X-Message-Number: 25535 Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 16:44:28 -0800 Subject: More of the Duplicates Paradox, to Jeff From: <> Dear Jeff, [snip] You wrote: "I submit that the 'correct answer' to this is like the 'correct answer' to the question, 'when does a person's life begin?'. There are so many different criteria which can reasonably be applied that there is no single objectively 'correct' answer." That is false. As soon as you define 'life', the question DOES have an objectively correct answer. And if you cannot define the words you are using, you have no business using them. In a similar fashion, once you define survive, as I have done before on many occassions, the answer to the question DOES have an objectively correct answer. When I go to sleep, if someone arranges my body so that I will see the moon when I wake up, then when I wake up, I will see the moon. If someone destroys me while I sleep, then creates two duplicates, with one facing the moon and one facing the sun, my contention is that I do not wake up up, and hence, that I see neither the moon nor the sun, because I was destroyed. Mike et al insist I do wake up. They have failed to answer the question, which one I see, the moon or the sun. Since if I do wake up, I will see either the moon or the sun, and not both, the answer to the question, 'What do I see?' has an answer, and it is either 'moon' or 'sun'. That is, if you grant that I wake up. I do not grant such a thing. When I am destroyed, I am destroyed. End of story. You wrote: "From my perspective, the thing we're really trying to decide when we discuss this paradox is, 'who gets what rights'?" That's inane. We aren't discussing which person gets rights, where discussing whether or not the inner subjective life of the original continues in the duplicate, after 6 hours of divergence, when I stab the original repeatedly with my life until he dies. You wrote: "Why should Mike have any *particular* interest in the fate of his original, since (given his claim that they are in fact identical), the death of either one is not a loss? I have two responses to this." No, we aren't discussing whether it constitutes a 'loss'. We are discussing whether or not the survival of the duplicate is and ought to be considered the survival of the original. Since Mike Perry believes that it is, he should allow me to kill him in the scenario I mentioned, as an academic exercise. But someone I don't think I would be able to convince him, even with strong painkillers, because Mike cannot possibly believe his own theory. If I stabbed him and he died, he would not be coming back in his duplicate. He would be dead. [snip] You wrote: "Most people seem to like the idea of doing or creating something in their lifetime that will contine after they're gone. Of course if I have the option, I'd rather not go in the first place. But given a choice between leaving behind a statue or a book or even an organization for others to remember me by, or leaving behind a duplicate to carry on my actual work, I'd definitely prefer the duplicate." I don't care what happens to the universe after I'm dead. Why should I? If some people think it is useful to have a duplicate running around, that's their business. But they cannot insist they survive in the duplicate if they die. That is plain silly. Best Regards, Richard B. R. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25535