X-Message-Number: 2694 From: Date: Thu, 21 Apr 94 14:10:03 EDT Subject: CRYONICS philosophy April 21, 1994 Heather Johnson via Cryonet > Subject: CRYONICS philosophy To Heather Johnson and anyone else who may be interested in an attempt to capsulize my current views on identity and related matters: In THE PROSPECT OF IMMORTALITY (1962 et seq) I made a flawed beginning on this topic, coming to no firm conclusion and omitting important aspects I thought of later, but clarifying some of the issues. In the intervening years I have thought about it further and, I think, made important advances, but still with no firm conclusion. I'll try here to summarize. Some of the details are available in past issues of THE IMMORTALIST, and there is much more in the draft of a new book I may finish if I live long enough before freezing, YOUNIVERSE: TOWARD A SELF-CENTERED PHILOSOPHY. First, to clear away some deadwood--nonsense notions that retain considerable support. I omit here most of the details. 1. The "information paradigm" is definitely wrong. The map is not the territory; isomorphism is not necessarily enough. Being (or life-as-we-know-it, LAWKI) is not characterized by the ability to converse (Turing), or by an input-output correlation. These can exist in a machine or system that has no subjectivity. Intelligence does not imply feeling, nor vice versa. 2. Memory/personality is not an acceptable criterion of identity, although it is extremely important. Memory and personality can and do change, and must. The degree of acceptable change over time is an unresolved question, and relates to further questions mentioned below. 3. A few writers have said that we are defined by our values. This is patently absurd, primarily because it is arbitrary; but also (a weaker reason) because it implies that people disjunct in space or time are the "same" if they have the same values, and you are a different person when your values change. (Of course you are indeed different when you change--in any respect--but we are looking for fundamental criteria, if such exist.) Over the years I have reached three main conclusions that I think will be useful: 1. Every feeling organism (one that has LAWKI) contains a subsystem (maybe localized, more likely distributed) that permits or creates feeling, hence constitutes the ground of being. (Non-feeling systems, however intelligent, are not beings or persons.) I call this subsystem the "self circuit," and it defines personhood. It may be a matter of degree and exist in some degree in all or many life forms; or it may be an all-or-nothing phenomenon, arising suddenly in relatively recent evolution. It may exist only in brains, or it may exist (in some rudimentary form) even in cells. In any event, it is a biological problem requiring biological investigation. The concept could be useful if it tends to focus investigation toward central rather than peripheral issues. The central issue is subjectivity. 2. The central question of personal life concerns values, which underlie goals or life plans. Values derive from wants. Wants are basically biological; certain events in the self circuit, or certain configurations, constitute satisfaction or its increase, or decrease of dissatisfaction. In other words, the goal of individual existence is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain; this of course was the starting point of the hedonists, epicureans, and utilitarians. But they quickly lost their way, because they lacked the necessary scientific tools. They did not know how to reconcile the many different kinds and degrees of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, or how to project probabilities over time. We don't either--but we are making progress. We can certainly say-- tentatively, at least--that the goal of an individual is to try to maximize personal satisfaction over future time. This will almost always set continued existence (survival) as the highest immediate value. 3. OPEN QUESTIONS: Certain crucial questions are simply unanswerable on present information. One concerns the nature of objective and subjective time; advances in both physics and biology are needed here. Another, already mentioned, concerns the nature of the self circuit and the number and types of fundamental satisfactions/dissatisfactions, and whether they are mutually compatible. Another concerns the complex, feedback relations between fundamental satisfactions and derivative ones. There are many important practical questions, such as how to distinguish true values from mere habits. There are the persistent continuity questions--whether disjunctions in time and space affect identity; theories in physics, such as what may underlie quantum theory, could be pertinent here. And over all we must keep in mind the difference between what we want and what we OUGHT to want. The primary problem of philosophy is to discover what we ought to want--on a rigorous, physical/biological basis. We aren't there yet, but the road ahead is reasonably clear. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=2694