X-Message-Number: 26660 Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2005 23:54:52 -0700 From: Mike Perry <> Subject: Importance of RBR's Notion of Survival References: <> Richard B.R. in a recent posting analyzed an argument I was making as follows: 1. Reality may be splitting into multiple copies. 2. If (1) is true, the original QE does not survive from one instant to the next. 3. If (2) is true, any physically possible definition of 'survival' does not require 'sameness of identity' (as I have previously defined it). 4. If (3) is true, then any objection to chemopreservation on ground that it violates sameness of identity is invalid. All the above is basically true, but it overlooks the really *main* point I was trying to make, that I think Richard's whole notion of "identity" is unimportant, that is to say, whether this identity survives or not is, in and of itself, unimportant. And I am well aware that even if the many-worlds theory is true in some reasonable sense, it does not guarantee that splitting as I refer to it is actually happening. In my posting I do say that "maybe it isn't." Okay, but at present we can't rule out the possibility, which if true, would imply (3) above. We would *then* have to look for a different notion of "survival" or just give up in despair. And I made the point that, if (1) were true, life would still go on as we see it (more properly, life *could* still go on as usual, as far as we can tell). Since we can't tell, experientially, if we are splitting all the time, and thus by Richard's criterion, dying all the time, it strongly suggests to me that his criterion of survival again should be considered unimportant. Different notions of "identity" and "survival" are called for, that would be robust enough that survival of many-worlds splitting would be possible. I think there are some arguments closer to home that also call into question the importance of Richard's concept of identity/survival. These have to do, again, with bifurcation. Argument 1: splitting the QE (non-many-worlds version). This is an elaboration of another recent posting of mine. A QE could in principle be split into two independently functioning QEs. If this happened even briefly, and the two were then merged again, no matter, the original person (with the original QE) did not survive. The resulting reconstruction, for Richard, is no better than cremation as far as the original's survival is concerned. Experientially, though, "I" can imagine, I think, what it would be like to undergo such an experience. I put "I" in quotation marks here hoping it will be understood that my notion of "I" is not the same as Richard's. I hope the meaning will be clear--otherwise I'd have to do some careful tagging (color-coding, for instance). Anyway, suppose my brain is split into two functioning persons, two QEs, for five minutes, then rejoined. (This I imagine might happen through actual physical separation of the brain components, or by some chemical means, such as selective anesthesia, or maybe even from extreme fatigue, cold, hunger, whatever.) Anyway, afterward I (the "I" or person that emerges) simply has, perhaps, slightly peculiar memories of the five-minute period--assuming that the memories accumulated during this time were in fact sufficiently preserved. Maybe, for instance, one of the two parts would understand a certain mathematical formula but not recognize a musical tune being played, and vice versa for the other. So I could have two minor, conflicting memories, of being on one hand able to understand the math but not recognize the tune, and on the other, just the opposite. The thought that *in an important sense* it is not *at all* the same "I" that exists before and after the 5-minute interlude, that cremation would have been no worse, would seem farfetched, putting it mildly. Okay, still if by Richards' criteria "I" didn't survive--so what? "I" would still survive in the ways I consider important, and maybe be better off for the experience I'd had. Argument 2: ambiguity. Say that we start with one conscious QE and split it in two by selective anesthesia. So now we have two conscious QEs. We then further anesthetize the whole so now, apparently, we have two dormant QEs since they have both been knocked out. But on the other hand, we could have just as well administered the full anesthesia right from the start, so, since we started with one QE, we would then have only one dormant QE. Yet our one dormant QE, with reasonable assumptions about particulars, is identical to the two-dormant case. So really, how many dormant QEs do we have here? On this basis then, it might be argued that a dormant QE cannot be said to be, unambiguously, the same entity as when it was awake. More properly, I suppose what we'd have to say is that for *some* QEs (at least) an ambiguity of the sort I've indicated must arise when they are made dormant (according to *some* protocols at least, that can reasonably be said to be merely dormantizing and not destroying). But if this possibility holds to the extent that I think it does, at minimum it is a further serious suggestion that this whole idea of identity/survival is unimportant. Something different is called for. Richard makes other points in his recent postings which I hope to address in due course. Best wishes to all, Mike Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=26660