X-Message-Number: 26620
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2005 00:26:27 -0400
From: 
Subject: Reply to Valera Retyunin

Valera Retyunin asks me questions, in a post above in today's queue.

I wrote:
> > And yes, I do comprehend the idea that
> > any "originality" attributable to the word processor printed document is
> > purely conceptual.  I also happen to think that any "originality"
> > attributable to an apple or a human, is also purely conceptual.

Valera wrote:
>It depends on what exactly in the human, apple or computer file matters to
>you. If there was a living and conscious file, whose life (the existence of
>a particular set of atoms with a particular set of properties) you really
>wanted to preserve, copying the file obviously wouldn't help. The "original"
>file's originality would not be purely conceptual. Nor is the originality of
>you if we define your personal survival as the survival of you who is now
>reading these words, not just the survival of any of your "prints" who's
>just thinking they are you and communicates with the world in the same way
>as you do.

Also in a post above in today's queue, Thomas Donaldson astutely points out 
the seeming association of RBR's position with the idea of a "soul".  It 
appears that you also fall prey to this delusion.  I am also jealous that 
Thomas pointed this out, since I thought of it myself yesterday and decided 
for the sake of clarity to restrict my posting yesterday to pointing out 
the logical fallacy in RBR's argument :-)

Valera wrote:
>Does you belief that the originality of a human is purely conceptual mean
>that, for instance, you would settle for an exact copy of your child if the
>"purely conceptual" original was taken away from you? Would the murder of
>someone dear to you be as inessential as the deletion of a file's copy if
>you got an exact copy of that person in return?

These types of questions are about as meaningful as ones that include the 
computer that can be conceived of that can do utterly anything, but of 
course no one can build it.  However, I will humor you along and give that 
somebody might be able to produce "an exact copy" of my child after the 
"original" was "taken away" (emotional euphemism for "destroyed," I 
presume).  In that case, yes, I would be delighted, if it was Bob.  If it 
were my son Roy, I would sue the bastard who did it.  Your next question 
also assumes the ability of someone to produce an exact copy - someone dear 
to me is murdered and would I be sad, yes.  If someone then gave me an 
exact copy would I be glad, yes.  Would I prefer the former?  Yes, it would 
avoid all manner of administrative, legal, and other timewasting headaches 
to sort through.   So it goes.

Now if and when someone CAN build an exact copy of a human, right down to 
the memories at T point of build, I could emotionally handle the new entity 
in either scenario - the old one is gone, or the new one goes on to build a 
different future from the old but still existing one.  Could you handle 
both of those, or are you wrapped up in soul ideas?

I wrote:
> > RBR accuses me of "mangling concepts with things," so I conclude from this
> > that he thinks that some things most of us think of as "things" such as
> > your Sunday newspaper, are less real than things such as apples.

Valera wrote:
>I don't believe he thinks your Sunday newspaper is less real than yourself.
>It's just that the newspaper's originality is unimportant, in stark contrast
>(I assume) to yours.

So it is all in one's personal conception of what is 
important/unimportant??!  Hey.  This mindset borders on solipsism!  (Google 
it, readers)

I wrote:
> > In speaking of my two identical word processor printed documents, RBR says
> > "When you printed out two 'copies', you created two arrangements.
> > They are distinct from each other, but similar. Labeling one as the
> > 'original' and the other as a 'copy' is disingenous."  I agree.  I also
> > fail to see the difference between them and an apple or a human.  A tree
> > can create untold numbers of essentially identical apples.  Twin birth,
> > cloning, etc. can create essentially identical humans.  Why not also call
> > them "arrangements"?

Valera wrote:
>Why not. But twins are *widely* viewed as two *different* arrangements,
>aren't they? Or do you also consider them essentially one and the same
>person?

No, I do not.  I consider them two different entities, though essentially 
identical to begin with.  However, RBR only considers "unimportant" things 
like word processor documents and newspapers to be "arrangements."  If you 
will note his last post, he only considers things like humans and apples to 
be something higher than "arrrangements".  And my post was actually focused 
on demonstrating the fallacy of his argument, not in engaging in the 
semantic aspects of it.

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