X-Message-Number: 2713 Date: Sun, 1 May 1994 00:37:58 -0500 (CDT) From: Heather Johnson <> Subject: CRYONICS Many of you have written to the list expressing a sort of Cartesian justification for identity. That is, do we not consider ourselves to possess continuity from year to year despite the likely replacement of each atom in our bodies? The question seems to be posed rhetorically- I think most would have a difficult time saying that such continuity is not the case. (Descartes makes an equivalent argument in Meditations II in referring to a ball of wax.) I am a bit confused however, by the use of this argument in conjunction with what I perceive to be a fondness for materialism among cryonicists. This argument is usually cited to give evidence for the presence of the non-material component in existence. That is, if every material entity in my body is replaced throught the course of time, this seems to suggest that something non-material (and therefore it would seem, not subject to change) would account for my identity. Plato even goes so far as to say that the non-material (assuming it exists) is what is most real. This he justifies by making the assumption that what endures is most real. Since once again, the non-material is not subject to change it follows that it is the most durable thing. One quick question- I am curious, given the overwhelmingly negative reaction to Penrose's conclusions and the Copenhagen interpretation of QM in general, whether any of you are more comfortable with Bohm's hidden variable theory which preserves determinism? I apologize for this somewhat sketchy message- there has been a lot of rich material out there that I would like to say something about. Unfortunately, time is still of the essence... Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=2713