-Message-Number: 25475
Date: Wed, 5 Jan 2005 08:46:36 -0500
From: Thomas Donaldson <>
Subject: CryoNet #25468 - #25472

For Mathew Sullivan:

Certainly we can set up multiple bodies with connections (not material
wires, but other kinds) between them. 

However by virtue of those connections (I note that I have no such
connections myself. Do you?) these bodies would not be duplicates of
ourselves.

I will add as someone who worked professionally with parallel computers
for a while (I don't do so any more, for reasons I will explain ---
nothing to do with parallel computing itself), it's far from clear
that these multiple connected bodies would have a mind or mind(s)
in any way like yours or mine. So even our selves would not continue
in that form. Perhaps this will be good, perhaps bad, but it's
certainly true that even our minds could not be duplicates.

You do raise an interesting offshoot from the arguments about QEs 
and identity which have filled Cryonet for the last few weeks, but
I don't see its direct relevance to those arguments.

             Best wishes and long long life for all,

                    Thomas Donaldson

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