X-Message-Number: 26660
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2005 23:54:52 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Importance of RBR's Notion of Survival
References: <>

Richard B.R. in a recent posting analyzed an argument I was making as follows:


1. Reality may be splitting into multiple copies.

2. If (1) is true, the original QE does not survive from one
instant to the next.

3. If (2) is true, any physically possible definition of 'survival'
does not require 'sameness of identity' (as I have previously
defined it).

4. If (3) is true, then any objection to chemopreservation on
ground that it violates sameness of identity is invalid.


All the above is basically true, but it overlooks the really *main* point I 
was trying to make, that I think Richard's whole notion of "identity" is 
unimportant, that is to say, whether this identity survives or not is, in 
and of itself, unimportant. And I am well aware that even if the 
many-worlds theory is true in some reasonable sense, it does not guarantee 
that splitting as I refer to it is actually happening. In my posting I do 
say that "maybe it isn't." Okay, but at present we can't rule out the 
possibility, which if true, would imply (3) above. We would *then* have to 
look for a different notion of "survival" or just give up in despair. And I 
made the point that, if (1) were true, life would still go on as we see it 
(more properly, life *could* still go on as usual, as far as we can tell). 
Since we can't tell, experientially, if we are splitting all the time, and 
thus by Richard's criterion, dying all the time, it strongly suggests to me 
that his criterion of survival again should be considered unimportant. 
Different notions of "identity" and "survival" are called for, that would 
be robust enough that survival of many-worlds splitting would be possible.

I think there are some arguments closer to home that also call into 
question the importance of Richard's concept of identity/survival. These 
have to do, again, with bifurcation.

Argument 1: splitting the QE (non-many-worlds version). This is an 
elaboration of another recent posting of mine. A QE could in principle be 
split into two independently functioning QEs. If this happened even 
briefly, and the two were then merged again, no matter, the original person 
(with the original QE) did not survive. The resulting reconstruction, for 
Richard, is no better than cremation as far as the original's survival is 
concerned. Experientially, though, "I" can imagine, I think, what it would 
be like to undergo such an experience. I put "I" in quotation marks here 
hoping it will be understood that my notion of "I" is not the same as 
Richard's. I hope the meaning will be clear--otherwise I'd have to do some 
careful tagging (color-coding, for instance). Anyway, suppose my brain is 
split into two functioning persons, two QEs, for five minutes, then 
rejoined. (This I imagine might happen through actual physical separation 
of the brain components, or by some chemical means, such as selective 
anesthesia, or maybe even from extreme fatigue, cold, hunger, whatever.) 
Anyway, afterward I (the "I" or person that emerges) simply has, perhaps, 
slightly peculiar memories of the five-minute period--assuming that the 
memories accumulated during this time were in fact sufficiently preserved. 
Maybe, for instance, one of the two parts would understand a certain 
mathematical formula but not recognize a musical tune being played, and 
vice versa for the other. So I could have two minor, conflicting memories, 
of being on one hand able to understand the math but not recognize the 
tune, and on the other, just the opposite. The thought that *in an 
important sense* it is not *at all* the same "I" that exists before and 
after the 5-minute interlude, that cremation would have been no worse, 
would seem farfetched, putting it mildly. Okay, still if by Richards' 
criteria "I" didn't survive--so what? "I" would still survive in the ways I 
consider important, and maybe be better off for the experience I'd had.

Argument 2: ambiguity. Say that we start with one conscious QE and split it 
in two by selective anesthesia. So now we have two conscious QEs. We then 
further anesthetize the whole so now, apparently, we have two dormant QEs 
since they have both been knocked out. But on the other hand, we could have 
just as well administered the full anesthesia right from the start, so, 
since we started with one QE, we would then have only one dormant QE. Yet 
our one dormant QE, with reasonable assumptions about particulars, is 
identical to the two-dormant case. So really, how many dormant QEs do we 
have here? On this basis then, it might be argued that a dormant QE cannot 
be said to be, unambiguously, the same entity as when it was awake. More 
properly, I suppose what we'd have to say is that for *some* QEs (at least) 
an ambiguity of the sort I've indicated must arise when they are made 
dormant (according to *some* protocols at least, that can reasonably be 
said to be merely dormantizing and not destroying). But if this possibility 
holds to the extent that I think it does, at minimum it is a further 
serious suggestion that this whole idea of identity/survival is 
unimportant. Something different is called for.

Richard makes other points in his recent postings which I hope to address 
in due course.

Best wishes to all,

Mike Perry

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