X-Message-Number: 25571
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2005 07:24:47 -0800
Subject: The Duplicates Paradox
From: <>

Dear Henri,

You wrote:

"But according to chemistry when the original arrangement is 
restored,
the original relations and properties are restored too."

You are engaging in 'concept smuggling' here with your use of the 
word 'restored'. Specifically, you are trying to imbue a sense of 
continuity between a destroyed thing, and a created duplicate. 

When you 'restore' a model T, it is the same model T, only with 
better paint and new upholstery. It is this sense of the word 
'restore' you are invoking here, to create a fuzzy minded picture 
of what is actually going on---which is, the destruction of the 
original brain, and the subsequent *creation* (NOT restoration) of 
a largely similar duplicate brain.

You wrote:

"Here you state that the QE is destroyed by disassembly. There is 
no dispute about that, the dispute is about : Why is it not 
restored by re-assembly. (Because according to physics/chemistry it 
should!)"

More concept smuggling, indicated by the words: 'restored', 're-
assembly', and most insidiously, by the word 'it'. The use of the 
word 'it' in such instances requires a form of platonism, for it 
implies the existence of something even after it is destroyed.

I allow people to speak in such sloppy terms only if they are not 
engaged in debate. You are engaged in debate. Therefore, unless you 
wish to provide scientific proof for the existence of platonic 
forms, then do not use such a sentence as, 'it [referring to a 
thing that does not exist, as if it did exist] is not restored'.

There can be no 'restoration' or 'reassembly' of a thing that does 
not exist, because there is no 'thing that does not exist', since 
that would be a contradiction. Speaking precisely, there are only 
things that exist. These things can stop existing. But if something 
stops existing, there is no 'it' anymore. Don't talk as if there 
were.

[snip]

You wrote:

"To avoid discussion about definitions I will not state here that 
'the original' is recreated, but only that the reassembled system 
is the same as the original. I.e. it possesses the same physical 
properties, and exhibits the same physical behavior."

Great, I am glad we are agreed on this point, which not even Thomas 
could bring himself to admit: that the creation of a duplicate does 
not constitute 'recreation' of the original, but rather, only 
creation of a system having (roughly) the same physical properties, 
and exhibiting (roughly) the same physical behavior.

If creation of such a system *while you are alive* does your 
survival no good, then why do you think creation of such a system 
*after your death* will do your survival any good? Clearly, it will 
not. A duplicate may comfort others, but it won't be you.

You wrote:

"But when a system possesses the same physical properties, and 
exhibits the same physical behavior as the original, then there is 
no difference between it and the original."

That is false, since I can construct N systems that have roughly 
the same physical properties, and behave in roughly the same ways 
(don't use the word 'same', chaos theory and QM will contradict 
you), and yet they are still N systems. If they were *exactly* the 
same, in the sense that 2 + 2 is *exactly* the same as 4, then 
there would be 1, and not N.

As a fellow reductionist friend of mine has said, two atoms are not 
identical, and that's why we call them two atoms and not one.

You wrote:

"I can take a system of chemically bonded atoms, I can disassemble 
it
and then rebuild the exact original system."

Smuggled concepts indicated by these words: 'rebuild', 'exact', and 
'original'. Please clean up your arguments before presenting them 
in such fallacious form.

You wrote:

"According to physics it should be the same as the original."

There is a difference between X being *the same as* Y, and X 
*being* Y. If X *is* Y, then X is merely a different name for Y; 
i.e. they possess the same identity. If X is *the same as* Y, then 
this means they share all properties in a set S = { x | x is a 
measurable property that is not time or location }, but possess 
their own separate identities.

[snip]

You wrote:

"Now, when it concerns dead matter, this seems to constitute no 
problem. But when it concerns a system that is a substrate for a 
process that results in human intelligence, then suddenly, for some 
people, disassembly and re-assembly does not result in restoration 
anymore..."

Stop trying to smuggle concepts. Don't use the word restore or 
reassemble. They assume platonism.

[snip]

You wrote:

"I would like to know what Richard thinks about disassembly and 
reassembly of a simple water molecule. Do you also state that this 
does not result in restoration of the original molecule?"

You are trying to smuggle concepts again. There is no 'restore' or 
'reassemble'. There is only creation and destruction. You can 
destroy a water molecule. And you can create a water molecule. It 
is absurd to say you can recreate a water molecule that once 
existed.

You wrote:

"I think you do not to want to accept that you are only a process 
taking place in a system of atoms. And that when the system is 
frozen, this process stops."

Have you read the 100+ pages I have written to CryoNet? I have told 
others repeatedly, that (1) I am a hunk of matter residing in my 
skull, and (2) my subjective inner life is numerically identical to 
changes of a certain type happening to this hunk of matter. Item 
(2) in particular implies (with what we know of biology) that my 
subjective inner life stops happening to my brain during deep 
sleep, during unconsciousness, and yes, during cryonic suspension. 
This itself poses no problem for personal survival.

You wrote:

"Especially the fact that according to physics, copies can be made 
of the system, including the process, seems to bother you. 
Therefore you made your axiom : that when the process stops, it is 
gone for ever, and when it restarts it is not the same process 
anymore."

Processes do not exist, they happen, and you cannot under any 
circumstances compare processes, to say that one is the 'same' as 
another, or can 'restart'. Such talk is meaningless and absurd. You 
are flinging around English words in nonsensical ways.

You wrote:

"Your kind of reasoning seems similar to the assumption of certain 
biologists a couple of decades ago that 'a mysterious life-force' 
had to be present in all living matter."

On the contrary, it is your reasoning that assumes a mysterious 
life force. Subjectivity is a property localized to your skull. 
With this in mind, imagine two scenarios:

Scenario 1: We create a duplicate of you 1 million light years 
away. We then kill this duplicate. Your subjective inner life 
continues (i.e. you do not die). You never even knew about the 
duplicate.

Scenario 2: We create a duplicate of you 1 million light years 
away. We then kill you. According to you and other patternists, 
your subjective inner life continues in the duplicate (i.e. you do 
not die).

IF subjectivity is localized to your skull, then it would have to 
transfer at faster than light speeds from the skull of the original 
to the skull of the duplicate.

This implies both the existence of some 'mysterious essence' and 
some mechanism of the universe which can accomplish this transfer. 

Both are laughable and have no place in a modern reductionist, 
materialist view of the universe.

Best Regards,

Richard B. R.

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