X-Message-Number: 25588
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2005 23:53:23 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Re: Even More of the Duplicates Paradox
References: <>

Here I am answering Richard's response #25572 to my earlier posting #25549.

>What does it mean to say an individual A 'was' an individual B?

What I mean is that there should be an appropriate similarity in brain 
structure between the present and past versions of the person (A and B), 
plus certain other details of structure in A. Exact specification is not 
possible here. But based on the structural details, A would reasonably feel 
he had lived as B, that it had happened to him. (If such similarity 
existed, it would also transfer to any sufficiently close copy of the 
present person; the similarity and feeling of "I was B" would duplicate.)

>You simply observe the brain with MRI: did anything happen to it, to 
>destroy its ability to experience qualia? No, then you survive.

This really doesn't settle the matter. It doesn't prove that "I" will not 
suffer oblivion and someone else take my place who only thinks they are me 
(or for that matter, thinks they are someone quite different, due to 
certain allowable changes).

>You think there is something mystical about the qualia experiencer. There 
>is not. It is a hunk of brain matter in your skull."

It seems to me to be that your QE is a kind of general-purpose device, like 
a computer whereas the person it "runs" is like an application running on 
the computer, a distinct and different entity. So actually, I don't think 
the hunk of matter is what "experiences" in a direct sense--the person 
experiences. (And the person, I think, is best regarded as a process not a 
physical object. So persons "happen" but don't "exist" in the same way a 
chunk of inert matter can be said to "exist"--if it can be. Matter is also 
constantly changing, even if slowly, and it may be that waves "particle" 
rather than the other way around.)

>Let's say we want to see if an apple we place on the countertop survives 
>until the next day, and is not replaced by some other apple while we 
>sleep. How do we do this? We place a video camera on the apple, so we can 
>check it in the morning. If we see it is not replaced by another apple, 
>then we are justified in concluding it is the same apple.

There is an important difference between an apple and a person. The apple 
has no subjective inner life. As far as *we* are concerned, sure, the apple 
survives. The apple has no person or "soul" inside that, for instance, 
could be replaced by another such entity that only thinks it is the 
original. So we don't address the matter further.

>The many worlds scenario has no scientific evidence, [snip]

I would say that there is *some* scientific evidence favoring many-worlds, 
but alternatives cannot be discounted either--certainly the case is not 
closed either way. Some interesting pro-MWI arguments are presented in *The 
Fabric of Reality* by David Deutsch, a quantum computer theorist who 
clearly believes in it.

>In any case, whether or not MWI is compatible with survival is a different 
>question entirely, one that could not be resolved without much better 
>understanding of the process by which MRI occurred.

I agree, but at least it suggests there could be trouble with any idea of a 
persisting, single QE. (Actually, though, even if it is persisting I am 
unpersuaded that it should be considered the "soul"--see my comment above.)

>I can clear my mind of all memories and all personality during deep 
>meditation. It is clear I still exist.

During this period you haven't lost your memories or other personality 
features; they will return later and it is not necessary to be directly 
aware of all features of yourself (including past versions of yourself) at 
all times.

>If I asked you, in the moon-sun scenario, when I fall asleep, "What will I 
>see when I wake up?", you can give me no answer.

Here is my answer: "You" will experience a random event--in this case, 
seeing the sun or the moon. And, "you" will find that a double is now in 
existence who will have had the alternate experience (seeing what "you" 
didn't see). This is what both continuers of the present "you" will agree, 
afterward, happened, and it seems reasonable to me. I realize this is 
highly informal, but I hope the general sense is clear. (I also realize you 
have a different concept of "you" -- my answer is from my point of view.)

I wrote: Okay, but now we are separate individuals, who only *were* some 
one entity, not presently *are* that entity. So if you kill one, the one 
does not survive, only the other.

>So I take it you would never have a major operation in which the 
>anesthesiologist gave you an amnesiac? As I said before, the cases are 
>identical.

The cases are related, I wouldn't say identical--the devil's in the 
details, as they say. I might have the operation you refer to. And I 
wouldn't say I would never consent to being offed if, in the future, there 
was some recently created near-duplicate who, at the time, had almost the 
same brain information I did, even though we did have some differences. It 
might, under suitable circumstances, amount to no more than a slight 
rearrangement of insignificant detail, with some passage of time, and not 
be a problem from my perspective. But let me see and understand those 
details first.

>Surely you realize that no matter how closely you copy a 'pattern', it 
>will have numerous imperfections and the limitations of QM and chaos 
>theory, especially if the pattern has been disrupted by freezing. So how 
>you would ever expect to 'survive' cryonics and uploading is a mystery.

And as it happens, the "me" of today must be reduced to memories and other 
brain attributes and can only survive in the future in that form, as my 
future continuer or continuers remember or otherwise have experiences that 
depend on these stored attributes. So granted things get pushed around, 
still I am hopeful that cryonics and/or uploading will not do substantially 
more of this "pushing" than what now happens. If a past "me" can survive in 
memories and such, it should be able to survive these other happenings too. 
(I have more to say in my book on the issue of very longterm survival, 
where I consider the notion of "convergence" of a being, over infinite 
time, to a condition of possessing a fixed body of attributes, infinite in 
amount or complexity.)

>Your notion of survival is not testable, it's just a definition, a useless 
>one at that (from the perspective of my self-interest).

By "testable" I mean in principle I should be able to compare a 
brain-record of A with a brain-record of B, both sufficiently detailed, to 
see if A corresponds to a person who would remember being B. And I realize 
that your notion of survival, as you define it, is testable too--in 
part--but I think an important part is glossed over. You could decide if 
the QE is present (according to your notion of being present) at all times. 
But you go on to equate this notion with the stronger notion that "you" 
subjectively survive, and are guaranteed not to be replaced by some other 
individual who only thinks they are you. That is the part that is not 
testable, as I see it. I would not make such a claim for my notion of 
survival (or yours either, naturally). I think such a matter is simply 
unknowable.

Best wishes,

Mike Perry

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