X-Message-Number: 2722
Subject: CRYONICS: More Replies to Heather Johnson
From:  (Ben Best)
Date: 	Wed, 4 May 1994 01:09:00 -0400

    A fundamental assumption of cryonics is that by preserving the
material brain in a frozen state, the brain may someday become
functional again -- resulting in reactivation of mind and identity.
People who believe that mind and identity reside in a non-material
"spirit" or "soul" are rarely interested in cryonics -- since they
believe that they need not preserve their material brain in order to
survive. Thus, you shouldn't be surprised at a "fondness for materialism
among cryonicists".

    The fact that all the individual atoms can apparently be replaced
in a material brain without compromising mind or identity is to be
expected within the materialist model. The nature of matter is such that
there are no discernable functional differences between individual
hydrogen, oxygen, carbon or nitrogen atoms. Any given carbon atom is
pretty much like any other carbon atom. Thus, it should make no
difference for identity to replace all the carbon atoms in the body with
other carbon atoms. Life and consciousness are like a candle flame --
the flame maintains its "identity", even though its constituent atoms
are continually changing. The candle flame is an entirely material
phenomenon, as are life and consciousness.

    I agree with Robert Ettinger's remarks about Plato, so I won't
repeat what he said. (In my opinion THE REPUBLIC is only a great book
if you make allowances for the context in which it was written. Which
definitely does not mean it is worth the time spent reading it.) The
materialist view is that the universe is governed by physical laws --
so it is rather paradoxical to interpret the existance of abstract (to
us) physical laws as proof of "spirit", or the non-material.

   I don't remember ever reading about a Cartesian justification of
identity based on continuity -- although my opening remarks addressed
this issue. As I understand it, Descartes is most famous for his Dualism
-- the assertion of the existence of both spirit and matter. He even
drew a diagram showing how spirit exerts its influence through the
pineal body (depicted in Patricia Churchland's NEUROPHILOSOPHY). I think
most philosophers are either "Idealists" (believing only in the reality
of spirit) or "Materialists" (believing only in the reality of matter).

   I am planning to write a detailed article on determinism in CANADIAN
CRYONICS NEWS, so I don't want to go too far with the question here.
Except to call attention to the fact that the question of determinism
as it applies to the human mind ("free will versus determinism") is
quite distinct from the question of determinism as it applies to quantum
mechanics. Feynman and other serious physicists have been emphatic in
stressing that the question of quantum uncertainty is unrelated to the
question of "free will". Even if a connection could be made, however,
and the position/momentum of subatomic particles were held to be
inherently random -- would the existence of "random will" really
constitute "freedom"?

   It also follows that the question of physical determinism is not
critical to the issue of materialism. Bohm's theory of hidden variables
is no more nor less materialist than the Copenhagen Interpretation,
"New Age" pseudoscientist airheads notwithstanding. Quantum uncertainty
does not disturb the structure of DNA enough toprevent the evolution
of life forms over hundreds of millions of years. Why should it be
critical to brain function? Especially when there is not a shred of
evidence that it is. Quantum "randomness" has a regularity that results
in predictability at the chemical level. Thus, I believe that chemistry
is a far more useful tool for understanding the biological processes of
the heart, kidney or brain than is quantum uncertainty.

                     -- Ben Best (ben.best%)

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