X-Message-Number: 26673
Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2005 23:31:08 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Once More for RBR
References: <>

Here I intend to finish up my responses to Richard B. R.'s posting the 
other day.

>You see cryonics as beneficial because it increases the number of
>universes in which you 'survive'; essentially decreasing the
>proportion of universes in which you die.

No, I don't. It seems, for instance, you could make the case that the 
number of universes is denumerable infinity, as also the number in which 
you survive (pattern-wise, of course). So you can't increase (or decrease) 
the *number* of universes in which you survive. So, we ask, why choose 
cryonics?

If you look at things from the perspective of a hypothetical god who is 
apart from the multiverse, the whole system I think is deterministic. 
However, relative to some being within the system, it does to all 
appearances make a difference which path you take in any endeavor. Based on 
patternism and the idea of the multiverse and such, I see *some* form of 
survival and afterlife as probably inevitable after clinical death, no 
matter what you do. Duplicates or other continuers of you must recur. *But* 
the particular details will depend on the choices you make, just as they 
do, say, when skiing down a slope. And I must confess that, when it comes 
to such a "leap" as clinical death, I'm no sort of thrill-seeker but prefer 
a choice whose outcome is, as far as possible, something I can comfortably 
anticipate and imagine I half-comprehend. With cryonics I have a vision of 
taking an extended sleep--a few decades, a century, who knows?--but then 
being awakened in a more-or-less comprehensible world. A leap into the 
unknown--yes, but what am I getting into if I *don't* choose cryonics? A 
much bigger leap--seems to me--and really I want to take a conservative 
path here, if possible (and indeed I'd avoid this whole death/deanimation 
thing altogether if I could). Actually, I should be saying that the choices 
you make affect the probability weights for the various outcomes. If you 
choose cryonics, then yes, the other possibly weird outcomes are still all 
possible too, but their "likelihood" is diminished, perhaps very considerably.

That's one possible short answer. If you want to consider the idea that, 
without cryonics, your continuer ("you" that is) would be likely to be 
created by loving, advanced beings somewhere, and you'd be very happy 
there, I have some thoughts on that possibility. The upshot is that it's 
still better to take the more conservative approach--choose cryonics.

> > In any case, I don't accept Richard's position whole-cloth.
> > Simulation at the quantum level (which I think might be
> > necessary) would be too complicated for it to happen under
> > just any conditions--there is just not enough complexity.
>
>First, a comment: it is interesting you now believe that quantum
>simulations will be necessary for simulating a human brain.

I don't say that but "might be necessary." I am not such an absolutist as 
one might be tempted to conclude. Actually, since I wrote that I've heard 
of possible limits to quantum computing (the information may be harder to 
stabilize than they thought)--so this matter is very much undecided (I 
think) at this point.

>Now to return to the debate. IIWT will not be dismissed so easily.
>Why? Because you are assuming the complexity must reside entirely
>within the physical system. That's an arbitrary assumption you're
>making. In fact, to achieve a given simulation, there is a tradeoff
>between complexity of the physical system performing the
>simulation, and the interpretive scheme used to evaluate those
>results. By 'stuffing' more complexity into the interpretive
>scheme, you can achieve arbitrarily complex simulations (for
>example, the movement of one atom in a certain direction at a
>certain time might correspond to a whole host of quantum mechanical
>phenomena).

Why not just have an "interpretive scheme" that "works" on a system as null 
as possible--say, some tiny volume of space at some designated location 
inside the system itself? So you can make this system simulate anything you 
want--what does that prove? More reasonable to think that the interpreter 
itself, essentially, is the source of whatever is happening than that tiny 
void being "interpreted." No, I would assume instead an interpreter that is 
fixed for more than one "source" or thing interpreted. It should act 
somewhat in the manner of a *translator of text*, to produce a different 
sort of phenomenon from its source. There are limits to what one can expect 
with that very reasonable constraint.You won't find a civilization within a 
rock (toilet, whatever) in most cases, I'll wager, especially if you want 
to communicate with the inhabitants and get intelligent responses.

> > Or instead, why not consider the notion of annihilation--which
> > is more inclusive (usually) with Richard's idea of survival?
> > Should the burden of proof be on Richard, then, to show that
> > certain changes (loss of the QE-soul) amount to annihilation
> > where I would deny that they do?
>
>You would not deny that they do. You would insist that we lose our
>QE with every branch of the multiverse, and you would maintain that
>this is somehow not 'important'. If I misunderstand your view,
>please correct me.

No, you understand my view. I should have been more careful in my usage of 
"annihilation," adding "in a sense that seems important."

> > This would seem to depend on the attitude one takes about the
> > prospect of one's death. If the fear or concern over your own
> > death predominates, then you'd want to be as sure as possible
> > that "you" will truly survive, so the burden of proof, you
> > could say, would fall on the broader rather than the more
> > restrictive notion of survival.
>
>I agree this is true: the more concerned you are with your
>survival, the more careful you need to be (as Robert would say,
>preserve as much of everything as you can, to be as safe as
>possible).
>
>But I would go a step further. Your theory requires the existence
>of the multiverse and supernatural entities such as patterns and
>information, and leads to such absurdities as IIWT (which implies,
>among other things, that all possible and impossible things 'exist'
>in the same way that a person simulated on an advanced computer
>exists).

I wouldn't go quite that far--see above. (My understanding of 
"supernatural" differs from yours too.) However, I concede my system *is* 
more complicated, and for a very good reason. Your system has a dismal 
eschatology: the dead are never coming back. I have tried to reformulate 
notions of identity and survival based on different thinking about what is 
important. I think I have the beginning of a system with a better, more 
hopeful eschatology, which nevertheless is *not* supernatural as the term 
is usually understood. This (proto-)system may be hard for many to accept, 
and I must be as clear as possible about my meanings so people will not be 
misled. That I will try hard to do in the future.

Best wishes to all,

Mike Perry

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