X-Message-Number: 26645
Date: Sat, 16 Jul 2005 20:08:02 -0700
Subject: Definite Answers, to Charles
From: <>

> I'm arriving late in this discussion, so maybe I missed
> something previously stated, but it touches an area of
> special concern to me.

Yes, I have discussed this previously, but I am happy to repeat it.

> rbr says "annihilation" and so do I. But where does rbr draw
> the line? Suppose he is cryopreserved imperfectly and then
> resuscitated after some repairs that were necessary as a
> result of incomplete cryoprotection. Suppose half his brain
> is accurately rebuilt as a copy. Has he been annihilated or
> not? Suppose only one-quarter of the brain is rebuilt ... or
> three-quarters ... or 99 percent ... or 1 percent.

Since by 'me', I mean an arrangement of atoms that facilitates 
subjective experience (and I think we would both agree, this is the 
most fundamental component of who we are), the answer to your 
question is that I stop existing when my brain is arranged so that 
it longer possesses the ability to experience subjectivity.

Is that 99%, 50%, or 1%? I can't say. The answer to the question 
requires advancing the science of experience. As I mentioned to 
someone else recently, we must first determine the ground rules for 
experience: what does an 'experiencing circuit' look like? What are 
its properties? What is the smallest possible experiencing circuit? 
Etc.

Then, and only then, will your 'fuzzy' questions have known 
answers.

> Do "I" care if "I" am revived after 3 minutes? Yes.  After 60
> minutes? Probably. After 100 years? Not so sure.

Time is irrelevant. The only thing that matters to your survival is 
the continued existence of the mechanism by which you experience. 
We don't know what that mechanism is, so we can't say (precisely) 
what degree of damage it can sustain.

> Everyone has a visceral, subjective idea of when the period
> of downtime or the process of repair becomes so extensive,
> the break in continuity is unacceptable. Trying to define
> this as a universal principle does not make sense to me,
> because the sense of self itself is entirely a subjective
> thing.

No offense, but this reeks of relativism. Survival is not a 
subjective issue. Dying tonight in my sleep is qualitatively 
different than not dying. In every single case of damage + repair, 
there is an objective answer to the question, 'Did I have a last 
experience [i.e. did I die]?' We cannot yet answer that question in 
the case of cryonics cases, but it does have an answer, and one day 
we will know it.

Richard B. Riddick

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